The Sujna Gokulji Zala Vedant Prize.

Essay for 1915.

"Disouss how far Sankaracharya truly represents the view of the author of the Brahmasutras."

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BY

M. T. TELIVALA, B. A., LL. B.,

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Motto. " ात्मा सदा निरस्तकुहकं परं धी हि."

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P EFACE.

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" ा ा ` दा निरस्तकुह ' ' परं धी हि".

"Discuss how far S'aṅkarâchârya truly represents the view of the author of Brahmasûtras."

The Sujna Gokulji Zala Vedanta Prize

Essay for the Year 1915.

Before taking up the main subject, let u advert to some preliminary points, which are worked out by commentators of the Brahma-sûtras. The first of these is:–who is the Adhikârin of this S'âstra ? In the S'ugâdhikaraṇa (1–3–34–38, B. S.), the Sûtrakâra declares that, among mortals, S'ûdras have no Adhikâra in this Vedic S'âstra, though a god has. Among the member of the first three castes who is the Adhikârin ? Of course the Traivarṇika must be learned in the Vedas, he must be capable of undertaking *S'ravaṇa, manana* etc., he must be possessed of some desire for spiritual elevation. These requirements are necessary, they re suggested, *arthâkshipta*, but beyond this, in the whole of the Brahma mîmânsâ, the Sûtrakâra does not consider the question of Adhikâra. However, S'aṇkara maintain that before one undertakes Brahma-Jijnâsâ, he ought to be possessed of the four requirements, viz. (1) नित्यानित्यवस्तुविवेक, (2) इहामुत्रार्थ-भोगविराग, (3) शमदमादिसाधनसम्पत्, and (4) मुमुक्षुत्व. These four requirements are, according to S'aṇk ra, *sine qua non* to the inquiry of Brahman, and these are, he think , suggested by the Sûtrakâra by the word 'अथ' in the 'अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा'. This 'अथ' is used in the sense of आनन्तर्य, and

presupposes the existence of the four requirements mentioned, above and not a कर्मावबोध. A knowledge of the Karma-mîmânsâ is no condition precedent to the study of Brahma-mîmânsâ. This is the view of S'aṇkarâchârya as regards अधिकार.

Bhâskara[1] and Râmânuja[2] both maintain धर्मानन्तर्य, and reject the आनन्तर्य of the above-mentioned four requirements.

It appears that the Sûtrakâra has in his mind neither of the two views. The 'अथ' suggests neither this nor that. 'अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा' is the first Sûtra of the Brahmamîmânsâ introducing the reader to the S'âstra. S'aṇkarâchârya rejects धर्मानन्तर्य on the grounds that ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा may precede धर्मजिज्ञासा of one who has studied Vedânta, and that there is nothing to establish the custom that धर्ममीमांसा must be studied before ब्र मीमांसा. By similar arguments, Vallabha[3] also comes to the same conclusion. To add to this, Bâdarâyaṇa and Jaimini are opposed in their views on this point, and as Prof. A. B. Dhruva remarked in his recent University lectures, a reader cannot be expected to study the works of the opponent before he studies his own, so a student of ब्रह्ममीमांसा does not necessarily need study धर्ममीमांसा before ब्रह्ममीमांसा. It is not disputed that some of the पूर्वमीमांसान्यायs are referred to here, but that does not compel us to come to the conclusion that a knowledge of धर्ममीमांसा is a condition precedent. Bhâskara accepts ज्ञानकर्मसमुच्चय, and says that this is the view of Bâdarâyaṇa expressed in 'सर्वापेक्षा च यज्ञादि-

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1. 'नित्यानित्यविवेकादयः अन्तःकरणधर्माः पूर्वत्राप्रकृताः स्वशब्देन चानिर्दिष्टाः कथमिव सूत्रकारस्य विवक्षिता इति प्रतिपत्तुं शक्यते' भा. भा. p. 4.

2. 'अपि च नित्यानित्यवस्तुविवेकादयः मीमांसाश्रवणमन्तरेण न संपत्स्यन्ते, फलप्रकरणे ति तैव्यताधिकारिविशेषनिश्चयादृते कर्मस्वरूपतत्फलतत्स्थिरत्वास्थिरत्वात्मनित्यत्वादीनां दुरवबोधात्' श्रीभाष्य, p. 13.

3. 'न तावद्धर्मानन्तर्यम्, विपर्ययसंभवात्, न च पाठतो नियमः, तत्रापि तथा, न च आचाराद्व्यवस्था, तत्रापि अनियमसंभवात्, प्रत्यवायाश्रवणात्' A. B. pp. 26–27.

श्रुतेरश्ववद्' (3-4-26). Even accepting for a moment Bhâskara's suggestion of ज्ञानकर्मसमुच्चय, it does not in the least invalidate S'aṅkara's argument—'धर्मजिज्ञासायाः प्रागपि अधीतवेदान्तस्य ब्रह्मजिज्ञासोपपत्तेः.' The Sûtra (3-4-26.) only says that a knowledge of कर्ममीमांसा is also recommended, but does not say it should necessarily precede the study of ब्रह्ममीमांसा. One may as well study ब्रह्ममीमांसा first, and then कर्ममीमांसा, or *vice versa*. There is no प्रत्यवाय prescribed whichever one begins first. Hence S'aṅkarâchârya, on this very argument alone, is right in rejecting धर्मानन्तर्य. But is he then right in prescribing the साधनचतुष्टयानन्तर्य? It is undoubted that this view does not suggest itself from the words of the Sûtrakâra. S'aṅkara's शमदमादिसाधनसंपत्ति is based on the passage of the Bṛihadâraṇyaka 4-4-23, but that passage refers to the stage of a person who has[1] known Brahman. Before one knows Brahman it is impossible for him to be possessed of शमदमादि, while according to S'aṅkara's view शमदमादि must precede ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा. This is rather placing the cart before the horse. One may never have शमदमादि, and then he will always he debarred from studying this ब्रह्ममीमांसा. The result would be शास्त्रोच्छेद. Vallabha[2] says that this view is opposed to our daily experience. The [3]sûtra (1-1-1) only introduces the reader to the study of Brahmamîmânsâ, and there neither appears any suggestion of धर्मानन्तर्य nor साधनचतुष्टयानन्तर्य. Both the views are not countenanced by the Sûtrakâra. Of course a knowledge of the Upanishads seems to be necessary for the right understanding of ब्रह्ममीमांसा. This knowledge of the Veda and a sort of earnest desire for knowledge of

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1. 'एष नित्यो महिमा ब्राह्मणस्य ××× य एवं वेद' 4–4–23. Br. Upa.

2. 'इदानीन्तनानामपि शमदमादिरहितानां निर्विचिकित्सितवेदार्थज्ञानोपलब्धेः' A. B. B. S. S. p. 32.

3. अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा.

अविद्याकल्पितभेदनिवृत्तिपरत्वात् शास्त्रस्य, न हि शास्त्रं इदंतया विषयभूतं ब्रह्म प्रतिपादयति, किं तर्हि, प्रत्यगात्मत्वेन अविषयतया प्रतिपादयदविद्याकल्पितं वेद्यवेदितृ-वेदनादिभेदमपनयति' 1-1-4. V. S. From the very undertaking of investigation and definition of Brahman by the Sûtrakâra, it is quite clear that S'aṇkara is not justified in making the above remark. Bâdarâyaṇa's whole system is entirely based on the words of श्रुति, so the duty of his commentator is not to modify or correct his statements, but simply to put them in their true light. The aim of the S'âstra is not merely the removal of अविद्याकल्पितभेद but the realisation of Brahman. Except श्रुति and तदनुसारिस्मृति, the Sûtrakâra does not take the aid of any other प्रमाण in support of his system. S'aṇkara also does not say that he accepts any more प्रमाणs. The later S'âṅkara writers accept six Pramâṇas, but with that we are not concerned. If S'aṇkara had maintained the position as declared[1] by him in दृश्यते तु । (2-1-6) throughout, we should have seen him entirely at one with the Sûtrakâra. Looking at S'ankara's Bhâshya as a whole, one sees a sort of contradiction running throughout, so far as his attitude to the S'âstra is concerned. While meeting the Mîmânsakas, he draws a distinction[2] between पुरुषतन्त्रत्व and वस्तुतन्त्रत्व. धर्म is पुरुषतन्त्र, and as such does not admit of any reasoning independent of Veda, while Brahman is वस्तुतन्त्र, and as such, admits the claims of reasoning. But when the Saṇkhya opposes him, he declares, as is said above, that the conception of Brahman like धर्म is based on Scripture alone, and does not admit of any प्रमाण independent of Veda (2-1-6). If S'aṇkara had

1. 'यत्तूक्तं परिनिष्पन्नत्वाद् ब्रह्मणि प्रमाणान्तराणि संभवेयुरिति, तदपि मनोरथमात्रम्, रूपाद्यभावाद् हि नायं अर्थः प्रत्यक्षस्य गोचरः, लिंगाद्यभावाच्च नानुमानादीनाम्, आगममात्र-समधिगम्य एव तु अयमर्थो धर्मवत् ××× श्रुत्यनुगृहीत एव ह्यत्र तर्कोऽनुभवांगत्वेन आश्रीयते ।' 2–1–6.

2. अतो न पुरुषव्यापारतन्त्रा ब्रह्मविद्या, किं तर्हि, प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणविषयवस्तुज्ञानवत् वस्तुतंत्रा एव । 1–1–4–S. B.

avoided this contradiction, and adhered to the view expressed in 2-1-6, his faithfulness to the Sûtrakâra would have been greatly enhanced.

Bâdarâyaṇa's attitude towards his opponents, though queer, is justified on the ground that it is consistent. When difficulties are raised against his system by a Sâṇkhya or a Vais'eshika, he says his system is based on श्रुति alone, and as such has nothing to do with reasoning, 2-1-29. But his opponents, as they accept तर्क, cannot take advantage of this position. As they resort to तर्क, he challenges their position by तर्क. S'aṇkara fitly remarks on this point thus:—'अपि च आगमबलेन ब्रह्मवादी कारणादिस्वरूपं निरूपयतीति नावश्यं तस्य यथादृष्टमेव सर्वमभ्युपगन्तव्यमिति नियमोऽस्ति, परस्य तु दृष्टान्तबलेन कारणादिस्वरूपं निरूपयतो यथादृष्टमेव सर्वमभ्युपगन्तव्यमित्यस्त्यतिशयः 2-2-38.' This is a very faithful way of expressing the Sûtrakâra's view, and had S'aṇkara followed the same, he would not have embodied two contradictory interpretations as in 1-1-11-18, 2-1-27, 2-1-29, etc. etc.

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Brahman is the centre round which the whole philosophy and theology of the Upanishads turn. In the first Sûtra, 'अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा', the Sûtrakâra undertakes an investigation of Brahman, and then immediately in the next Sûtra gives the definition of Brahman, 'जन्माद्यस्य यतः', as that in which the world has origination, existence and absorption. It is worthy of note that the Sûtrakâra, instead of defining Brahman as 'सत्यं ज्ञानं अनन्तं ब्रह्म' 'सत्यं ानं आनन्दं ब्रह्म,' instead of giving स्वरूपलक्षण, gives कार्यलक्षण, by declaring that the Brahman of which he has undertaken investigation, is the creator of the Universe. In 'शास्त्रयोनित्वात्', he declares further that his definition of Brahman is

ntirely based on Scripture. Brahman is शास्त्रैकसमधिगम्य. The Sûtra 'जन्माद्यस्य यतः' is very important. S'aṇkara also says that it gives the definition of Brahman. This लक्षण must be referred to the Brahman whose जिज्ञासा has been undertaken in the first Sûtra. Instead of defining Brahman as 'सच्चिदानन्द', Bâdarayaṇa declares Brahman as that which creates, sustains and absorbs the universe, the reason for this being that the Sûtrakâra has not in his mind only the summary of the leading tenets of the Upanishads, but a desire to clear every Vedic passage of importance of any doubt or difficulty by giving its interpretation. To the mind of the Sûtrakâra, the tenets of the Sâṇkhya's were most prominent. This fact can be inferred from the boundless zeal with which he refutes the principal dogmas of the Sâṇkhyas. On every occasion, he makes a polemic remark against the Sâṇkhya. Now these Sâṇkhyas attributed activity not to Brahman–or more correctly to Purusha, but to *jada* प्रकृति, while the पुरुष was *chetana* but निष्क्रिय etc. Many of the Vedic thinkers themselves were under the spell of the Sâṇkhyas. Thus, this was the crucial point, on which it was essential for the Sûtrakâra, interpreter as he was of the Upanishads, to pronounce a very definite opinion, and this the Sûtrakâra has done by declaring that Brahman is that which creates, sustains, and resolves the world in itself, thereby tacitly rejecting the Sâṇkhya doctrines of पुरुष's being निष्क्रिय and प्रकृति's being कर्त्री. Similarly, by writing the Sûtra 'शास्त्रयोनित्वात्', he boldly declares that his definition of Brahman is entirely based on scripture, meaning thereby that the S'âstra teaches the कर्तृत्व of Brahman and not of प्रकृति. Thus it appears that the learned Sûtrakâra at one stroke achieves two objects, viz. he sets aside the doubts of the Vedic passages, and then with it pronounces a definite view that, Brahma , the

highest entity of the Upanishads, is possessed of activity, and therefore of knowledge also. Thus in 'जन्माद्यस्य यतः,' Brahm n as *sad* is shown to be the cause. In ईक्षत्यधिकरण, Brahman, as *chetana*, is shown to be the cause of the universe. In आनन्दमयाधिकरण, the same Brahman, as *Ânanda-maya*, is declared to be the cause. In जन्माधिकरण Brahman as *sad*, in ईक्षत्यधिकरण as *chetana*, and in आनन्दमयाधिकरण as *ânanda*, is declared to be the cause of the universe. *Îkshati* and *kâma* being the attributes of *chetana* something, the causality of the non-intelligent *prakṛiti* etc., is out of question. Similarly 'नेतरोनुपपत्तेः' sets aside the causality of the human soul, though he is *chetana*. Thus, the learned Sûtrakâra, while setting aside the doubt as to कर्तृत्व and कारणत्व of the universe, suggests and establishes that the same *Kartṛi* and *Kâraṇa* Brahman is सच्चिदानन्द. In other words, सच्चिदानन्द Brahman as सत्, चित्-and आनन्द is the material nd efficient cause of the universe, and not *jada Prakṛiti* nor *chetana jîva*. Thus by showing the causality of Brahman alone, and suggesting thereby Brahman's unfettered ctivity, the Sûtrakâra has established that the same Brahman is सच्चिदानन्द. After once declaring in brief his conception of Brahma , the Sûtrakâra proceeds to show that, words bearing other senses elsewhere, refer to Brahman alone in the Upanishads, and even while doing so, he does bring o t some essential characteristics of Brahm n. With this double end in view, he seems to arrange his latter portion of the first chapter. Hence, आनन्दमय, अन्तर आदित्य, आकाश, प्राण, परो दि ो ज्योतिः, प्राण, मनोमय प्राणशरीर, अत्ता, अन्तर, अन्तर्यामिन् अदृश्य, वैश्वानर, द्युभ्वाद्यायतन, भूमन्, अक्षर, दहर, अंगुष्ठमात्र, प्राण, ज्योतिः, आकाश and विज्ञानमय are all Brahman. 'गुहां प्रवि ै' refers to Brahman and jîvâtman, *Samprasâda* refers to Brahman. One clearly sees here that the aim of the Sûtrakâra is not only to say that these words refer to Brahman, but that they do

individually bring out a certain attribute of Brahman. The Sûtrakâra, by following this method, develops, and perfects his conception of Brahman, the investigation of which he has proposed to undertake in 'अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा', and whose definition he has given in 'जन्माद्यस्य यतः'.

S'aṇkara in 'जन्माद्यस्य यतः' 1-1-2. observes as follows: 'यत इति कारणनिर्देशः, अस्य जगतो नामरूपाभ्यां व्याकृतस्य अनेककर्तृभोक्तृसंयुक्तस्य प्रतिनियतदेशकालनिमित्तक्रियाफलाश्रयस्य मनसाप्यचिन्त्यरचनारूपस्य जन्मस्थितिभंगं यतः सर्वज्ञात् सर्वशक्तेः कारणाद् भवति तद् ब्रह्मेति वाक्यशेषः'. From this it can be seen that Brahman which is being investigated by the Sûtrakâra is *sarvajna*, *sarvashaktimat*, and, therefore, *kartri* also according to his view as interpreted by S'aṇkara here. The Sûtrakâra's *jijnâsâ* thus refers to Brahman which is सर्वज्ञ, सर्वशक्तिमत्, कर्तृ etc., and शा समन्वय, established in the following Sûtras, refers to the same Brahman; while according to S'aṇkara, the जिज्ञासा and the समन्वय both refer to निर्विशेष Brahman. In 'तत्तु समन्वयात्' (1-1-4), S'aṇkara observes:—'इदं तु पारमार्थिकं कूटस्थं नित्यं व्योमवत् सर्वव्यापि सर्वविक्रियारहितं नित्यतृप्तं निरवयवं स्वयंज्योतिःस्वभावं × × × अतस्तद् ब्रह्म यस्य जिज्ञासा प्रस्तुता.' In 'तदनन्यत्वमारंभणशब्दादिभ्यः' (2-1-14), S'aṇkara labours to show that, in adopting the ideal of अत्यन्त निर्विशेष Brahman, he does not violate the *pratijnâ* of the Sûtrakâra expressed in 'जन्माद्यस्य यतः' 1-1-2. The fact that throughout the latter portion of the Brahmamîmânsâ, Brahman is described as possessed of some attributes, confirms the view that the Sûtrakâra has not in his mind the जिज्ञासा and शा समन्वय that S'aṇkara wants to impose upon him in the समन्वयसूत्र, 1-1-4. Vallabha also says, 'न च येन रूपेण समन्वयो मतान्तरस्थैः विचारितः तथाग्रे सूत्रेषु निर्णयो स्ति', 1-1-4. p. 115. Kes'ava Bhatta Kâs'mîrin, after showing the contradiction between the views of the Sûtrakâra and S'aṇkara, observes that, according to the reasoning of S'aṇkara, there can neither be anything like जिज्ञास्यब्रह्मन्, nor even शास्त्रारंभ. 'परमते तु जि ास्यो दुरुपपादः × × × परमते तु

विषयस्य दुर्निरूपत्वेन शा ारंभोऽसंभव एव × × विकल्पासहत्वात्' etc., 1-1-1. ब्रह्मसूत्रवृत्ति, pp. 22. 23, निम्बार्कभाष्य. Thus the ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा of the Sûtrakâra, and that of S'aṇkara are different. S'aṇkara's ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा does not refer to Sûtrakâra's Brahman strictly speaking. S'aṇkara tries to bridge over this difficulty by splitting the Sûtrakâra's conception of one Brahman into twofold. S'aṇkara's introduction to आनन्दमयाधिकरण gives a very clear insight into his view of two Brahmans. According to S'aṇkara's own statement, the first ten Sûtras of Bâdarâyaṇa refer to Brahman which is सर्वज्ञ, सर्वशक्तिमत्, ईश्वर and जन्मस्थितिलयकारण of जगत्, and that it is *chetana*, and not *jada prakriti*. The scope of the Vedânta sûtras then following is thus explained by him:—'द्विरूपं हि ब्रह्मावगम्यते, नामरूपविकारभेदोपाधिविशिष्टं, तद्विपरीतं च सर्वोपाधिविवर्जितं × × × एवमेकमपि ब्रह्म अपेक्षितोपाधिसंबन्धं निरस्तोपाधिसंबन्धं चोपास्यत्वेन ज्ञेयत्वेन च वेदान्तेषूपदिश्यते इति प्रदर्शयितुं परो ग्रन्थ आरभ्यते'. Again in the next *adhikaraṇa*–'अन्तस्तद्धर्मोपदेशात्', he says:—'अपि च यत्र तु निरस्तसर्वविशेषं पारमेश्वरं रूपं उपदिश्यते, भवति तत्र शास्त्रम्', 'अशब्दमस्पर्शमरूपमव्ययमित्यादि, सर्वकारणत्वात्तु विकारधर्मैरपि कैश्चिद्विशि : परमेश्वर उपास्यत्वेन निर्दिश्यते 'सर्वकर्मा सर्वकामः सर्वगन्धः सर्वरसः' इत्यादिना'. This is how S'aṇkara draws a distinction between निर्गुण ब्रह्मन् and सगुण ब्रह्मन्. So far as his निर्विशेष ब्रह्मन् is concerned, the lakshaṇa of Brâhman, given by the Sûtrakâra in 'जन्माद्यस्य यतः,' has no bearing whatever. In आरंभणाधिकरण, S'aṇkara says that 'जन्माद्यस्य यतः' etc., has been written by the Sûtrakâra to refute the Sâṇkhyas and others, but that definition has only reference to the सगुण Brahman. Its ईश्वरत्व, सर्वज्ञत्व, सर्वशक्तिमत्त्व etc., are not to be attributed to Brahman in the highest sense (परमार्थतः). Brahman is called ईश्वर, सर्वज्ञ, सर्वशक्तिमत्, so far as there is अविद्यात्मकोपाधिपरिच्छेद. 'तदेवं अविद्यात्मकोपाधिपरिच्छेदापेक्षमेवेश्वरस्येश्वरत्वं सर्वज्ञत्वं सर्वशक्तिमत्त्वं च, न परमार्थतो विद्ययापास्तसर्वोपाधिस्वरूपे आत्मनि ईशित्रीशितव्यसर्वज्ञत्वादिव्यवहार उपपद्यत' 2-1-14. Thus according to S'aṇkara's view, the Brahman, whose definition is given by the Sûtrakâra, refers only to the सगुण ब्रह्मन्, and the

concluding Sûtra, 'अनावृत्तिः शब्दात् अनावृत्तिः शब्दात्', teaching the non-return of those who have reached Brahman, would, by a parity of reasoning, refer to the lower or *saguṇa* Brahman, a creature of *avidyâ*. We fail to trace this view to ny Sûtra, neither does S'aṇkara support it by any Sûtra, hence, in the absence of any convincing proof, we cannot take this to be the view of the Sûtrakâra. Looking at the Vedânta Mîmânsâ as a whole, one sees that, in 'अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा', the Sûtrakâra undertakes the investigation of the Brahma , in 'जन्माद्यस्य यतः' etc., declares that जगत्कारणत्व is Brahman's असाधारणलक्षण, in sûtras like 'ईक्षतेर्नाशब्दम्', 'कामाच्च नानुमानापेक्षा', he removes the प्रकृतिकारणता of जगत्, nd in Sûtras like 'नेतरोऽनुपपत्तेः', he removes the कर्तृत्व of jîvâtman, in the second chapter, the Sûtrakâr declares that even though Brahman and Jîvâtman are *ananya*, still Brahm n is *adhika*, this being the reason why unlike Brahman he does sometimes *ahita* to himself; that Jîvâtman is the *aṇs'a* of Brahm n, that his Brahmanhood, omnipresence, etc., are through his relation with Brahman, that the Jîvâtman is a *kartṛi* under the control and guidance of *para* Brahman; in the third chapter, the Sûtrakâra teaches how निष्कामकर्मs secure body fit for the acquirement of ब्र ज्ञान, and in the fourth chapter, this Jîvâtman, by the aid of संसाधन ब्रह्मज्ञान, reaches Brahman by अर्चिरादिमार्ग from where he does not return; vide Aṇubhashya 2–3–29. Dr. Deussen, in his 'System of the Vedânta', on pp. 98–99, thus summarises the teachings of the Brahmasûtras:—The first part contains, in Adhyâya I, the theology, which, on the basis of seven times four passages of the Upanishads, discusses the essence of the Brahman, its relation to the world as creator, ruler, destroyer, its relation to the soul, and its various names and attributes. This is followed, in Adhyâya II, by cosmology which is concerned with the relation of the

world to the Brahman as cause, its gradual evolution from and reabsorption in it, and, from II-3-15 on, the psychology, in which are thoroughly discussed the nature of the soul and its organs, its relation to God, to the body, nd to its own deeds. In Adhyaya III, comes first the doctrine of transmigration, then a supplement to psychology (III, 2, 1-10), another to the theology (III, 2, 11-41); the rest of the Adhyâya contains a miscellaneous assemblage of discussions, for the most part exegetic in character, as the chief content of which we ca , in any case, with S'aṇkara, consider the teaching of the means (साधनs) to attain the higher and lower doctrine, that is the knowledge and worship of the Brahman. For the most part these discussions deal with the strange question whether certai passages of the Veda are to be comprehended in one Vidyâ or to be separated, question which has me ni g only for the lower doctrine, with its im of worship. Fi ally, the conclusion of the work, Adhyâya IV cont ins eschatology; it sketches in detail the departure of the soul after death, and how some souls follow the way of the Fathers (पितृयान) to new incarnation, while, on the contrary, others, the worshippers of the Brahm n re led along the way of gods (देवयान) higher and higher upwards to the Brahma , 'whence there is no retur ' ccording to the Upanishads."

After thus summarisi g the syste , he goe on to say 'but not without further conditions, according to the reasoning of our (S'aṇkara's) system, for this Brahman i only the 'lower' Brahman, that is, as considered as possessing ttributes 'guṇ ', it is the object of worship, and no of 'perfect knowledge' 'सम्यग्दर्शनम्'; o ly after this latter, th t is, the esoteric doctri e is imparted to the pious in the world of Brahman, is he also liberated; until then, lthough he is in the wo ld of Brah an, nd a part ker of

Lordship 'ऐश्वर्यम्' 'his darkness is not yet driven away', 'his ignorance not yet destroyed', that is, he possesses only the lower doctrine 'अपरा विद्या', whose content consists of all that has hitherto been mentioned, not the opposed higher doctrine, the परा विद्या or सम्यग्दर्शनम्, that is, the pure philosophic, esoteric doctrine, which, in every part of this picture of the world with its empiric colouring, crops up in contradiction with it, and whose results, according to the metaphysical standpoint which we occupy, we may find strange, or admirable.' Thus Dr. Deussen says that there is a contradiction between the system which is deduced from the express Sûtras of Bâdarâyaṇa, and the esoteric doctrine of S'aṇkara, and then proceeds thus to explain S'aṇkara's esoteric doctrine:—'In the department of Theology it teaches that the Brahman is not thus or thus, but altogether without attributes 'गुण', distinctions 'विशेष' and limitations 'उपाधि', and therefore in no way capable of being defined or conceived. And this Brahman, devoid of all limitations, is only being, outside which nothing is; therefore in the department of cosmology, there can be as little question of the origin of the world as of its existence, but only of there being neither anything different 'नाना' from the Brahm n, nor any plurality of things 'प्रपञ्च', and that the world extended in names and forms is non-existent 'अवस्तु', is only a glamour 'माया' which Brahman of course 'सगुण', as master-magician 'मायाविन्', projects 'प्रसारयति', as the dreamer projects dream-forms. In the same way all further Psychology falls way after the saying 'तत् त्वम् असि', 'that thou art' is comprehended, according to which the soul of each human being is not an emanation, not a part of the Brahman, but fully and completely the Brahman. For him who knows this, there is no more migration for the soul, nor even liberation; for he is already liberated; the con-

tinued existence of the world and of his own body appear to him only as an illusion, the appearance of which he cannot remove, but which cannot further deceive him, till the time when, after the decease of the body, he wanders not forth, as the others, but remains where he is and what he is and eternally was, the first principle of all things, 'the originally eternal, pure, free, Brahman.'

This is a very fairly accurate view of S'aṇkara as laid down by Dr. Deussen. S'aṇkara's views about cosmology, psychology and eschatology are examined in the sections of Jagat, Jîvâtman and moksha respectively, and have been shown not to flow naturally from the Sûtras of Bâdarâyaṇa as they stand at present. Here we are concerned with the consideration of Brahma , so we shall examine here his view as to whether S'ankara's distinction of higher and lower Br hman can nat rally be worked out from the Sûtras of Bâdarâyaṇa. It has been suggested above that so far as our casual survey of the Brahmasûtras is concerned, S'aṇkara's distinctio , between the higher निर्विशेष, निर्गुण, निरुपाधि, and the lower, सविशेष, सगुण, ोपाधिक Brahman, is not found to be countenanced by the sûtras of Bâdarâyaṇa.

The most important Sûtras, on this point, are to be found in the second pâda of the third *Adhyâya*. The adhikaraṇa, beginning with 'न स्थानतोऽपि परस्य उभयलिंग सर्वत्र हि', and ending with the sutra 'दर्शनाच्च' (3-2-11-21), deals with the question, whether Brahman is सविशेष or निर्विशेष or both. The next adhikaraṇa, beginning with 'प्रकृतैतावत्त्वं हि प्रतिषेधति ततो ब्रवीति च भूयः', and ending with the sûtra 'प्रतिषेधाच्च' (3-2-23-30), deals with .the question of निषेध which refers to the रूपद्वय of Brahman, and not to Brahman itself, or in the words of Deussen, deals with the question of the possibility of knowing the निर्विशेष Brahman or esoteric Brahman. This is the scope of these sûtras as stated by S'aṇkara.

At the outset, it may be remarked that it is r the somewhat stra ge to find these Sutras (3-2, 11-30) in the third chapter, which, as its very name suggests, purports to deal with the question of sâdhanas. But as none of the Vedanta doctors have questioned their legitimacy, we shall deal with them as they are to be seen at present. These Sûtras seem to be rather obscure, and this seems to account for the vast divergence to be noticed in the existing Bhâshyas regarding the sense of these Sûtras, s well as the arrangement of them into the adhikaraṇas.

From the first adhikarṇa (3-2-11-21), S'aṇkara thus works out the निर्विशेषत्व of his Brahman. According to S'aṇkara, the human soul, when freed from all उपाधिs, becomes identical with Brahman in stages like dreamless sleep. In his Bhâshya on the Chhândogy also, S'aṇkara says that by the word 'स्व' the श्रुति suggests the identity of the jivâtman and Brahman. The Swarûpa of this Brahman is being investigated in this section by the aid of the Vedic passages. Concerning Brahm n, says S'aṇkar , there are Vedic passages of two kinds. One set of Vedic passages like 'सर्वकर्मा, सर्वकामः, सर्वगन्धः, सर्वरसः' teaches that Brahm n is सविशेष, while another set of Vedic passages like 'अस्थूः मनण्वहस्वमदीर्घम्' teache the निर्विशेषत of Brahma . Now the Brahman in itself, continues S'aṇkara, cannot be both, for it is not possible that one and the same thing in itself should be सविशेष and निर्विशेष. It is true that we ight think that Brahman in itself is निर्विशेष, and becomes सविशेष by उपाधिs. But one thing cannot become nother by the fact that it appears to be connected with limitations (उपाधिs); the crystal remains clear even when it has अलक्ताद्युपाधियोग; s it is an error to take it red in itself, so in case of Brahman also, the विशे त्व is due to limit tions etc., nd rests only on Ignorance (उपाधीनामविद्याकल्पितत्वात्). Therefore S'aṇkara concludes that Brahman is free from

all differences and perfectly unchangeable, and not the contrary, 'अतश्चान्यतरलिंगपरिग्रहेऽपि समस्तविशेषरहितं निर्विकल्पकमेव ब्रह्म प्रतिपत्तव्यं न तद्विपरीतम्,' the reason being that in all the passages like 'अशब्दम्' etc., where the swarûpa of Brahman is taught, it is declared to be devoid of all limitations etc., 'अपास्तसमस्तविशेष.' Having worked out the निर्विशेषत्व of Brahman thus, in the next sûtra, 'न भेदादिति चेन्न प्रत्येकमतद्वचनात्' 3-2-12, S'aṇkara further elaborates the same by declaring that Brahman is निराकार. How does it happen then that in many passages of scripture, manifold forms are attributed to Brahman? Should we not admit that by such passages a difference of form is actually brought out? 'तस्मात् सविशेषत्वमपि ब्रह्मणोऽभ्युपगन्तव्यम्.' For otherwise what is the purpose of the passages of scripture which attribute 'भेद' differentiation to Brahman? To this it is replied that in every passage where limitations appear, it is further said that Brahman is not affected by them, 'प्रत्युपाधिभेदं ह्यभेदमेव ब्रह्मणः बोधयति शास्त्रम्'. Having thus emphasized the निर्विशेषत्व of Brahman, S'aṇkara remarks, 'अतश्च न भिन्नाकारयोगो ब्रह्मणः शास्त्रीय इति शक्यते वक्तुम्, भेदस्योपासनार्थत्वादभेदे तात्पर्यात्'. The III next Sûtra, 'अपि चैवमेके', has been written to teach the cognition of *abheda* which is preceded by a censure of the perception of *bheda*. How is it that only the अनाकार Brahman is insisted upon when the Vedic passages describe Brahman as both? To this question, an answer is IV furnished by 'अरूपवदेव हि तत्प्रधानत्वात्' 3-2-14. Brahman is not रूपादिमत्, because Vedic passages like अस्थूलम् etc., expressly declare that निर्विशेष Brahman is प्रधान. Then what about the Vedic passages teaching Brahman as आकारवद्? To V this an answer is given in 'प्रकाशवच्चावैयर्थ्यात्' 2-3-15. As the light of the sun and the moon, when it falls on the finger, shares in the finger's limitations, and in conformity with it, seems crooked, when it is crooked, straight, when it is straight, so also Brahman, when it is united with पृथ्व्याद्युपाधि

assumes its forms. Such an 'आकारविशेषोपदेश' is not विरुद्ध, for it is taught for the purpose of उपासना. It is therefore by no means purposeless. All the words of the Upanishads have a purpose, and are authoritative, but this does not prevent this view of Brahman's सविशेषत्व etc., from resting on Ignorance all the same, for on inborn Ignorance depends worldly action as well as those prescribed by the Veda. The Sûtra, 'आह च तन्मात्रम्' 3–2–16, also teaches the निर्विशेषत्व of Brahman. The Sûtra 'दर्शयति चाथोऽपि स्मर्यते' 3–2–17, emphasises the निर्विशेषत्व of Brahman by quotations from श्रुति and स्मृति. After explaining the Sûtras, 'अत एव चोपमा सूर्यकादिवत्', and 'अम्बुवदग्रहणात्तु न तथात्वम् 3–2–18–19, in the same strain, S'aṇkara remarks in 'वृद्धिह्रासभाक्त्वमन्तर्भावादुभयसामंजस्यादेवम्' 3–2–20 :—Just as the जलगतसूर्यप्रतिबिम्ब increases with the increase of water, moves with its motion, is जलधर्मानुविधायि, in the same way, the one अविकृतसद् Brahman assumes the धर्मs of उपाधि. In the last sûtra, 'दर्शनाच्च' 3–2–21, S'aṇkara concludes again emphasising the same view on the authority of certain passages of the Veda. In the end, S'aṇkara gives it as his opinion that Brahman is निर्विकल्पक. 'तस्मात् निर्विकल्पकैकलिंगमेव ब्रह्म न उभयलिंगं, न विपरीतलिंगं चेति सिद्धम्' 3–2–21.

The interpretation of these Sûtras by S'aṇkara cannot be taken to be convincing, because it is not consistent with what the Sûtrakâra has said before, and even if we do not mind this inconsistency with the previous Sûtras, the interpretation of the Sûtras and Vedic passages cannot be denied to be very forced. In 'न स्थानतोऽपि परस्योभयलिंगं सर्वत्र हि', S'aṇkara explains the words 'सर्वत्र हि' by 'ब्रह्मस्वरूपप्रतिपादनपरेषु अशब्दमस्पर्शमरूपमव्ययमित्यादिषु निर्विशेषस्यैवोपदेशात्'. The wording of the Sûtra does not in the least suggest this meaning, nor is it to be found in this third chapter, nor in whole of th Mîmânsâ S'âstra. The word *Sarvatra* is

once found before in 'सर्वत्र प्रसिद्धोपदेशात्' 1-2-1, and there also, no suggestion is to be found in favour of S'aṇkara's interpretation. Hence that explanation owes its existence to S'âṇkara's zeal for the *Nirvis'esha* Brahman. Even the latter halves of the sentences, quoted by S'aṇkara in support of *Nirvis'esha* Brahman, do not support his view, but go against him. The first sentence quoted is this:— 'अशब्दमस्पर्शमरूपमव्ययं तथाऽरसं नित्यमगन्धवच्च यत् । अनाद्यनन्तं महतः परं ध्रुवं निचाय्य तन्मृत्युमुखात् प्रमुच्यते' कठ० 3-15. In this passage the same *Brahman* which is *As'abdam* etc., is described to be *Anâdyananta, mahatah para* and *dhruva*, which, in their turn, imply the *savis'eshatva* of Brahman. Moreover, when it is established here, that Brahman is *Nirvis'esha*, the following Sûtra, 'अरूपवत् तत्प्रधानत्वात्', becomes redundant. To consider that this doctrine, which is to be proved there, is proved here, is also rather incongruous. Again, the interpretation of the Sûtra, 'अरूपवत् तत्प्रधानत्वात्', does not appear to be supported by the very texts, which S'aṇkara, quotes in his support. The first text, quoted by S'aṇkara, is 'अस्थूलमनणु' etc., बृह० 3-8-8. This sentence has been spoken by the sage Yâjnavalkya to explain to Gârgi the nature of Brahman, so first he says *Asthûlam etc.*, and then at once teaches the *pras'âsitṛitva, ambarântadhârakatva*, beginning with *drashṭṛitva*, and ending with *âkâs'opâdânatva*. Hence to lay unnecessary stress on the negative words like *asthûlam* etc., and to say that the *nirvis'esha* Brahman alone is taught, and to disregard completely the context teaching divine attributes of Brahman like *pras'âsitṛitva* etc., is not fair. *Asthûlam* etc., can be reconciled by saying that the *nishedha*, there referred to, is only the negation of what is to be found in the world of prakriti, it is only a *nishedha* of *prâkṛita* or *laukika* things, and not a wholesale negation of everything including even attributes divine like *pras'âsitṛitva* etc. The second *kâthaka*

sentence 'अशब्दमस्पर्शम्' etc., does not, as already shown above, support S'aṇkara's contention that Brahman is absolutely devoid of any attributes, 'केवलनिर्विशेषाग्रह'. The third quotation is from the Chhândogya, 'आकाशो वै नामरूपयोर्निर्वहिता ते यदन्तरातद्ब्रह्म', 8-14-1. This sentence is very clear. It distinctly teaches that the revelation of names and forms is an (नामरूपनिर्वाहकत्व) attribute of Brahman. It teaches Brahman as possessed of attributes, *savis'esha*, and it is rather strange to find S'aṇkara quoting it in his support. The fourth is quoted from Muṇḍaka 'दिव्यो ह्यमूर्तः पुरुषः स बाह्याभ्यन्तरो ह्यजः (2-1-12). That also cannot be taken to teach the out and out *nirvis'eshatva* of Brahman. By calling the *purusha amûrta*, it does not deny *mûrti* absolutely, it may be *iyattâ-pariṇâma*, for it, at the same time, says that *purusha* Brahman is *divine-divya*, बाह्याभ्यन्तरसाहित्य or बाह्याभ्यन्तररूप. But the passage quoted goes further, and declares that the *purusha* is greater than the great *akshara* Brahman, 'अक्षरात्परतः परः'. Thus this passage also goes against the *nirvis'eshatva* of Brahman. The last sentence, quoted by S'aṇkara, is from the Brihadâraṇyaka 'तदेतद्ब्रह्म अपूर्वमनपरमनन्तरमबाह्यमयमात्मा ब्रह्म सर्वानुभूः' 2-5-19. Even when we consider this sentence without any reference to the context, the very word *sarvânubhûh* suggests an inference against S'aṇkara's absolute negation of any attributes in Brahman. If there was no *sarva*, how was Brahman to be *sarvânubhûh*? 'सर्वसत्त्वे एव सर्वानुभवितृत्वसम्भवात्'. Taken with the context it further goes against S'aṇkara's view. This quotation is at the end of the *Madhu-Brahmaṇa*. In the beginning of the *Madhu-vidya* 'अयमेव स योऽयमात्मेदममृतमिदं ब्रह्मेदं सर्वम्' is repeated fourteen times in order to teach the *sarvatva* of Brahman. Then is further taught the 'सर्वभूताधिपतित्व,' then as an explanation to 'रूपं रूपं प्रतिरूपो बभूव' is added 'अयं हरयोऽयं वै दश च सहस्राणि च बहूनि च

अनन्तानि' which directly declares not the absolute negation in S'aṇkara's sense, but the *anantarûpatâ* or *sarvatva* of Brahman. Hence the so-called prominence-*pradhânatâ* of *nirvis'esha* Brahman, according to S'aṇkara, cannot be fairly worked out here. S'aṇkara's very appropriate remark 'नहि वेदवाक्यानां कस्यचिदर्थवत्त्वं कस्यचिदनर्थवत्त्वमिति युक्तं प्रतिपत्तुं, प्रमाणत्वाविशेषात्' loses much of its force, when he says that the आकारविशेषोपदेश of Brahman is due to उपाधि, because according to him, what is due to उपाधि, cannot be said to belong to the thing itself, and also because all the उपाधिs are आविद्यक, 'उपाधिनिमित्तस्य वस्तुधर्मत्वानुपपत्तेः' 'उपाधीनामाविद्यकत्वात्.' Even Vedic passages like 'यतो वाचो निवर्तन्ते अप्राप्य मनसा सह आनन्दं ब्रह्मणो विद्वान् न बिभेति कुतश्चन' at best teach the वाङ्मनसातीतत्व and Brahmavid's भयाभाव and not its अत्यन्तनिर्विशेषत्व. The quotation from *Geeta* 'ज्ञेयं यत् तत्प्रवक्ष्यामि यज्ज्ञात्वाऽमृतमश्नुते, अनादि-मत्परं ब्रह्म न सत्तन्नासदुच्यते' 13-12, refers to व्याकृत and अव्याकृत stages of Brāhman on the authority of 2-1-17-B. S. Moreover this conclusion is strengthened by the fact that the Geeta further describes Brahman as सर्वतः पाणिपादान्तम् etc. Attributes like 'सर्वतःपाणिपादान्तत्व' etc., cannot be *prâkṛita laukika, heya.* The illustrations given in the 'वृद्धिह्रास' sutra 3-2-20, can be explained by the fact that there is no difference in the प्रतिबिंब either in less or more water भाष्यप्रकाश. pp. 945-946. B. S. S.

Thus it has been shown that so far as the sûtras and the texts of the Upanishads are concerned, S'ankara's effort to work out the absolute निर्विशेषत्व of Brahman in this अधिकरण (3-2-11-21) cannot be justified. Now in the next अधिकरण (3-2-22-30) he works out his interpretation in the same strain, and concludes: 'तस्माद् ब्रह्मावसानोऽयं प्रतिषेधः, न अभावावसान इत्यध्यवस्यामः' (3-2-22). The sutra 'प्रकृतैतावत्त्वं हि तिषेधति ततो ब्रवीति च भूयः' 3-2-22 is thus explained by S'aṇkara. The विषयवाक्य 'नेति नेति' etc., here chosen, is from the बृहदारण्यक.

In the passage in question, 'नेति नेति' follows a statement of the two rûpas of Brahman viz., मूर्त and अमूर्त. Both these forms according to S'aṇkara, are denied of Brahman by 'नेति नेति.' It is by the aid of this Sûtra that S'aṇkara establishes his strict अद्वैतवाद. By denying everything except Brahman which is 'केवल चैतन्य,' he distinguishes his system from the शून्यवाद of the Bauddhas. Everything except the Brahman is to be denied, and the Brahman itself is to be, if at all, discribed by all negations. This is the essence of the Vedânta according to him. Thus his system should be very aptly called, not the 'अद्वैतवाद', the doctrine of non-duality, but 'एकवाद' or 'singularism' in the words of Sir Ramkrishna Bhandarkar.

Thus there are two sorts of passages to be found in the Upanishads, one teaching the Brahman as सविशेष, and the other teaching it as निर्विशेष. S'aṇkara subordinates, nay rejects, the Vedic passages teaching Brahman as सविशेष, as shown above, calling them useful only in उपासनाs, which in their turn, are products of अविद्या, according to him. On what authority S'aṇkara bases this theory of his, we are unable to trace. No Sûtra of Bâdarâyaṇa can with certainty be taken as an authority for drawing this distinction. In doing so, he, it appears, departs from the lines of the Sûtrakâra. In (3-2-15), he remarks 'न हि बेदवाक्यानां कस्यचिदर्थवत्त्वं कस्यचिदनर्थवत्त्वमिति युक्तं प्रतिपत्तुं प्रमाणत्वाविशेषात्.' Thus according to the principle laid down by S'aṇkara himself (and this seems to be the view of the Sûtrakâra, who, as a true Vaidika, has undertaken to set aside विरोध, and to work out harmony of the conflicting Vedic passages) the विरोध would not be set aside, if some passages are subordinated or deprived, as is done by him, of their primary importance and significance. Being passages of the Veda, their authoritativeness is equal, and

they deserve to be equally respected. The difficulty of contradiction should have been set aside on the principle laid down by Bâdarâyaṇa in 'श्रुतेस्तु शब्दमूलत्वात्', 2-1-27. This seems to be a very strong piece of argument to refute S'aṇkara's theory of अत्यन्त निर्विशेष Brahman. The argument that, because the 'एकवाक्यता' is to be worked out, S'aṇkara is justified in subordinating, or rather rejecting, सविशेष Vedic passages to निर्विशेष ones, and thereby removing the विरोध between them, would not stand a moment's consideration; the hollowness of this argument is not difficult to be seen. The विरोध as such, can rightly be said to be reconciled, when both sorts of Vedic passages deserving of equal weight as they are, are given their due and equal weight and scope. S'aṇkara's way of looking at the श्रुतिs, one must admit, not only subordinates the सविशेष श्रुतिs, but renders them meaningless ultimately. What prevented S'aṇkara from an unqualified submission to the letter of the Veda, in complete disregard of the so-called युक्तिविरोध, as was done by the learned Sûtrakâra in 2-1-26-27, is a question, which cannot be satisfactorily solved. S'aṇkara ought to have accepted the principle, which he himself expresses so very tersely in 2-1-27. 'शब्दमूलं च ब्रह्म, शब्दप्रमाणकं, नेन्द्रियप्रमाणकं, तद् यथाशब्दमभ्युपगन्तव्यम्, शब्दश्च उभयमपि ब्रह्मणः प्रतिपादयति, अकृत्स्नप्रसक्तिं निरवयवत्वं च, लौकिकानामपि मणिम ौषधि-प्रभृतीनां देशकालनिमित्तवैचित्र्यवशात् शक्तयो विरुद्धानेककार्यविषया दृश्यन्ते, ता अपि तावन्नोपदेशमन्तरेण केवलेन तर्केणावगन्तुं शक्यन्ते, अस्य वस्तुन एतावत्य एतत्सहाया एतद्विषया एतत्प्रयोजनश्चा शक्तय इति, किमुताचिन्त्यस्वभावस्य ब्रह्मणो रूपं विना शब्देन न निरूप्येत, तथा चाहुः पौराणिकाः 'अचिन्त्याः खलु ये भावा न तांस्तर्केण योजयेत्, प्रकृतिभ्यः परं यच्च तदचिन्त्यस्य लक्षणम्' इति, तस्मात् शब्दमूल एव अतीन्द्रियार्थयाथात्म्याधिगमः' Thus Brahman's स्वरूप being अचिन्त्यस्वभावयुक्त there is no विरोध. What seems impossible to us becomes possible in the case of Brahman. Thus has the Sûtrakâra set aside ' र्य ारणविरोध', o, follow-

ing the same reasoning he removes in 3-2-11-30, th विरोध, which appears to exist in the various attributes of Brahman. The Sûtra 'तदव्यक्तमाह हि' 3-2-23, declares that Brahman is अव्यक्त—that which cannot be comprehended. But this want of comprehension or दर्शन is not due to Brahman's being devoid of any विशेष; रूप etc., can be seen from the next sutra 'अपि च संराधने प्रत्यक्षानुमानाभ्याम्' 3-2-24, where it is taught that Brahman is seen in संराधनकाल. Now if Brahman is absolutely निर्विशेष, what is to be seen or realised in the संराधन ? Again, it would not be fair to say that what is seen in संराधन is a product of nescience, for as S'aṇkara remarks, this दर्शन is ज्ञानप्रसाद, and hence, it should be accepted as प्रामाणिक. Thus the Sûtrakâra seems to accept that Brahman is 'अव्यक्त' without ज्ञानप्रसाद or भक्ति, while it is 'व्यक्त' when there is भक्ति and ज्ञानप्रसाद, and as such, the latter दर्शन would be प्रामाणिक. S'aṇkara's absolute negation of विशेषs in Brahman, is a view, which seems never to have occurred to the mind of the Sûtrakâra. This view is strengthened by the answers given by the Sûtrakâra to the objection raised by the Sâṇkhya, where the Sûtrakâra distinctly says that Brahman is सर्वशक्त्युपेता and सर्वधर्मयुक्त. 'सर्वोपेता च तद्दर्शनात्' 'सर्वधर्मोपपत्तेश्च' 2-1-30 and 2-1-37 respectively.

IV. Again, the Sûtra 'उभयव्यपदेशात् अहिकुण्डलवत्' 3-2-27, seems to answer the view, put forth above. It does not appear to be a मतान्तरीय sûtra, but a सिद्धान्त sûtra. Nimbarka and Vallabha take it to be such. In 'न स्थानतोपि परस्य उभयलिंग सर्वत्र हि' 3-2-11, it is declared that Brahman's उभयलिंगत्व cannot be due to उपाधिs, for it is described everywhere as such (उभयलिंगयुक्त). (*Vide* Nimbarka's Bhâshya on thi sûtra). To this question, this Sûtra seems to furnish an answer by saying that just as it is natural in a serpent to assume ऋजु and ण्डल forms, so Brahman at will assumes

forms of all sorts. This view is not singular. Vall bha also says the same thing when he observes 'यथा सर्पः ऋजुरनेकाकारः कुण्ड श्च भवति, तथा ब्रह्मस्वरूपं सर्वप्रकारं भक्तेच्च या तथा स्फुरति × × तस्मात् सकलविरुद्धधर्मा भगवत्येव वर्तन्त इति न कापि श्रुतिरुपचरितार्थेति सिद्धम्' 3-2-27. The above view is again supported by the Upanishads which frequently describe Brahman by contraries[1]. Vallabha gives another explanation of the negative श्रुतिs. 'प्रतीतं च निषेध्यम्, न अप्रतीतं, न श्रुतिप्रतीतं, सत्यत्वादयश्च लौकिकाः, ततः सर्वनिषेधे तद ानमेव भवेत्'. Aṇubhâshya B. S. S. p. 57. The निषेध should have reference to what one sees, and not to the attributes of Brahman, which have been spoken of in the Veda. The Sûtra 'प्रकृतैतावत्त्वं हि प्रतिषेधति ततो ब्रवीति च भूयः' 3-2-22, does not deny रूप, etc., in Brahman, but simply 'इयत्ता.' (*Vide* Nimbarka-Bhâshya and Aṇu-Bhâshya on this Sûtra). Hence in the absence of any Sûtra directly supporting S'ankara's view, it appears clear that his acceptance of the negative श्रुतिs alone is not sanctioned by the Sûtrakâra. The Sûtrakâra seems to ccept that Brahman is possessed of all धर्मs, (सर्वधर्मोपपत्तेश्च 2-1-37.), and also those that appear to be contrary. It is possessed of all wonderful powers, ('सर्वोपेता च तद्दर्शनात्' 2-1-30, 'आत्मनि चैवं विचित्राश्च हि' 2-1-28). The negation of negative श्रुतिs refers not to the divine attributes described of Brahman in the Upanishads, but to the लौकिक or प्रा त or इयत्तावाचक ones. This seems to be the युक्ति to explain to those who cannot see their way to accept Brahman as possessed of even contrary attributes on the authority of the Vedic texts and the अचिन्त्यैश्वर्ययोग of Brahman, for in that case there is no विरोध, but a विरोधाभास, an अलंकार, resulting in suggesting the glory of the great Brahman, and sowing the seed of devotion to it.

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1 अपाणिपादो जवनो ग्रहीता पश्यत्यचक्षुः स शृणोत्यकर्णः । श्वेताश्वतर० 3–19. अणोरणीयान् महतो महीयान् आत्मा गुहायां निहितोऽस्य जन्तोः । श्वे० 3–20 कठ० 2–10. तदेजति तन्नैजति तद्दूरे तद्वदन्तिके । ईश० 5–1. आसीनो दूरं व्रजति, शयानो याति सर्वतः । कठ० 2–20.

This view, thus it appears, is in perfect harmony with the Sûtras of Bâdarâyaṇa. Nimbârka nd Râmânuja also favour this view. S'aṇkara's निर्विशेषाग्रह does not seem to have any connection with the Sûtras of Bâdarâyaṇa. This view is supported by the fact that none of the Vedânta writers accept S'aṇkara's view of निर्विशेष Brahman to be the view of the Sûtrakâra.

Thus, according to Bâdarâyaṇa, the same Brahman is both निर्विशेष and सर्वधर्मयुक्त. S'aṇkara's theory of निर्गुण पर and सगुण अपर Brahman is further shaken of by Bâdarâyaṇa in 3-2-21, and the Sûtras following. There the question is raised whether there is any पर greater Brahman than which has been described before. The answer given to this question in the following Sûtras is in the negative. Not only is this Brahman the highest, but another its equal is prohibited. Thus the same Brahman which is उभयलिंग is the highest. 'परमतः सेतून्मानसम्बन्धभेदव्यपदेशेभ्यः' × × 'सामान्यात्तु' × × 'उपपत्तेश्च' 'तथान्यप्रतिषेधात्.' 3-2-31,32,33,34, 35,36. Dr. Thibaut[1] agrees with the view that S'aṇkara's theory of Saguṇa and Nirguṇa Brahmans is not recognized by the Sûtrakâra, but he thinks that S'aṇkara by recognizing Saguṇa and Nirguṇa Brahmans gives scope to all sorts of divergently conflicting श्रुति texts. But this sounds rather strange. To say that S'aṇkara understood or harmonised the Upanishads better than Bâdarâyaṇa is placing the cart before the horse. S'aṇkara's lower Brahman being a creature of nescience, a non-entity in the highest sense, the scope given to सविशेष श्रुतिs is also illusive. Bâdarâyaṇa does not even dream of such a method, a fact evidenced by the absence of any Sûtra quoted by S'ankara in support of this theory. If in

1. *Vide* Vedanta Sûtra I. Introduction p. 128. Sacred Books of the East.

numerous places the Upanishads describe Brahman by contrary attributes, Bâdarâyaṇa like a true, Vaidic with the great regard that he had for the letter of the Veda, without subjecting one set to another, or accepting one set and rejecting another, refers both the sets to the same Brahman, and says that it is the highest. When the विरोध is pressed against him, he falls back on the letter of the Veda as in 2-1-27, 'श्रुतेस्तु शब्दमूलत्वात्,' saying that Brahman is to be learnt only from scriptures, and that independent reasoning as such has nothing to do with it. Thus it will be seen that Dr. Thebaut's claim for S'aṇkara that he gives scope to all the श्रुतिs is very weak. Bâdarâyaṇa decidedly has done better justice to all the श्रुतिs by referring them to one and the same Brahman, while S'aṇkara's insistence on the निर्विशेष श्रुतिs alone has rendered his conception of Brahman open to the charge that it owes its origin not to Veda or Sûtras of Bâdarâyaṇa but to Buddhism. (*Vide* Bhaskara's भाष्य p. 124.).

Thus it will be seen that the investigation of the Sûtrakâra refers to Brahman which is सर्वधर्मयुक्त and सर्वशक्त्युपेत and therefore कर्तृ, but not to निर्विशेष Brahman as S'aṇkar repeatedly says. Except Bhâskara, all the Bhâshyakâras are almost agreed with the view expressed above, and even Bhâskara's निर्विकल्पकाग्रह is very mild as compared to that of S'aṇkara. Vallabha's commentator truly remarks:—'अतो न्यनिषेधो यो वर्तते स स ब्रह्मणोऽन्तर्निवेश्येतरं निषेधति, न तु सर्वं मिथ्याकृत्येति धीभिरवधेयम्', pp. 953. Aṇu-Bhâshya Prakâs'a B. S. S.

Bâdarâyaṇa has established that Brahman whose investigation he has undertaken, and whose definition he has given in 'जन्माद्यस्य यतः' is possessed of wonderful powers, creates universe etc., for its sport, is कर्तृ. S'aṇkara wants to refer the कर्तृत्व not to Brahman but to अविद्या, the

reasons for this being विषमता and निर्घृणता. Here also he departs from the lines of the Sûtrakâra. The Sûtrakâr considers this question in 'वैषम्यनैर्घृण्ये न सापेक्षत्वात् तथाहि दर्शयति' 2-1-34. Bâdarâyaṇa says that Brahman is not to be charged with partiality or cruelty, for it allots fruits according to धर्माधर्म; Brahman is कर्मसापेक्ष, Veda teaches so. Though here the Sûtrakâra gives धर्माधर्मसापेक्षत्व as the reason why Brahman is neither विषम nor निर्घृण, he feels conscious of the difficulty that if Brahman were to allot fruits according to धर्माधर्म, its स्वातन्त्र्य would to that extent be controlled by it, and so far its ईश्वरत्व, 'सर्वस्य शी, सर्वस्येशानः', etc., would be limited. Hence, to avoid this objection he says in 'फलमत उपपत्तेः' that Brahman alone allots fruits and not धर्माधर्म. Giving fruits according to धर्माधर्मs Brahman is not controlled by them. This seems to be the reasoning of Bâdarâyaṇa. Of course he says जगत्प्रवाह is अनादि, and hence it is possible for Brahman to allot fruits according to कर्मs, but then the difficulty arises- if the जगत्प्रवाह is अनादि, how is Brahman to create it? To this his reply is that श्रुति and स्मृति teach both. After removing this doubt, he cuts short the argument by the Sûtra 'सर्वधर्मोपपत्तेश्च' meaning thereby that Brahman is possessed of all धर्मs, and that is in fitness of things. श्रुति word is Bâdarâyaṇa's shelter in case of difficulty, while S'aṇkara's is अविद्या. S'aṇkara's interpretation of these Sûtras is correct, though according to the reasoning of S'aṇkara's system the answer would be different. According to S'aṇkara's reasoning there is no question of वैषम्य and नैर्घृण्य. Brahman's कर्तृत्व is आविद्यक, hence its फलदातृत्व much more so, happiness and misery are आविद्यक, and the human soul is also a creature of nescience. How does Brahman become joined with अविद्या? Of this the Sûtras give no trace. Even S'aṇkara does not give any reason for this, as is remarked by Dr. Deussen:—"In reality (परमार्थतः,) there is

nothing else besides Brahman alone. If we imagine we perceive a transformation (विकार) of Him into the world, division (भेद) of Him into a plurality of individual souls, this depends on अविद्या. But how does this happen ? How do we manage to deceive ourselves into seeing a transformation and a plurality, where in reality Brahman alone is ? On this question our authors give us no information." System of Vedanta pp. 302. Bâdarâyaṇa does not give ny information on this point, because as shown above, he does not hold this view, and S'aṇkara does not give any reason because it is not possible to do so. Hence Dr. Deussen's remark: 'But the system gives no real ground for this assumption' (S. V. p. 303) can be applicable only to S'aṇkara's reasoning. When Jîva's कर्तृत्व is due to Brahman (परात् तु तत् श्रुतेः), when Brahman is itself the source from which all activities flow, how can Brahman be अकर्तृ ? Since Brahman is unfettered by anything like अविद्या, माया, कृति etc., at will it becomes कर्तृ or अकर्तृ. Hence Bâdarâyaṇa' system is not to be charged with अनिर्मोक्षप्रसंग; neither his Brahman is to be charged with partiality or cruelty, for Brahman's creation is आत्मसृष्टि, आत्मकृति or लीलासृष्टि. One cannot be unjust to one's self, one cannot be said to be unjust or cruel, if one were to do anything for the sake of fun, लीला, similarly Brahman cannot be said to be unjust or cruel towards its own creation created for the sake of लीला only.

Thus the Brahman whose investigation Bâdarâyaṇa has undertaken is—possessed of all धर्मs,[1] all wonderful powers,[2] it is independent doer,[3] attâ;[4] it is untouched[5] by the short-comings of the Jîvâtman; it resides in the heart;[6]

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1. सर्वधर्मोपपत्तेश्च 2–1–37. 2. सर्वोपेता च तद्दर्शनात् 2–1–30. 3. जन्माद्यस्य यतः 1-1-2. 4. अत्ता चराचरग्रहणात् 1-2-9. 5. संभोगप्राप्तिरिति चेन्न वैशेष्यात् 1-2-21. 6. गुहां प्रविष्टौ आत्मानौ हि तद्दर्शनात् 1-2-11.

it is अदृश्यत्वादिगुण ;[1] it is पवत्;[2] it is अन्तर्यामिन्;[3] it is भूमन्;[4] it is अंगुष्ठमात्र;[5] it is वैश्वानर;[6] it is प्रादे मात्र[7] and व्यापक; it is दहर;[8] it is सत्[9] चिद्,[10] आनन्द.[11] It is everything.[12] It is[13] beyond प्रकृति, ाया, अविद्या, शरीर, शक्ति, etc.,Guṇas of प्रकृति[14], etc., have no सम्बन्ध with it, hence it is निर्गुण. It is जगत्कंपनकर्तृ;[15] it is आनन्दमय,[11] it is the support[16] of heaven and earth; these attributes are divine. The subject[14] of negative श्रुतिs has reference to attributes of कृति etc. The negative श्रुतिs do not deny the divine attributes of Brahman spoken of in other Vedic passages.

This Brahman whose investigation Bâdarâyaṇa has undertaken, and in whom harmony of all the Vedic passages (समन्वय[17]) has been worked out by him, for its own sport[18], develops[19] itself into Jadajîvâtmaka universe, without undergoing the least change,[20] and without ceasing to be निर यव. It alone shapes,[21] and names the Jadajîvâtmaka universe making it Nâmarupâtmaka also. Just as Brahman, by its mysterious powers, makes सदंश and चिदं perceptible, while आनन्दांश imperceptible, thus developing itself into ज जीवात्मकप्रपञ्च, similarly by making

1. अदृश्यत्वादिगुणको धर्मोक्तेः 1-2-21, 2. रूपोपन्यासाच्च 1-2-23. 3. अन्तर्याम्यधिदैवादिषु तद्धर्मव्यपदेशात् 1-2-18. 4. भूमा संप्रसादादध्युपदेशात् 1-3-8. 5. शब्दादेव प्रमितः 1-3-24. 6. ैश्वानरः साधारणशब्दविशेषात् 1-2-24. 7. आमनन्ति चैनमस्मिन् 1-2-32. 8. दहर उत्तरेभ्यः 1-3-14. 9. जन्माद्यस्य यतः 1-1-2. 10. ईक्षतेर्नाशब्दम् 1-1-5. 11. आनन्दमयोऽभ्यासात् 1-1-11. 12. सर्वत्र प्रसिद्धोपदेशात् 1-2-1. 13. गौणश्चेन्नात्मशब्दात् 1-1-7. 14. प्रकृतैतावत्त्वं हि प्रतिषेधति ततो ब्रवीति च भूयः 3-2-22. 15. कम्पनात् 1-3-39. 16. द्युभ्वाद्यायतनं स्वशब्दात् 1-3-1. In वैश्वानराधिकरण, वैश्वानर is described as प्रादेशमात्र and अभिविमान according to scripture 1-2-32. This also goes to show that there is no विरोध in Brahman if the contradictions are sanctioned by Veda, because the स्वरूप of Brahman is शास्त्रैकसमधिगम्य. S'aṅkara's interpretation of these two words is forced, and consequently is rejected by Ra anuja, Bhaskara, Vallabha, Madhva, Deussen and others. 17 तत्तु समन्वयात् 1-1-4. 18. लो वत्त लीला कैवल्यम् 2-1-33. 19. आत्म तेः परिणामात् 1-4. 26. 20. श्रुतेस्तु शब्दमूलत्वात् -1-27. 21. संज्ञामूर्ति ृप्तिस्तु त्रिवृत्कुर्वत उपदेशात् 2-4. 20.

i perceptible the सर्वरूपत्व and सर्वनामत्व, develop एकरूपत्व d एकनामत्व producing thus an infinite beautiful variety. Giving fruits to Jîvas according to their कर्मs, Brahman is not controlled by them. In becoming ईश्वर, it does not become partial or cruel. Brahman is शब्दमूल. Ratiocination has nothing to do with it. On the strength of the letter of the Veda, this Brahman, all-pervading[1] as it is, is to be reached from whence there is no return. It is one nd infinite. It is everything. S'aṇkara's theory negativing everything in Brahman cannot be supported by any of the sûtras of Bâdarâyaṇa. Bâdarâyaṇ 's view seems to be to affirm that Brahman is everything, rather than to deny everything of Brahman.

HU AN .

It has been shown that so far as the Sûtras of Bâdarâyaṇa are concerned, one fails to find any trace of the theory of 'निर्विशे ' higher Brahman and सविशेष lower सगुण Brahman, that all the passages of the Upanishads describing Brahman as 'नेति नेति' or 'सर्वकर्मा', etc., refer to the same Brahman; and the विरोध between these two sets of Vedic passages, transforms itself into a विरोधाभास the moment तर्क as such is dismissed from our consideration, and the letter of the Veda is with implicit faith (श्रद्धा) followed, without the least attempt to better or modify its natural significance, and thereby accepting Brahman to be possessed of wonderful powers विचित्र शक्तिs and all attributes 'सर्वधर्म's; or if one fails to see his way to अचिन्त्यैश्वर्य-युक्त ब्रह्मन्, then he may set aside the विरोध by referri g the negative Vedic passages to 'प्रा त' or ' ौकिक' पदार्थs nd the ffirmative to 'दिव्य' divine ones, as is suggested by Râmânuja, Nimbârka, or even by V llabha in 'प्रकृतैता त्वं हि तिषेधति ततो ब्रवीति च भूयः' 3-2-22. V. S., thus givi g equal

1. अनावृत्तिः शब्दात् अनावृत्तिः शब्दात् 4-4-22.

scope to both sets of Vedic pass ges without following S'aṇkâra's method of subordinating the affirmative to the negative ones, a method which on its face is not justified by the fact that the Vaidikas like Bâdarâyaṇa are alw ys anxious to revere all the Vedic passages whether like 'नेति नेति' or like 'सर्वज्ञः' with the same reverence.

Now let us take up the consideration of the human soul-Jîvâtman. The whole body of the Vedânta Sûtras dealing with the nature of the Jîvâtman, is to be found in the third pâda of the second chapter of the Brahmamîmânsâ (2-3-16-53). Bâdarâyaṇa begins thus: In 'चराचरव्यपाश्रयस्तु स्यात् तद्व्यपदेशो भाक्तः तद्भावभावित्वात्' 2-3-16, it is said that birth, death, etc., refer to the body of the human soul. In 'नात्माऽश्रुतेः नित्यत्वाच्च ताभ्यः,' it is taught that Jîvâtman has no उत्पत्ति, Vedic passages deny the 'उत्पत्ति' of Jîvâtman, they on the contrary teach the नित्यत्व of Jîva. In 'ज्ञोऽत एव' 2-3-18, it is taught that Jîva, though by nature चेतन, is a 'ज्ञ,' on the authority of the Veda. S'aṇkara's insistence that Jîva is only 'चैतन्यस्वरूप' and not a knower goes directly against the wording of the Sûtra. In Sûtras 2-3-19-2 , it is taught that Jîvâtman is of the size of an atom, because 'उत्क्रान्ति, गति and आगति' are spoken of him in the Veda; even if उत्क्रान्ति be otherwise explained, the गति and आगति do refer to Jîvâtman as such; that श्रुति passages describing Jîvâtman as non-Aṇu describe him as such in his capacity of Brahman; where Jîvâtman's Brahmanhood is to be emphasized, there only he is described as non-aṇu-विभु; Vedic passages do teach Aṇutva of Jîvâtman as well as suggest it; the objection that the चैतन्य of Jîvâtman as he is atomic cannot be 'सर्वशरीरव्यापि' pervading the whole body, does not stand. Just as चन्दन though applied to one part produces coolness in the whole body, similarly the चैतन्य of Jîvatman, atomic as he is, spreads over the whole body; like chandan , Jîvâtman has his abode in the heart, the Vedic p ges

teach the same thing. On the analogy of the diamond or the lamp, also the Jîvâtman's चैतन्य spreads over the whole body. These latter instances seem to be given because some one might urge that minute particles produce coolness in the case of chandana, and that the Jîvâtman has no particles, hence just as the light of a diamond spreads over a wider space than is occupied by the diamond, in the same way even though the Jîvâtman resides in the heart, his chaitanya spreads over the whole body. 'गुण' cannot exist without द्रव्य, hence if the Jîvâtman resides in the heart, and is of the size of an atom, his chaitanya would not be सर्वशरीरव्यापि; this objection is set aside by Bâdarâyaṇa on the analogy of गन्ध.[1] Vedic passages also teach the aṇutva of the Jîvâtman. The श्रुति passage, 'प्रज्ञया शरीरं समारुह्य', teaches that by चैतन्यगुण the Jîvâtman pervades the whole body. Hence the conclusion is that the Jîvâtman is of the size of an tom. Why is the Jîvâtman then said to be विभु, etc., if it is really aṇu? If the Jivâtman is really different from Brahman, why is 'तत् त्वमसि' etc., taught by the Vedic passages? These questions the author of the sûtras answers in 'तद्गुणसारत्वात् तु तद्व्यपदेशः प्राज्ञवत्' 2-3-29. The Jîvâtman is described as विभु Brahman, etc., because he derives these attributes from Brahman on the analogy of the प्राज्ञ. Just as the प्राज्ञ, though a सुषुप्तिसाक्षिन्, is, in Bṛihadâraṇyaka, described as possessing the attributes like अपहतपाप्मत्व, etc., which are Brahman's असाधारणधर्मs, similarly when the ब्रह्मत्व of the Jîvâtman is to be emphasised, he is described as विभु, etc. This is the interpretation favoured by Nimbârka and Vallabha, and it is strengthened by the preceding sûtra 'नाणुरतच्छ्रुतेरिति चेन्नेतराधिकारात्' 2-3-23, where विभुत्व, etc., are said

1. Modern science may detect a flaw in this reasoning, but Bâdarâyaṇa's view is clear. He wants to say that the Jîvât an's residence in the heart, his aṇutva, and his 'सर्वशरीरव्यापि चैतन्' are all possible.

to be attributed to the Jîvâtman to declare his Brahmanhood. Hence, according to Bâdarâyaṇa, the Jîvâtman is *aṇu*, when in Brahmabhâva he experiences विभुत्व, etc., on account of his Brahmanhood. Râmânuja, Madhva, Nimbârka and S'reekantha all accept the Jîvâtman to be *aṇu*.

S'aṇkara interprets the sûtras 2-3-19-28 as belonging to पूर्वपक्ष, and 2-3-29—'तद्गुणसारत्वात् तु तद्व्यपदेशः प्रा वत्' as सिद्धान्तसूत्र refuting and rejecting the Jîvâtman's *aṇutva* and accepting his विभुत्व. With some reservation, Bhâskara follows S'aṇkara, and VijnanaBhikshu, though breaking the adhikaraṇa from 'पृथगुपदेशात्', says that Jiva's *aṇutva* is due to उपाधि. S'aṇkara explains the sûtra thus:—the first 'तद्' of the sûtra 2-3-29 refers to 'बुद्धि उपाधि', etc., and the second 'तद्' to अणुत्व, etc., that the Jîvâtman through the adjuncts of बुद्धि उपाधि, etc., is described as *aṇu*, just as the 'प्राज्ञ', the supreme soul, though devoid of any विशेषs, is described s possessed of all धर्मs, and called सर्वज्ञ, सर्वशक्तिमत्, etc., which are ब्रह्मलिंगs. S'aṇkara's interpretation has one advantage over that of Râmânuja, Madhva, and S'reekantha in the fact that he explains the instance of 'प्रा ' somehow, while the other writers fail to make out much of it. In fact, they seem to have lost sight of its importance. Dr. Thibaut has also neglected to consider its importance. But Vallabha manages to interpret it, in an exactly opposite way, by showing the appropriateness of the instance. He says, just as प्राज्ञ who is merely a सुषुप्तिसाक्षिन्, who is not Brahman, is attributed ब्रह्मधर्मs on account of his Brahmanhood, so the Jîvâtman on account of his Brahmanhood is described as विभु, etc., though he is अणु. Vallabha's explanation has this advantage that he has not to add words like बुद्धि or उपाधि which re never suggested in any of the sûtras of Bâdarâyaṇa either preceding or followi g this sûtra. Bh sk ra' reference to 'विज्ञानमनसी'

2-3-15, in support of his reference of first 'तद्' to उपाधि, does not improve the case by the absence of any reason for tr nslating 'विज्ञानमनसी' not as इन्द्रियs but बुद्धि and उपाधि. The distance between the two sûtras suggests an inference against Bhâskara.

But S'aṇkara's arguments in favour of विभुत्व deserve to be considered independently. He observes in 2-3-29, 'नैतदस्ति अणुरात्मेति, उत्पत्त्यश्रवणात्, परस्यैव तु ब्रह्मणः प्रवेशश्रवणात्, तादात्म्योपदेशाच्च परमेव ब्रह्म जीव इत्युक्तम्, परमेव चेद् ब्रह्म जीवस्तस्माद् यावत्परं ब्रह्म, तावानेव जीवो भवितुमर्हति, परस्य च ब्रह्मणः विभुत्वमाम्नातम्, तस्माद् विभुः जीवः'. S'aṇkara thus advances three arguments in favour of the Jîvâtman's विभुत्व, *viz.*, (1) उत्पत्त्यश्रवण, (2) परस्यैव ब्रह्मणः प्रवेश, (3) तादात्म्योपदेश. It is worthy of note that none of these arguments find any support from the sûtras of Bâdarâyaṇa. The first rgument, which S'aṇkara gives, in favour of the विभुत्व of the Jîvâtman, has been used by Bâdarâyaṇa to establish the eternity of the human soul, hence it cannot be taken to be conclusive. The denial of उत्पत्ति does not conclusively prove that the Jîvâtman is विभु. It cannot be said because Jîva's उत्पत्ति has been denied, it is Brahman, and hence विभु. The very argument goes against S'aṇkara's view of अविद्या, which he accepts to be without उत्पत्ति—अनादि. It cannot be said because अविद्या has no उत्पत्ति it is ब्रह्मन्. To this, it may be urged on behalf of S'aṇkara that the acceptance of any duality being opposed to the प्रतिज्ञा of 'एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानम्', the नित्यत्व suggested by the denial of उत्पत्ति, results in अभेद-ब्रह्मन्, while अनादित्व alone suggests मिथ्यात्व as in the c se of अविद्या, that is, there cannot be two things eternal, he ce the नित्यत्व of Jîva, taught by the Sûtrakâra, teaches th t Jîva is Brahman, and hence विभु, while अविद्या though अनादि has an end, hence it is मिथ्या.

To this argument, an answer is furnished from the ûtras of Bâdarâyaṇa. Even accepting the Jîvâtman to

be नित्य and अणु, there is no विरोध of the प्रतिज्ञा of 'एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानम्.' This प्रतिज्ञा can be fulfilled by accepting the Jîvâtman to be an अंश of Brahman, as taught by Bâdarâyaṇa later on in 'अंशो नानाव्यपदेशात्', etc., or by taking the human soul to be a शक्ति of Brahman as done by Nimbârka, or प्रकार or विशेषण by Râmânuja, and by taking the अंश jîva to be अनन्य with Brahman on the principle laid down by the Sûtrakâra in 'तदनन्यत्वमारंभणशब्दादिभ्यः' 2-1-14. The अंश, according to Bâdarâyaṇa, is अनन्य with अंशिन् Brahman, the शक्ति is अनन्य with शक्तिमत् Brahman, the विशेषण is अनन्य with विशेष्य Brahman; hence the knowledge of अंशिन् Brahman includes the knowledge of अंश Jîvâtman. The प्रतिज्ञा on the other hand goes radically gainst S'aṇkara's view, because it can be possible of fulfilment only when there is 'one' and 'all', and that 'one' is 'all'. The difficulty arising from the Vedic passages teaching the निरवयवत्व of Brahman can well be answered on the principle laid down by Bâdarâyaṇa in 'श्रुतेस्तु शब्दमूलत्वात्' 2-1-27. Thus the denial of the उत्पत्ति of the human soul cannot be worked out to prove that jîva is Brahman विभु. It cannot be taken to be the view of the author of the Sûtras.

The second argument of S'aṇkara is based on passage from the छान्दोग्य (VI), 'अनेन जीवेन आत्मना अनुप्रविश्य नामरूपे व्याकरवाणि'. Para Brahman's entrance is taught in this ति, hence says S'aṇkara, that the Jîvâtman is the same as Para Brahman विभु. According to the reasoning of S'aṇkara, in the first place, there can be no प्रवेश, the परब्रह्मन् being व्यापक. Nor can we interpret प्रवेश in the sense of संयोग, for Brahma being व्यापक inside and outside the सृष्टि, even without the declaration of प्रवेश Brahman could have developed names and forms. With this श्रुति if we read 'द्वा सुपर्णा' श्रुति teaching co-existence of Brahman and Jîva, the sense

that can be made out is this, that the supreme enters with the Jîvâtman, and then develops names and forms. The difficulties, presented by the अद्वैतश्रुतिs and व्यापकत्वश्रुतिs, can be answered by Bâdarâyaṇa on the authority of 'श्रुतेस् शब्दमूलत्वात्' 2-1-27. Hence the argument of Para Brahman's वेशश्रवण is not conclusive on the point of Jîva's विभुत्व.

The third argument of S'aṇkara is तादात्म्योपदेश. This argument is based on the passage of the छान्दोग्य which runs thus: 'स एष अणिमा, ऐतदात्म्यं इदं सर्वं, तत् सत्यं, स आत्मा, तत् त्वम् असि'. It is taught by Uddâlaka to his son S'vetaketu. This argument is on the whole stronger than the two preceding ones. But even here one cannot say that this तादात्म्योपदेश is in the sense of S'aṇkara. The 'तत्' of 'तत् त्वमसि', as[1] Ranga Râmânuja remarks, refers to ऐतदात्म्य. The Vedic passage has been spoken with a view to teach श्वेतकेतु 'the knowledge of everything by the knowledge of one'. With this end in view Uddâlaka teaches his son that 'इदं सर्वं' this whole visible, universe is ऐतदात्म्य—a प्रकार of सद्, it is सत्य because सद् is its आत्मा, श्वेतकेतु, thou art that ऐतदात्म्य— प्रकार of सद्, तत् being a pronoun refers to the noun ऐतदात्म्य. But apart from this, the fact remains that Jîva as such is not Brahman; then why does श्रुति say so? To the Vaidika the letter of the Veda is all in all. Its authoritativeness cannot be questioned by him.

According to S'aṇkara, 'तत् त्वम् असि' is possible thus. तत् refers to Brahman, freed from अविद्या and its products, *viz.* omniscience, omnipotence, etc., while त्वम् refers to the human soul, freed from अविद्या and its adjuncts अल्पज्ञत्व, अणुत्व, अंशत्व, कर्तृत्व, etc. Thus in both तत् and त्वम् a लाक्षणिक secondary sense is to be preferred in perfect disregard of the अभिधा—primary sense. S'aṇkara's preference for secondary

1 छान्दोग्यटीका, आनन्दाश्रम Series.

sense cannot be supported by any sûtr of Bâdarâyaṇa. In addition to this, the result is that all उपासनारूपs of Brahman become the products of अविद्या, the कार्यs and अंशs of Brahman become मिथ्या, and श्रुति passages and sûtras, teaching कारणत्व and अंशित्व of Brahman, become असद् अर्थवादs. The result is that one arrives at a point where the demarcation line between S'aṇkara's निर्विशेषवाद—absolutely negative system, singularism, and शून्यवाद of Mâdhyamika becomes a problem of doubt and difficulty. One cannot seriously dispute that there is Buddhistic influence working here somewhere in one form or another.

But if we take Jîva as अंश of Brahman following the letter of Bâdarâyaṇa, then there is लक्षणा only of 'तत्,' and this too is not असत्पर्यवसायिनी, but as Vallabha says, just as the crown-prince becomes king, so Jîva becomes Brahman, and he experiences ब्रह्मभाव, he experiences विभुत्व, etc., the धर्मs of ब्रह्मन्, side by side with his अणुत्व. The result here is सत्पर्यवसान. The Vedic passage, 'स आनन्त्याय कल्पते', also favours this view; besides the theories of Saguṇa Nirguṇa Brahmans, जगन्मिथ्यात्व, etc., resulting from S'aṇkara's reasoning, have not to be resorted to. On the acceptance of 'अनन्यत्व' of 'अंशिन्' Brahman and अंश Jîva on the principle taught by Bâdarâyaṇa in the sûtra, 'तदनन्यत्वमारंभणशब्दादिभ्यः' 2-1-14, the तादात्म्योपदेश can well be explained. The काठकश्रुति teaches that just as water, coming in contact with pure water, becomes तादृक्, so the soul of the muni, knowing Brahman, becomes तादृक्. The word is तादृक् and not तत्. If Jîva were परमार्थतः Brahman, then this illustration cannot be explained. 'वास्तवयत्किञ्चिद्भावे अस्य दृष्टान्तस्य सर्वथानुपपत्तेः'. Thus we are driven to the conclusion that the Sûtrakâra's long list of sûtras confirms the view that Jîva is अणु, his विभुत्व is spoken in the state of ब्रह्मभाव to establish his Brahmanhood. Dr. Thibaut also remarks that it is strange that पूर्वपक्ष could be so very lengthy.

If the reasoning above adopted is correct, then S'aṇkara's remark, 'तस्माद् दु नित्वाभिप्रायमिदमणुत्ववचनमुपाध्यभिप्रायं वा द्रष्टव्यम्', has no bearing whatever so far as the sûtras of Bâdarâyaṇa are concerned. It also follows from what has been said above that S'aṇkara's interpretation of the next three sutras 2-3-30-31-32 does not seem to bring out the view of the Sûtrakâra. The Sûtrakâra nowhere suggests this बुद्धिसंयोग or उपाधिसंयोग. The sûtra, 'यावदात्मभावित्वाच्च न दोषः तद्दर्शनात्', is not very clear. The objection why low हीन-Jiva is said to be the highest Brahman is set aside by saying that once the Brahmanhood of the Jîvâtman becomes manifest, he continues for ever to experience Brahmatva and with it विभुत्व also. It is well said:—

'व्यापकत्वश्रुतिस्तस्य भगवत्त्वेन युज्यते ।
आनन्दांशाभिव्यक्तौ तत्र ब्रह्माण्डकोटयः ।
तीयेरन् परिच्छेदो व्यापकत्वं च तस्य तत् ॥'

Aṇu Bhas'ya. 2-3-30.

The Brahmanhood—विभुत्व, etc., before the Jîvâtman experiences ब्रह्मभाव, is latent in him; in the state of ब्रह्मत्व, विभुत्व, etc., develop in him on the analogy that पुंस्त्व which is latent in a child develops in him when he attains puberty. 'पुंस्त्वादिवत् तु अस्य सतोऽभिव्यक्तियोगात्' 2-3-31. The next sûtra confirms this view. Hence the Jivatman according to Bâdarâyaṇa is अणु, and not व्यापक or विभु as S'aṇkara says; the Jîvâtman is spoken of as Brahman in secondary sense so long as he is in संसारदशा, but when he is in मुक्तिदशा, when his ब्रह्मत्व becomes प्रकट—his ब्रह्मत्वव्यपदेश is मुख्यवृत्त—in primary sense. Thus it appears that S'aṇkara has clearly misunderstood the sûtra 2-3-29. Regarding this Dr. Thibaut also observes:—'Now, in the first place, nothing in context warrants the explanation of the first *'tat'* by *Buddhi*. And—which is more important in the second place, it is more th doubtful whether ccording

to S'aṇk ra's own system the qualities of the Buddhi such s pleasure, pain × × etc., can with any propriety be said to constitute the essence of the soul even in the samsâra state. The essence of the soul in whatever state, according to S'aṇkara's system, is knowledge or intelligence; whatever is due to its association with the buddhi is nonessential or, more strictly, unreal, false'. (Vedanta Sûtra 1-page 55.) Hence S'aṇkara is not right in turning the जीवा त्वबोधक sûtras s belonging to पूर्वपक्ष.

I The next adhikaraṇa, consisting of sûtras 33 to 39, establishes that the Jîvâtman is a kartâ. In support of the Jîvâtman's *kartritva*, the Sûtrakâra gives the following reasons:—(1) शास्त्रार्थवत्त्व, (2) वि रोपदेश, (3) करणोपादान and (4) क्रियाव्यपदेश. The 'च' in the sûtra 2-3-36, 'व्यपदेशाच्च क्रियायां न चेन्निर्देशविपर्ययः' ends the list of reasons given by the Sûtrakâra in support of the Jîvâtman's *kartriva*. The next three sûtras deal with the question how it is that Jîv who is a kartâ does sometimes good or bad to himself. The sûtra says just as the eye sees pleasant as well as unpleasant objects, so the Jîvâtman does actions which are sometimes beneficial or harmful to himself, because his powers are crippled, and he has no समाधि which helps II one to perceive what is हित or अहित. 'उपलब्धिवदनियमः', 'शक्तिविपर्ययात्', 'समाध्यभावाच्च', 2-3-37-38-39. The 'च' in the last sûtra, 'समाध्यभावाच्च' ends the list of reasons given for हिताहितकरण. After once referring the sûtra 'उपलब्धिवदनियमः' to हिताहितकरणदोष, S'aṇkara's referring the next sûtra 'शक्तिविपर्ययात्' to refute Buddhi's Kartṛitva, and then again the last sutra 'समाध्यभावाच्च' to show that the Jîvâtman is a kartâ, is rather forced. The propriety of 'च' comes in the way, and Bâdarayâṇa's reading 'समाध्यभावाच्च' instead of 'समाधिभावाच्च' is also difficulty to meet which we have to strain ourselves to make out the se e.

The next sûtra is 'यथाच तक्षोभयथा' 2-3-40. It is very important. The diversity in the interpretations of this sûtra by different Bhâshyakâras has enhanced our interest in it. S'aṇkara in this sûtra puts forth the view that the *kartṛitva* of the Jîvâtman, established by Bâdarayâṇa in the previous adhikaraṇa, is not Jîvâtman's स्वाभाविक *kartṛitva* but उपाधिनिमित्त. the Jîvâtman's *kartṛitva* is a product of nescience, as a matter of fact, the human soul is अकर्ता. With this end in view, S'aṇkara proceeds to interpret the sûtra thus: The 'च' in the sûtra is used in the sense of 'तु', and thereby it refutes the view, put forth in the previous adhikâraṇa that Jîvâtman is a स्वाभाविककर्ता. The Jîvâtm n's कर्तृत्व, according to S'aṇkara, is not स्वाभाविक in the sense that heat is स्वाभाविक in fire; on the contrary as in the case of तक्षा who busies himself with the axe and other tools in his hands, and feels pain, but afterwards goes home, lays aside his axe and other tools, and in his n tural state rejoicing and at ease feels pleasure, so too the soul s long as it is affected by the duality founded on ignorance, is busied in the st te of dreaming nd waking, and feels pain, but when it enters into itself to throw off weariness into the highest self, it is freed from the complexity of the organs of work, is not an agent and feels pleasure in the state of deep sleep; it is the same in the state of liberation where it is केवल, reposes, and is happy after gloom of Ignorance is driven away by the torch of knowledge. The simile of the c rpenter is to be taken s follows:— the carpenter is, in respect of various kinds of work such s fitting, etc., and with regard to certain tools s ch as his axe, etc., an agent, but not an agent so f r as his body goes, so too the soul in its exertions with regard to the org ns, manas, etc., is n gent, but not an agent with regard to his own self. The soul, as opposed to the carpenter, h s not lik hi , limbs with which it could t k

up the org ns, m nas, etc., or l y them side, as the c r-penter with his hands takes up, and l ys aside his tools.

Though this interpretation ppears to have been worked out very ingeniously, it is nevertheless a forced one. How can it be for a moment supposed that Bâdarâ-yaṇa uses the 'च' in the sense of ' '? How can one convince the opponent that 'च' is used in the sense of 'तु'? It is more than probable that S'aṇkara is trying here to put forward a view that seems to have bee never thought of by the Sûtrakâra. It is certain that this is not the view of the Sûtrakâra, and one cannot seriously dispute that S'aṇkara here is reading his own individual opinion into the sûtra of Bâdarâyaṇa. This opinion is strengthened by Dr. Deussen who, in his 'System of Vedanta' page 319, referring to S'aṇkara's taking 'च' in the sense of 'तु', says thus: 'a remark which possibly hints at fundental differences between Bâdarâyaṇa and S'aṇkara'.

It is better to take the sûtra a Râmânuja does, as s pplement to what has been said before. If the human soul were स्वाभावि कर्ता, as is taught in the preceding adhik raṇa, then, says the opponent, he would lways remain as such–कर्ता–and hence he would never be free from action. To such an objection this sûtra furnishes an answer:—Just as a तक्षा even h ving with him an axe, etc., works or does not work at will, so the Jîvâtman even though possessed of organs of speech, etc., (वागादि रणसंपन्न), t will works or does not work. Hence no अनिर्मोक्षप्रसंग.

Vallabha also considers this sûtra to be a supple ent to the theory of the Jîvâtman's कर्तृत्व propounded in the preceding sûtras. According to him, the Jîvâtman is not only a *Kartâ* but a *Bhoktâ* also. It is not necessary, s ys Vallabha, th t *Kartâ* and *Bhoktâ* ought to be separ te; just s तक्षा h ving m de the ch riot rides in it, so the Jîvâtm

does somethi g, and enjoys it. V llabh further says that कर्तृत्व by its very nature is not दुःखरूप nple sant; drinking milk, etc., is सुखरूप pleasant.

In either case the view that the Jîvâtman's कर्तृत्व is औपाधिक or आविद्यक, and that he is परमार्थतः an अकर्ता is not accepted. Whether one accepts Râmânuja's or Vallabha's rendering, it does not matter much; both seem to be more natural than that of S'aṇkara.

It has been shown that S'aṇkara's rendering of the sûtr , 'यथा च तक्षोभयथा' 2-3-40, is forced. The sûtra does not seem to consider the question whether the Jîvâtman's कर्तृत्व is स्वाभावि or औपाधिक, but as Râmânuja remarks, this sûtra teaches the कर्तृत्व or अकर्तृत्व of the Jîvâtman at will, just as a carpenter works or takes rest at will. S'aṇkara cannot quote any sûtra to prove the र्तृत्व of the Jîvâtman to be औपाधिक or आविद्यक. This sûtra cannot help him much. If the Jîvâtman's स्वा ाविक कर्तृत्व is to be questioned at all, it can be referred to be due to परब्रह्मन् on the authority of the next sûtra, 'परात्तु तच्छ्रुतेः' 2-3-41, rather than to बुद्धि or उपाधि. S'aṇkara has, however, independently of the Sûtrakâra, advanced the following arguments against the Jîvâtman's स्वाभाविक कर्तृत्व. (1) If Jîva's कर्तृत्व is स्वाभाविक, then as अग्नि cannot be free from heat, so Jîva cannot be free from कर्तृत्व, hence अनिर्मोक्षप्रसंग. (2) कर्तृत्व is दुःखरूप. (3) मोक्षसिद्धि is referred to नित्यशुद्ध द्ध मुक्त soul. (4) Some श्रुति passages teach Jîva's कर्तृत्व to be आविद्यक. For these reasons, says S'aṇkar , the Jîvâtman is an अकर्ता.

The first objection c n be met by taking the interpretation of the sûtra like Râmânuja. On the other hand, if बुद्धि's कर्तृत्व is insisted upon, then as बुद्धि is अचेतन, there can be no motive for भोगवाञ्छा, etc., hence कर्तृत्व would be नित्य. Vallabha also advances the same arguıents in different words. He observes:—'न च हजकर्तृत्वे

अनिर्मोक्षप्रसंगः, पराधीनकर्तृत्वे एवैतदिति, सांख्य तन्मतानुसारिणो वान्यस्य भ्रम एव कर्तृत्वे न मुक्तिः, नपुंसक एवमुच्येत, बा वत्, निरिन्द्रियस्यैव समाधिरित्यपि, करणत्वेन बुद्धिवन्न केनापि दूष्यते, तस्मात् जीवस्य स्वाभाविकं कर्तृत्वम्, ध्यायतीव लेलायतीवेत्यपि परधर्मा करणम्। अयमप्येको धर्मः, स्वाप्ययसंपत्त्योर्ब्रह्मव्यपदेशं पुरस्कृत्य सर्वविप्लवं वदन् उपेक्ष्यः'. Again one fails to understand why S'aṇkara calls any sort of कर्तृत्व to be दुःखरूप. It depends on how one takes it. Considering कर्तृत्व to be दुःखरूप, imagining the existence of दुःख in आनन्दमय—all these go to suggest that S'aṇkara is influenced by deeply pessimistic leanings. When कर्तृत्व is taken in the light of the ब्रह्मविद्, when individual soul's कर्तृत्व is declared to be Brahman's, then there seems to be no valid objection. With great force does Vallabha observe in 1-1-1:—'न च ब्रह्मरूपात्मविज्ञाने देहाध्यासाभावेन कर्तृत्वाभावात् कर्मानधिकार इति वाच्यम्, निरध्यस्तैरेव देहादिभिः कर्मकरणसंभवात्, अत एव जीवन्मुक्तानां सर्वे व्यापाराः, तथाच स्मृतिः, नैव किंचित् करोम्यहमिति युक्तो मन्येत तत्त्ववित्, पश्यन् शृण्वन् स्पृशन् जिघ्रन् अश्नन् गच्छन् स्वपन् श्वसन्, प्रलपन् विसृजन् गृह्णन् उन्मिषन् निमिषन् अपि, इन्द्रियाणीन्द्रियार्थेषु वर्तन्ते इति धारयन्, ब्रह्मण्याधाय कर्माणि संगं त्यक्त्वा करोति यः, लिप्यते न स पापेन पद्मपत्रमिवांभसा'. 'ब्रह्मार्पणं ब्रह्म हविः ब्रह्माग्नौ ब्रह्मणा हुतं, ब्रह्मैव तेन गन्तव्यं ब्र कर्मसमाधि ना.' These quotations from Geeta show how कर्मs are to be performed. They do not say that Jiva is an अकर्ता, but th t he has to be a कर्ता with ब्रह्म by his side. The misery is due to अभिमान and not to कर्तृत्व. Hence Bâdarâyaṇa teaches that Jiva's कर्तृत्व is due to पर-ब्र न्.

The श्रुति passages can be explained otherwise. The quotation from न्दोग्य does not teach कर्तृत्वाभाव, but that कर्तृत्व is due to आत्मन्-ब्रह्मन्-(7th प्रपाठक). Bâdarâyaṇa teaches the same in परात्तु तच्छ्रुतेः 2-3-41. To add to all this, the Sûtrakâra never suggests any of S'aṇkara's arguments, but boldly goes on declaring Jîva's कर्तृत्व. Hence the most skilful advocate of S'aṇkara would fail on this point. Thus the Jîvâtman's कर्तृत्व is स्वाभाविक.

The ne t two sûtras 2- -41-42, declare that though the Jîvâtman is कर्ता, he derives his कर्तृत्व from Brahman–पर. It is impossible for any balanced thinker to reconcile S'a-kara's reasoning with that of the Sûtrakâra in 2-3-41-42 'परात् तु तच्छ्रुतेः' 2-3-41. Bâdarâyaṇa says that श्रुति teaches Jîva's कर्तृत्व to be derived from पर-ब्रह्मन्; he does not say उपाधि. The next sûtra is ' तप्रय ापेक्षस्तु विहितप्रतिषिद्धावैयर्थ्यादिभ्यः' 2-3-42. This sûtra seems to have been written by Bâdarâ-yaṇa to refute the objection of वै म्य and नैर्घृण्य accruing to Brahman, by its being declared to be the final source of all activity–and thence of happiness and misery prevailing in the world at large. If S'aṇkara's interpretation is taken by itself without any reference to his esoteric doctrine of कर्तृक्रियारहित Brahman, it is quite in harmony with 2-1-34. All the Âchâryas take कृतप्रयत्नापेक्ष in the sense of जीवकृतप्रय-ापेक्ष, and say as प्रवाह is अनादि there is no वैषम्य, etc., because Brahman is जीव तप्रय ापेक्ष. In 3-2-38, 'फलमतः उपपत्तेः,' it is taught that Brahman allots fruits, and Jaimini's view that धर्म or मं allots fruits is refuted. Again in 3-2-5, [1]'पराभि-ध्यानात् तु तिरोहितं ततो ह्यस्य बन्धविपर्ययौ, bondage, etc., of the Jîvât-man are referred to परब्रह्मन्'s अभिध्यान. The Vedic passage, 'एष हि एव साधु कर्म कारयति यमेभ्यो लोकेभ्य उन्निनीषति,' etc., teaches that the Supreme Lord makes a human soul do good or bad actions according to His will to raise or lower him. The sûtra, 'परात् तु तच्छ्रुतेः,' states that the human activity has its source in Brahma . Hence it appears that when Brahman is the sole doer, He ought to be held liable for the misery and h ppiness of the Jîvâtmans, and they should not be made to suffer or enjoy the fruits of actions which are not strictly their own.

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1. S'aṇkara renders the sutra thus:—He refers the अभिध्यान to जीवकर्तृकपराभिध्यान. तिरोहितम् is rendered in the sense of अतिरोहितम्. This is far-fetched. It seems better, with Râmânuja, Madhva, Nimbârka and Vallabha, to take it as परब्रह्मन्'s अभिध्यान.

If we follow S'a.k r 's re soning, this दूषण of वैषम्य-नैर्घृण्य goes away. But then we have to cast aside the purport of ll the sûtras. Hence Bâdarâyaṇ must have in his mind view, which refutes this objection of वैषम्य, etc., d at the same time, is thoroughly consistent. The difficulty can be solved in two ways: *viz.*, (1) by referring this contradiction to Brahman's अचिन्त्यैश्वर्य and the letter of the Veda; the Veda teaches that Brahman gives fruits; it may be according to कर्मs, or may not be; though giving fruits according to कर्म, Brahman is independent of कर्म; when Brahman gives fruits according to His sweet will, even then He is not liable to वैषम्य, etc., for Veda teaches so; (2) by taking the कृतप्रयत्नापेक्ष not s जीवकृतप्रयत्नापेक्ष as all the आचार्यs have done, but as पर—(ब्र) कृतप्रयत्नापेक्ष. The advantage of t king the sûtra this way is clear. We have not to bring in the word जीव from the drift of the प्रकरण, but from the sûtr just preceding. According to this view, the whole सृष्टि becomes ब्र प्रयत्न. In 'आत्मकृतेः परिणामात्' 1-4-26, it is taught that the सृष्टि is आत्मसृष्टि and आत्मकृति; in 2-1-33 'ोकवत्तु ली ा कैवल्यम्,' it is taught that this ात्मसृष्टि आत्मकृति is ली ाकैवल्यम्; in 2-3-43, 'अंशो नानाव्यपदेशात्,' etc., it is taught that the Jîvâtman is n अंश of ब्रह्मन्; in 'पराभिध्यानात् तिरोहितं ततोह्यस्य बन्धविपर्ययौ' 3-2-5, it is taught that the Jîvâtman's Brahmanhood is तिरोहित—has become late t—by the अभिध्यान of Brahman, and to Brahman are due bond ge, etc. Hence it appears that Brahman, for His own sport alone, out of His sweet will, develops Himself into Jada-Jîva, nd still remaining transcendent, determines that particular Jîvatman will do a particular action, and He will give him particular fruit. So according to फलदानेच्छा, Brahm n rules His अंशs, Jîvas. As अंशs they are अनन्य with ब्रह्मन्. The human soul's position can be compared to an ctor. He has to play the part allotted to him in

ब्रह्मलीला; the happiness and misery trouble him so far as h forgets that his कर्तृत्व is Brahman's and not his ow ; in fact, happiness nd mise y are both creatures of Brahm , and cannot be said to be the criterion of deciding Brahman's partiality and cruelty; the moment the human soul realises that Brahman for His sport guides him to do this or that, he ceases to be miserable; his limited ideas of प्रियत vanish; he experiences 'साधूनां वसुधैव कुटुम्ब म्'. Forgetting his own कर्तृत्व, and remembering Brahman's तृत्व, the human soul ceases to be responsible for his so-called ctions; he feels buoyant. Like Brahman, he sees in the ली ा of Brahman आनन्द. The कर्तृत्व becomes thus source of pleasure, आनन्द—and not a source of misery as S'aṇkara says. Br hman makes Jîva work according to His अभिध्यान and लीलार्थकृतप्रय , otherwise His विहित and प्रतिषि would be purportless. The part allotted to Jîva by Brahman to pl y would be jeopardised. Thus this Jad -jîvâtmak —Nâm rûpâtmaka—Sṛishti bei g आत्मपरिणाम-आत्म ति, being Brahman' केव लीला, Brahman is not liable to the shortcomings of partiality nd cruelty. The wording of the sûtra, विहितप्रतिषिद्ध—i stead of विधिनिषेध—also helps us. In this way also, we have to deny in Jîva his अभिमान in कर्तृत्व, and emphasise that he is a creature guided by Br hman's will in all his actions. This seems to be the view of Bâdarâyaṇa suggested from the sûtras. With S'aṇk ra we can deny Jîv 's अभिमान in कर्तृत , but unlike him we prefer to refer all hum ctivity to Brahman s source, and not to उपाधि बुद्धि, etc.

The sectio , consisting of sûtras 2-3-43-53, deals with the question of the relationship of the soul to Brahman. According to Bâd râyaṇa, the Jîvâtman is the अंश of Brahman; Brahman is अंशिन्, while the Jîvâtman is अंश. Like master and servant, the human soul is not different from Brah ,but like sp rk and fire, h is नन्य with Br h n. The

Vedic mantr , पादो स्य र्वा भूतानि, and the Gîta passage, 'ममैवांशो जीव ोके जीवभूतः सनातनः', teach that the Jîvâtman is the अंश of Brahman. This is the view of the Sûtrakâra. However, S'aṇkara does not like to accept this view. Accordingly, S'aṇkara changes 'अंशः' into 'अंश इव'. To take अंश in the sense of 'अंश इव' is clearly modifying the view of Bâdarâyaṇa. Even though certain passages of the Upanishads declare Brahman to be निष्क -निरवयव, that does not justify us in rejecting the texts which teach the अंशत्व of the Jîvâtman. Adopting the reasoning which Bâdarâyaṇa has worked out in 2-1-26-27—'श्रुतेस्तु शब्दमूलत्वात्', the difficulty can be removed by accepting Brahman's swarûpa to be निरवयव, and at the same time having अंशs. In a शब्द माणशा like this, reasoning as such has very little scope.

This view is not singular. In this view, Vallabha is with us when he observes: 'ननु ब्रह्मणो निरवयवत्वात् कथं जीवस्यांशत्वमिति-वाच्यम्, नहि ब्रह्म निरंशं वा सांशमिति वा क्वचित् ोके सिद्धम्, वेदैकसमधिगम्यत्वात्, सा च श्रुतिः यथोपपद्यते तथा तदनु 'घनेन वेदार्थवि ानार्थं युक्तिः वक्तव्या, × × तत्रैषा युक्तिः

विस्फुलिंगा इवाग्नेर्हि जडजीवा विनिर्गताः ।
सर्वतःपाणिपादान्तात् सर्वतोऽक्षिशिरोमु ात् ॥
निरिन्द्रियात् स्वरूपेण तादृशादिति निश्चयः ।
सदंशेन जडाः पूर्वं चिदंशेनेतरे अपि ॥
अन्यधर्मतिरोभावान्मूलेच्छातो स्वतंत्रिणः ।

ब्र वादे अंशपक्ष एव' 2-3-43. This seems to be very fair view of interpreting Bâdârayaṇa's sûtras. But in spite of what Bâdarâyaṇa and Vallabha might say, the fact remains that this difficulty h s been fruitful in producing numerous theories as regards the relation of the human soul with Brahman. The very word अंश, though clearly meaning n अवयव, has been subjected to yield senses which, if not wrong, cannot be accepted to b correct, or at least cannot be supposed to represent the true view of Bâd rây .a.

S'aṇkar h been honest in saying that he does not ccept the theory that the Jîvâtman is अंश of Brahman, when he s ys that 'अंश' should be taken in the sense of 'अंश इव'. But other Âchâryas have worked, from the word 'अंश', a sense uit bl to their views. It need not be remarked that, according to Bâdarâyaṇa, अंश means a 'part'. The Vedic Mantra using the word 'पाद' also sugggests the same thing. Let us see what Bhâskara says. He remarks, 'अंशशब्दः कारणवाची, यथा पटस्यांशः तन्तुरिति', but this sense is not acceptable to him, and he remarks, 'तयोरिह ग्रहणं न भवति, किन्तूपाध्यवच्छिन्न ानन्यभूतस्य वाचको यमंशशब्दः प्रयुक्तो यथाग्नेर्विस्फुलिंगस्य'. Thus, according to Bhâskara, अंश means उपाध्यवच्छि न अनन्यभूत. निरवयव Brahman has अंश, the जीव, because the Vedic passage, 'यथाग्नेः क्षुद्राः विस्फुलिंगाः', teaches so. This अंश is भिन्नाभिन्न with Br hm , his अभिन्नत्व is स्वाभाविक, while भिन्नत्व is औपाधि . Bhâskara is right in remarking th t the Jîvâtman is अं of Br h ıan as spark is of fire, and that he is भिन्नाभिन्न, because श्रुति and सूत्र support it, but he is wrong in saying that भिन्नत्व is औपाधिक, for the श्रुति passage quoted does not support it.

Râmânuja takes the word अंश in the sense of विशि - वस्त्वेकदेश, nd so does S'reekantha. The relation between Brahman and the Jîvâtman is that of विशेष्य and विशेषण.

Nimbârka[1] takes अंश to mean शक्ति. The Jîvâtman is a शक्ति of Brahma . Hence, according to him, the relation between the Jîvâtman nd Brahman is that of शक्ति and क्ति त्. S'reekantha[2] also accepts this view.

According to Madhv , अंशs[3] are different like son and others, or non-different like hands, feet, etc. To the

1. 'अंशो हि शक्तिरूपो ग्रा : 2-3-42. वेदान्त ौस्तुभ of S'reenivâsa Ni bârka.

2. Sir R. Bhandarkar's Vaishṇavis p. 161.

3. *Vide* Râ ânuja's and S'ree Kantha's Bhâshyas on this sûtr a d Madhva's Bh shya.

first class belongs human souls and to the second मत्स्यादि incarnations of Vishṇu.

Râmânuja, S'reekantha, Nimbârka, Madhva, and Vijnânabhikshu accept the भेद between the Jîvâtman and Brahman to be स्वाभाविक. Vijnânabhikshu like Bâdarâyaṇa accepts वास्तव अंशत्व of the Jîvâtman on the analogy of spark and fire or son and father. भेद and अभेद are both स्वाभाविक. Vallabha says that भेद is ऐच्छिक. One notices that all these writers are labouring under difficulties. They do not, like S'aṇkara, say that अंश means 'अंश इव', but still, like Bâdarâyaṇa Bhikshu and Vallabha, they are not prepared to take अंश in its natural significance of a 'part'. It is safe with Bâdarâyaṇa to take the Jîvâtman to be अंश—part of Brahman, on the analogy of spark and fire on the authority of the same S'ruti passage, and to say that they are अनन्य on the principle laid down by the Sûtrakâra in 'तदनन्यत्वमारंभणशब्दादिभ्यः' 2-1-14.

The next two sûtras 2-3-46-47 declare that even though the Jîvâtman is an अंश of Brahman, and hence अनन्य with Brahman, Brahman does not suffer because the Jîvâtman suffers. 'प्रकाशादिवन्नैवं परः, स्मरन्ति च'. These two sûtras are quite consistent with what Bâdarâyaṇa has said before in 2-1-21-22. 'इतरव्यपदेशाद्धिताकरणादिदोषप्रसक्तिः', and 'अधिकं तु भेदनिर्देशात्', 2-1-28-29. Though the Jîvâtman is अनन्य with Brahman, still Brahman is अधिक, greater than the Jîvâtman. The same reasoning is followed here by Bâdarâyaṇa. He says though the Jîvâtman is the अंश of Brahman, and अनन्य with Brahman, still the परमात्मा is not affected by the miseries, etc. of the Jîvâtman because Brahman is पर-अधिक greater than the Jîvâtman. This reasoning would be possible only when the Jîvâtman's कर्तृत्व and भोक्तृत्व were स्वाभाविक, and not औपाधिक. How can the Jîvâtman, who is the अंश of Brahman, and अनन्य with

it, be different from Brahman so far as his suffirings, etc., are concerned? How can the Jîvâtman be thus भिन्नाभिन्न with Brahman, because भेद and अभेद are contradictory and cannot be in the same place? To such questions Bhâskara has well replied in 2-1-22, 'अधिकं तु भेदनिर्देशात्':—

'प्रमाणतश्चेत् प्रतीयेत को विरोधोयमुच्यते ।
विरोधे चाविरोधे च प्रमाणं कारणं मतम् ॥'

The प्रमाण is श्रुति, and श्रुति teaches so, therefore, there is no विरोध. The Veda and the sûtras teach both. According to the reasoning of S'aṇkara, these sûtras draw a distinction without difference, for happiness and misery are both creatures of nescience, अविद्या. The illustration given in the sûtra also goes against S'aṇkara.

The next two sûtras refute a further objection that though the Jîvatman is the अंश of Brahman, and अनन्य with Brahman, the karmas, enjoined in the Veda, have only an application to the Jîvâtman and not to Brahman, the reason for this being the Jîvâtman's देहसंबन्ध. There is सन्तति of देहसंबन्ध in one life, hence one is known as Brâhmaṇa, etc., during the period of that life, and he has to perform karmas accordingly. The सन्तति does not extend to next life, hence Jîva has to perform karmas according to देहसंबन्ध in that life. Here it appears that Bâdarâyaṇa gives देहसंबन्ध to be the cause of karmakaraṇa; so when one realises that his soul is different from the देह, he would cease to have any connection with the karmas and their fruits. Then he has to perform karmas on the principle, laid down in 'परात्तु तच्छ्रुतेः', and 'ब्रह्मार्पणं ब्रह्महविः ब्रह्माग्नौ ब्रह्मणा हुतं ब्रह्मैव तेन गन्तव्यं ब्रह्मकर्मसमाधिना', गीता. From this it appears that S'aṇkara is right in his rejection of देहाध्यासकर्तृत्व, but wrong in his absolute rejection of the Jîvâtman's kartṛitva. This accounts how देहाध्यासरहित जीवन्मुक्त sages, like Vaṣishṭha, S'uka, Sanatkumâra per-

formed कर्मठ actions. To them the कर्मकरण was neither 'ध प nor दुः रूप nor आविद्यक, but a परकर्म—ब्रह्मकर्म. They had a manifestation of ब्रह्म in कर्म. 'कर्मसु ब्रह्माभिव्यक्तिः'. This seems to be the proper view of looking at the connection between the two Mîmânsâs, and it appears that S'aṇkara is perh ps driving at the same thing when he observes in 'तत्तु समन्वयात्' 1-1-4, 'न हि धनिनो गृहस्थस्य धनाभिमानरहितस्य तदेव धनापहारनिमित्तं दुःखं भवति, न च कुण्डलिनः कुण्डलित्वाभिमानरहितस्य तदेव कुण् लित्वाभिमाननिमित्तं सुखं भवति+++मिथ्याभिमानस्तु प्रत्यक्षः संबन्धहेतुः'. So it follows, from what Bâdarâyaṇa and S'aṇkara say, that देहाध्यासकर्तृत्व is a cause of misery, but then the कर्तृत्व without देहाध्यास—देहसंबन्ध is not to be referred to अविद्या बुद्धि or उपाधि as S'aṇkara says, but to Brahman—पर as Bâdarâyaṇa says. Thus the performance of karmas, without देहाध्यास-देहाभिमान, as ब्रह्मकर्मs, produces in one ब्रह्माभिव्यक्ति in कर्मs, and ब्रह्मज्ञान produces ब्रह्माभिव्यक्ति in ज्ञान. The two Mîmânsâs thus help each other, and suggest the ideal of Brahman as ज्ञानक्रियाविशिष्ट, the क्रिया referring to सद्रूप, ान to चिद्रूप, and the two together to आनन्दरूप, thus giving the full conception of सच्चिदानन्द ब्रह्मन्. This see ıs to be the view of Bâdarâyaṇa, and we are unable to reconcile S'aṇkara's reasoing in 'तत्तु मन्वयात्', and the second interpretation of आनन्दमयाधिकरण with the sûtras of Bâdarâyaṇ . According to Bâdarâyaṇa, the human soul can be free from misery, etc., only when he realises that he does not do anything, but Brahman *Para* does it or makes him do it. *Avidyâ* as such has no place in the system of Bâdarâyaṇa.

Then comes the sûtra, 'आभास एव च'. This is read by Bhâskara as 'आभासा एव च'. He rejects the re ding of S'aṇkara with this remark: 'आभासस्यावस्तुत्वाभ्युपगमादवस्तुनः शशविषाणकल्पस्याचेतनस्य कुतो बन्धो मोक्षो वा कर्माधिकारो वा । न च परमात्मनः संसारित्वमस्तीत्युक्तं पुरस्तादतो नार्षः पाठ इति'. Râmânuj wants to favour Bhâskara's reading, and renders it by हेत्वाभास. It matters little whether the sûtra is read as 'आभासः' or 'आभासाः'. From what has been said above, it is not possi-

ble th t B^dar^y ṇ could h ve nt ' ' to efe t the Jîvâtman's being a मिथ्या-आभा of Br hm . Vallabh drives at the same thing, when he observes, 'ननु सच्चिदानन्दस्य ब्रह्मणोंशः सच्चिदानन्द ए भवेदतः प्रवाहे वेशो ग तश्च र्वकार्याणि तत्राह, आभास एव जीवः, आनन्दांशस्य तिरोहितत्वात् × × न र्वं । ति^ न्मिथ्यात्वं × × अतो न मिथ्यात्वरूप आ ासोत्र विवक्षितः'.

Before concluding the जीवविचारणा, the ûtr 1-4-22 may be considered. S'aṇkar adopts the view of काशकृ :— 'दर्शितं तु पुरस्तात् काशकृत्स्नीयस्य पक्षस्य श्रुतिमत्त्वम् × × ाशकृत्स्नस्याचार्य ावितः परमेश्वरो जीवो नान्य इति तम्, आश्मरथ्यस्य तु यद्यपि जीवस्य परस्मादनन्यत्वमभिप्रेतं, तथापि प्रतिज्ञासिद्धेरिति ापेक्षत्वाभिधानात् र्य ारणभावः कियानपि अभिप्रेत इति गम्यते, औडुलोमिपक्षे पुनः स मेवावस्थान्तरापेक्षौ भेदाभेदौ गम्येते, तत्र काशकृत्स्नीयं मतं श्रुत्यनुसारीति गम्यते, प्रतिपिपादयिषितार्था ारात् 'तत्त्वमसि' इत्यादिश्रुतिभ्यः'. S'aṇkara interprets काश त्स्नमत thus– 'अस्यै परमात्मनो नेनापि विज्ञानात्मभावेनावस्थानादुपपन्नमिदमभेदेनोपक्रमणम्'. Râ ṇ-nuja also takes काशकृत्स्न's view as सिद्धान्त view, nd expl i thus: 'य आत्मनि ति न् आत्मनो न्तर' इत्यादिना जी त्मनि पर त्मन आत्मतया अवस्थितेः'. Vallabha explains it th s:—'भगवत एवावस्था जीवः', but he takes ाश त्स्न's view to be different from that of Bâd rây aṇa–'अवस्थया व्यवसायात् सिद्धान्ताद्विशे :' Wh tver may be said s reg rds the view of ाश , it i certai that we c nnot say with perfect confid ce that it is the view of the Sûtrakâra. Bâdar^ yaṇ disti cty says th t the Jîva is अंश, and hence to tak काशकृत 's view s that of Bâdarâyaṇa, nd to t k it either in S'aṇk ra's sense or Râ â uj ' se i cert i ly strain on the sûtra. When the scope of the ाक्यान्वयाधिकरण is considered, one ees that after establishing th ब्रह्मवाक्यत्व of मैत्रेयीब्रा ण, Bâdarâyaṇ quotes th opinion of these writers, *viz.*, आश्मरथ्य, औडुलोमि and काशकृत्स्न, to show that according to their views lso the ब्रह्मत तिपादकत्व मैत्रेयीब्राह्मण is not ाधित. Therefore it is ot proper to work out Bâdarâyaṇa's view that विकृतब्रह्मन् is the s e जीव freed from अविद्या, etc., from ाशकृत्स्न's view.

Hence the conclusion is that 'ब्रह्मैव अविद्याभ्रान्तं जीवः' i not the view of the Sûtrakâra, neither is the human soul a प्रतिबिम्ब nor an आभास of ब्रह्मन् in S'aṇkara's sense. According to the Sûtrakâra, the Jîvâtman is अंश of Brahman as a spark of fire, it is अनन्य with Brahman, as अंश is with the अंशिन्, still Brahman is अधिक, greater than the Jîvâtman. The Jîvâtman is a कर्ता inheriting his कर्तृत्व from Brahman. He is नित्य. He is अणु, but in the stage of ब्रह्मभाव, he experiences विभुत्व, etc., which ever remain permanent, on the analogy that the crown-prince becomes the king. It appears thus that Bâdarâyaṇa accepts 'भेदसहिष्णुरभेद', and not S'aṇkara's absolute 'भेदासहिष्णुरभेद'. This conclusion is strengthened by the remark of Sir. R. Bhandarkar that S'aṇkara's system should be more fitly called 'Singularism', rather than Monism or Adwaitism. *Vide* Vaishṇavism. p. 159.

JA AT.

The second Sûtra of Bâdarâyaṇa gives the लक्षण of Brahman. From this definition of Brahman we know that according to Bâdarâyaṇa this universe is Brahman's कृति and परिणाम. Brahman is both the material and the efficient cause of the universe. It is important to note here that the definition of Brahman given by Bâdarâyaṇa must be of the same Brahman whose investigation he has proposed to undertake in the first sûtra 'अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा', that is, Brahman alone, pure and simple, whose investigation Bâdarâyaṇa has undertaken, is the material as well as the efficient cause of this universe. Bâdarâyaṇa again reverts to this question in 1-4-23-27. While refuting the Sâṇkhya's प्रकृतिकारणवाद, he elaborates his doctrine which he has expressed in brief before. The sûtra 'प्र तिश्च प्रतिज्ञाद न्तानुपरोधात्' 1-4-23 declares against the Sâṇkhya that Brahman is उपादान as well as

निमित्तकारण of the universe. The प्रति ा and द ान्तs of Uddâlaka naturally yield the same sense. To support Brahman's कर्तृत्व and प्र तित्व, Bâdarâyaṇa cites ब्रह्मन्'s अभिध्या. Brahman's ईक्षा, काम and बहुभवन support Brahman's उभयविधकारणत्व. The श्रुति and स्मृति both teach that the universe has its प्रभव and प्रलय in Brahman. This is also a reason why Brahman is both the material as well as the efficient cause of the universe. The next sûtra, 'आत्मकृतेः परिणामात्' 1-4-26, throws much light on the system of Bâdarâyaṇa. Whether one takes 'आत्मकृतेः परिणामात्' as one sûtra, or 'आत्मकृतेः' and 'परिणामात्' as two distinct sûtras, the result is almost the same. The sûtra is based on a passage from the तैत्तिरीय 2. 7. 'तदात्मानं स्वयमकुरुत'. This passage suggests the कर्मत्व and कर्तृत्व of Brahman, 'आत्मानमिति कर्मत्वं, स्वयमकुरुतेति कर्तृत्वम्'. How can the 'पूर्वसिद्ध' *sat* Brahman be कर्तृ and कर्म? The answer to this objection is 'परिणामात्'. The पूर्वसिद्ध *sat* आत्मा-ब्रह्मन् developed itself into the universe. Brahman is योनि. Thus Brahman's प्रकृतित्व is प्रसिद्ध. 'एवं ब्रह्मणः प्रकृतित्वं प्रसिद्धम्'. 1-4-27. Though Brahman is the material cause, it does not require a separate निमित्त as in the case of an earthen pot and potter. In the world, one sees that the उपादान and निमित्त are always separate, but this rule has no bearing whatever here. The swarûpa of Brahman is to be learnt from Veda alone, and since Veda teaches that Brahman itself becomes the उपादान and निमित्त, it should be accepted as such. 'यत्पुनरिदमुक्तमीक्षापूर्वकं कर्तृत्वं निमित्तकारणेषु एव कुलालादिषु लोके द ं नोपादानेष्ि ष्यादि, तत्प्रत्युच्यते, न लोकवदिह भवितव्यम्, न ह्ययमनुमानगम्योऽर्थः, शब्दगम्यत्वात्त्वस्यार्थस्य यथाशब्दमिह भवितव्यम्, शब्दश्चेक्षितुरीश्वरस्य प्रकृतित्वं प्रतिपादयतीत्यवोचाम'. This is what S'aṇkara observes on 1-4-27. The interpretation of S'aṇkara here is exactly in the spirit of Bâdarâyaṇa. Brahman with its ईक्षा develops itself into the universe a d still remains transcendent. Though the interpretation of S'aṇkara on these sûtras (1-4-23-27) is correct as it stands, the qualification which he has in hi

mind and which he suggests by the use of the word 'ईश्वर' inste d of Brahman, cannot be justified as legitimate. A Nimbârka writer Kes' vabhatta Kâshmîrin thus criticises S'aṇkara: 'पर ते तत्त्वं दुर्घटं, र्यस्य कल्पितत्वांगीकारेण कुला वदुपादान-गोचरप्रयत्नचिकीर्षादिमत्त्वासम्भवात् × × इ न्तासंभवादिति संक्षेपः. N. B. pp. 351-352. The same writer then criticises Râmânuja, 'केचित्तु चिदचिद्विशि ' ब्र गोपादानम् etc., pp. 352-353 N. B. Thus in order to emphasize अविकृतत्व of Brahm , Râmânuja and S'reekanth accepted चिदचिद्विशि ब्र न् as उपादान, Bhâskar and Nimbârka ccepted ब्र न्'s क्ति as उपादान, Madhv accepted प्रकृति to be the उपादान, Vijnan bhikshu also accepted ति to be the उपादान, the difference being that his कृति is अविभक्त with Brahma , and that it become the उपादान under the प of Brahman, while ब्र न् is only साक्षिन्. Here it is quite clear th t all these writers, though modifying the शुद्ध ब्रह्मन्' उपादानता, do ot reject it altogether. Now rem in the two writer S' ṇkara and Vallabha. Their views re entirely opposed. S'aṇkara by delegating Brahman's उपादानता to the sphere of अविद्या rejects it, while Vallabha like Bâd râyaṇa, following trictly the letter of the Ved , accepts it out and out. In rejecting Brahman's उपादानता, S' ṇk r h s to subject the whole body of the Vedânta sûtras to a secondary sense. श्रुति teaches ब्रह्मपरिणाम nd at the s me time its अविकृतत्व. Bâd râyaṇa does not care for the objectio s based on तर्क if the letter of the श्रुति is strictly followed. This view is followed by Vall bha, who, like Bâd rây ṇ , gives greater weight to the word of the श्रुति than to pure re son शुष्क त , when they appear opposed to e ch other. Other Âchâryas have tried to follow Bâdarâ-y with slight changes to tisfy reaso . It is only S' k r who in rejecting ' ब्दबलेन विरोधपरिहारः' has chalked out -lines of reasoni g *which run in an entirely opposite direction.* Sir R makṛishna Bhand rk r says the same in h' rece t bo k V i hn vism tc. pp. 15 -159, 160-161.

Drawing a distinction between Spinoza's Pantheism and Upanishad Pantheism he says:–'Brahman is not exhausted in the world, but it exists separately also. But the objection to this view is that Brahman, being of the nature of spirit, is not like the body divisible into parts, so that one may become developed into the world and another remain outside; × ×. This inconsistency is removed by Bâdarâyaṇa in Brahmasûtras (2-1-26-27). The argument is that though the Upanishads state that the constituent cause of the world is Brahman, they at the same time affirm the existence of Brahman separately from the world. (Ch. U. III, 12, 6 and VI, 3, 2.). The two are inconsistent on the theory that Brahman is a spirit and not discerptible into parts. Though they are thus inconsistent, they must both be accepted on the authority of the sacred texts, since the true nature of Brahman and the world is beyond the reach of human intellect. This solution of the difficulty is inadmissible to non-believers in the sacred texts, but it shows that Bâdarâyaṇa does not agree with the latter part of Spinoza's definition of Pantheism, *i. e.*, according to him the sacred texts do not affirm that "God exists only as realised in the cosmos: the cosmos exists only as a manifestation of God". The inconsistency pointed out by him is based on the impossible conception of Brahman's being divisible into parts. But it will not arise if, instead of bringing in this conception, we suppose that in one aspect Brahman is the material or constituent cause of the world or realised in the world, and from another point of view it remains pure and becomes the object of contemplation and devotion. Whatever it may be, Bâdarâyaṇa's view appears to me to be correct, and the Pantheism of the Upanishads is not exactly the same as that formulated by Spinoza. × × × ×

We have noticed above the m nner in which Bada-

râyaṇa removes the inconsistency between God's develop-ing himself into the world, while at the same time he is transcendent, and his being a simple spirit without parts. S'aṇkarâchârya fairly explains, I think, Bâdarâyaṇa's view. But raising a further objection he brings in his own doctrine eventually that the so-called development of Brahman into the world is fancied by ignorance and is not true, that is, the world is an illusion. There are two doctrines indicative of the relation of God to the world, the so-called Pariṇâmavâda and the Vivartavâda. The former implies real development, and the latter, an illusive development. This last is the doctrine of S'aṇkârachârya, wherefore his system should be called Singularism rather than spiritual monism; while the first is that clearly held by the author of the Sûtras. This is evident from his very definition of Brahman as that from which every-thing originates, in which everything lives, and into which everything resolves itself in the end, and from the manner in which in the first Pada of the second chapter, he answers the objections based upon the theory that an intelligent being cannot develop into non-intelligent or insensate matter; and S'aṇkarâchârya himself acknowledges at the end of his comment on 2-1-14, that the author of the Sûtras follows the Pariṇâma doctrine, though to save his theory he imagines without any grounds that Bâdarâyaṇa has in his view the ordinary or illusory condition of things in doing so. S'aṇkara-chârya's Vivartavâda it was which the later schools of Vaishṇavism and S'aivism contended against; for according to him it leaves no scope for the relation of the ruler and the ruled, *i. e.* God and the devotee in the condition of reality when all illusion is dispelled and one spirit alone exists (2-1-14). Most of them adopted Bâd rây aṇa's Pari âm vâd , b t the distinctness of God,

man and the world, which was necessary for the validity of their doctrines of worship and devotion, they secured by qualifying the mode of development. By this qualification they also steered clear of the inconsistency pointed out by Bâdarâyaṇa in 2-1-26. So that his mode of satisfaction was not necessary for them'. After this, Sir R. Bhandarkar gives in brief the doctrines of Râmânuja, Nimbârka, Vallabha, Madhva, and S'rîkantha S'ivâchârya, shows how they have followed or qualified the Pariṇâmavâda of Bâdarâyaṇa, and concludes thus:—"Thus most of these schools avoid the Pantheism of Spinoza, and the incompatibility between God's development into the world and his transcendency by holding that the rudiments of the material and the spiritual world associated with God as his characteristics[1] or as his body[2] or as his power,[3] only undergo development, he himself remaining pure. Vishṇusvamin and Vallabha, admitting as they do, the development of Purushottama into the world and at the same time his transcendency, follow Bâdarayaṇa. The mysterious[4] power which causes the differences by rendering certain qualities imperceptible, may be compared to the self-determining power of God involved in Spinoza's statement". Thus it follows that S'aṇkara in rejecting the ब्रह्मपरिणामवाद of Bâdarâyaṇa, has failed to represent the correct view of the Sûtrakâra, that Brahman alone is the material cause of the world.

Thus acccording to Bâdarâyaṇa the universe is an आत्मकृति and आत्मपरिणाम, or if we substitute the word 'ब्रह्मन्' for 'आत्मन्' then ब्रह्मकृति and ब्रह्मपरिणाम; the same Brahman whose investigation Badarayaṇa has undertaken, is itself both उपादान and निमित्त, causa materialis and causa efficiens

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1. Râmânuja. 2. Nimbârka. 3. Bhaskara. 4. 'आविर्भावतिरोभावौ शक्ती ब्रह्मणः'.

of the universe. Madhva, not accepting this, has failed to make out anything of the Brahma-sûtras. Sir R. Bhandarkar most accurately remarks, 'He denies his (Brahman's) being the material cause of the world. All the sûtras of Bâdarâyaṇa which set forth that doctrine have been interpreted by him in an entirely different way. Probably he would have set aside the Brahma-sûtras altogether, but he could not do so, since the work had acquired an uncontested authoritativeness as regards religious truth before his time. He had therefore to show that his system did not go against the Brahmasûtras and therefore accepted them and interpreted them in almost a fantastic manner. Texts from the Upanishads, too, which do not agree with his doctrines he treats similarly'. Vaishṇavism S'aivism. p. 58.

To a certain extent this remark of Sir R. Bhandarkar applies to Vijnâna-Bhikshu also. The difference between Madhva and Bhikshu is this:—Madhva wants to emphasize भक्त्युत्पादकब्रह्ममाहात्म्य, while Bhikshu is anxious to work out an अविरोध between the सांख्य, वैशेषिक, योग and Vedanta etc., an effort though praiseworthy, cannot be justified. But the most important reason which led all the writers to modify the ब्रह्मकारणता of Bâdarâyaṇa, is the fear of विकृति. If Brahman were taken to be the material cause, it would undergo change, and consequently it would be अनित्य and cease to be Brahman, नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्त. To avoid this difficulty S'aṇkara delegated Brahman's causality to अविद्या. 'अविद्याकल्पितेन च नामरूपलक्षणेन रूपभेदेन व्याकृताव्याकृतात्मकेन तत्त्वातत्त्वाभ्यामनिर्वचनीयेन ब्रह्म परिणामादिसर्वव्यवहारास्पदत्वं प्रतिपद्यते' 2-1-27. Râmânuja for the same reason did not accept the ब्रह्मस्वरूपपरिणाम, and substituted चिदचिद्विशिष्टशरीर instead of pure Brahman of Bâdarâyaṇa. 'मृत्सुवर्णादिवद् ब्रह्मस्वरूपपरिणामस्तु नैवाभ्युपगम्यते, अविकारत्वनिर्दोषत्वादिश्रुतेः' 2-1-13. R. B. Anand Press. II. 23. Similar is the reasoning of S'reekantha. Nimbârka and Bhâskara

for the same reason substitute ब्रह्मशक्ति instead of Brahman, 'ब्रह्म स्वशक्तिविक्षेपेण जगदाकारं आत्मानं परिणामयति' N. B. 347-57. 'परिणामो द्विविधः, स्वरूपपरिणामः शक्तिविक्षेपलक्षणपरिणामश्च, × × श्रीपुरुषोत्तमः स्वात्मक-स्वाधिष्ठितनिजशक्तिविक्षेपेण जगदाकारं स्वात्मानं परिणामयति' केशवभट्टकाश्मीरिन् & 'परिणामात् परिणामोऽत्र शक्तिविक्षेपरूपो, न तुस्वरूपपरिणामस्तस्मान्न विकारसंभावना-वकाश इति' परपक्षगिरिवज्र. p. 369. Thus according to Nimbârka writers, परिणाम is not Brahman's but its शक्ति's, the modification owing its existence to the fear of विकार. Similarly Bhâskara writes 'शक्तिविक्षेपं कृतवान्'. 1-4-25, p. 85 Bhaskara-Bhashya.

'अप्रच्युतस्वरूपस्य शक्तिविक्षेपलक्षणः ।
परिणामो यथा तन्तुनाभस्य पटतन्तुवत् ॥' 2-1-14.

स हि स्वेच्छया स्वात्मानं लोकहितार्थं परिणामयन् स्वशक्त्यनुसारेण परिणामयति'. भास्करभाष्य. 2-1-14. Thus Bhâskara also does not accept ब्रह्मपरिणाम. Vijnâṇabhikshu for the same reason rejects Brahman's उपादानकारणता and substitutes अधिष्ठानकारणता of Brahman 'ब्रह्मणश्च स्वाविभक्तप्रकृत्याद्युपष्टंभकत्वं साक्षितामात्रेणेति जगत्कारणत्वे-ऽपि न ब्रह्मणो विकारित्वं' भिक्षुभाष्य. p. 32. 1-1-2. Madhva also for the same reason refuses to accept Brahman's उपादानकारणता. Vallabha only is an exception to this rule. He accepts like Bâdarâyaṇa that Brahman alone is the उपादानकारण. Thus he accepts ब्रह्मस्वरूपपरिणाम. In this he seems to be following Bâdarâyaṇa as remarked by Sir R. Bhandarkar on pp. 160-161. in Vaishṇavism etc. It has been shown above that according to Bâdarâyaṇa, Brahman is the material as well as the efficient cause of the universe, in other words, this Jagat is ब्रह्मकृति and ब्रह्मपरिणाम. To this the III Sâṇkhya raises an objection in 2-1-26. 'कृत्स्नप्रसक्तिर्निरवयवत्व-शब्दकोपो वा'. If Brahman were the material cause, then either there would be कृत्स्नप्रसक्ति, and hence मूलोच्छेद, or the निरवयवत्वप्रति-पादक Vedic passages would have to be strained. To this the answer furnished by the Sûtrakâra is very significant. IV The Sûtrakâra says 'श्रुतेस्तु शब्दमूलत्वात्' 2-1-27. As श्रुति

teaches both, we accept both, that is, though Brahman
the material cause, still it is transcendent, it remains अविकृत
the reason being that the Swarûpa of Brahman is to b
learnt from Veda alone, and as Veda teaches that Brahma
is निरवयव and material cause without 'कृत्स्नप्रसक्ति' one mu
accept both. As Brahman is शब्दमूल the difficulty of विक
or निरवयवत्व does not stand. Tarka as such has no place in th
system of the Sûtrakâra. Hence it appears to be clear tha
all the Âchâryas, except Vallabha, who have modified th
शुद्धब्रह्मकारणता have failed to realise the attitude of Bâdara
yaṇa to the letter of the Veda. But except S'aṇkar
none is bold to reject the 'परिणामवाद' of Bâdarâyaṇa. Th
S'âṇkara Bhashya on 2-1-27 is a prominent instance whe
one sees S'aṇkara trying to create imaginary difficultie
and to superimpose his views on those of the Sûtrakâra
Explaining the Sûtra in the strain of the Sûtrakâra
S'aṇkara rightly concludes 'तस्मात् शब्दमूल एवातीन्द्रियार्थयाथात्म्याधि
गमः'. But with this, he is not satisfied and he remark
that even शब्द cannot set aside विरोध. Here we feel tha
S'aṇkara entirely misses the aim of the Sûtrakâra. H
conclusion that the whole world is अविद्याकल्पित owes it
existence to an imaginary difficulty of कृत्स्नप्रसक्ति-विकार creat
ed by himself which in its turn owes its origin to his failur
to revere the text of the श्रुति as infallible as the Sûtrakâr
has done, and whatever we may say as to his philosophica
merits, the undoubted fact remains that S'aṇkara is no
following the express words of the Sûtrakâra.

It has been shown above that S'ankara does no
follow the Sûtrakâra when he rejects Brahman's उपादान
कारणता; now we shall see how far he is correct in rejectin
Brahman's निमित्तकारणता. On this question Râmânuja
Nimbârka, Madhva, S'reekantha and Vallabha are unan
imous. All of them follow Bâdarâyaṇa. If Brahman wer
the efficient cause, kartṛi, it would be liable to the fault

of partiality and cruelty says S'âṇkara. To remove this difficulty he refers Brahman's activity to अविद्या. But that is not what Bâdarâyaṇa has said. According to the Sûtrakâra Brahman is neither partial nor cruel, for it is कर्मसापेक्ष. The जगत्प्रवाह is beginningless, and Brahman is possessed of all धर्मs. 'वैषम्यनैर्घृण्ये न सापेक्षत्वात्, तथाहि दर्शयति, न कर्माविभागादिति चेन्नानादित्वात्, सर्वधर्मोपपत्तेश्च'. Though S'âṇkara gains the advantage of removing Brahman's वैषम्यनैर्घृण्य by referring Brahman's कर्तृत्व to अविद्या, and thereby rejecting its कर्तृत्व, the other commentators do not accept it because it deals a terrible blow to all devotion and meditation, by delegating the Brahman's माहात्म्य to the sphere of sceptic illusion. 'अपिच त्वनाद्यविद्यानिबन्धना' भामती p. 406. N. S.

The first पाद of the second अध्याय gives us greater insight into the view of the Sûtrakâra regarding the universe. In the first Chapter, Bâdarâyaṇa has declared that Brahman alone is causa materialis and causa efficiens of the world. This proposition is laid down by Bâdarâyaṇa in the first Adhyaya on the authority of the Vedic texts. Now the Sâṇkhya opposes the Sûtrakâra by putting before him certain Smṛitis which teach the Sâṇkhya tenets. To this Bâdarâyaṇa replies that when we meet two sorts of Smṛitis, those in harmony with the Veda are to be preferred to those not following it. Manu and others teach ब्रह्मकारणता, hence they are to be preferred since they follow the Veda. This principle is also laid down by Jaimini in 'विरोधे तु अनपेक्ष्यं स्यादसति हि अनुमानम् । 1-3-3.' Now when the Sâṇkhya loses both on the grounds of श्रुति and स्मृति, he opposes the Sûtrakâra on the platform of reason. The Sûtrakâra, though he meets the Sâṇkhya on purely rational grounds, distinctly says that reason as such has no place in his system ultimately. His reasoning must be the reasoning favoured by the Ved . Had this been borne in mind by S'aṇkara, w do

not think, he would have proceeded to qualify the sense of the Sûtras after once explaining them accurately. And where S'aṇkara does not expressly qualifiy the sense of the Sûtra, his commentator does so. See भामती and [1]गोविन्दानन्द on [2]प्रकृत्यधिकरण. The Saṇkhya[3] begins by saying that as a rule cause and effect are similar, but since there is a dissimilarity between the cause Brahman which is चेतन, and the effect jagat which is *jada*, Brahman cannot be the material cause of Jagat. To this Bâdarâyaṇa replies that we do see an effect dissimilar to the cause, hence the objection does not stand. But here too we notice Bâdarâyaṇa's tendency to reject independent reasoning and falling back upon the words of the श्रुति 'तर्काप्रतिष्ठानात्' etc. 2-1-11.

The Sûtra 2-1-13 also is important. It deals with the question that even though the cause Brahman is the

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1. अत्र सूत्रे परिणामशब्दः कार्यमात्रपरः, न तु सत्यकार्यात्मकपरिणामपरः, 'तदनन्यत्वम्' इति विवर्तवादस्य वक्ष्यमाणत्वात् । रत्नप्रभा. pp. 341. 342. N. S. edition.

2. इयं चोपादानपरिणामादिभाषा न विकाराभिप्रायेणापि तु यथा सर्पस्योपादानं रज्जुरेवं ब्रह्म जगदुपादानं द्रष्टव्यम् etc. भामती pp. 342-343. N. S. edition.

3. In 2. 1. 4. 'न विलक्षणत्वादस्य तथात्वं च शब्दात्' S'aṇkara quotes a view of some one whom Govindanand calls एकदेशी thus:—'योऽपि कश्चिदाचक्षीत श्रुत्वा जगतश्चेतनप्रकृतिकतां तद्वलेनैव समस्तं जगच्चेतनमवगमयिष्यामि, प्रकृतिरूपस्य विकारे अन्वयदर्शनात्, अविभावनं तु चैतन्यस्य परिणामविशेषाद् भविष्यति, यथा स्पष्टचैतन्यानामप्यात्मनां स्वापमूर्च्छाद्यवस्थासु चैतन्यं न विभाव्यते, एवं काष्ठलोष्टादीनामपि चैतन्यं न विभावयिष्यते, एतस्मादेव च विभावितविभावितत्वकृताद्विशेषाद्रूपादिभावाभावाभ्यां च कार्यकारणानामात्मनां च चेतनत्वाविशेषेऽपि गुणप्रधानभावो न विरोत्स्यते, तथा च पार्थिवत्वाविशेषेऽपि मांससूपौदनादीनां प्रत्यात्मवर्तिनो विशेषात् परस्परोपकारित्वं भवत्येवमिहापि भविष्यति, प्रविभागप्रसिद्धिरप्यत एव न विरोत्स्य इति । तेनापि कथंचिच्चेतनाचेतनत्वलक्षणं विलक्षणत्वं परिहियेत, शुद्ध्यशुद्धित्वलक्षणत्वं नैव परिहियते'. In the 2-1-6, 'दृश्यते तु' S'aṇkara remarks on this view thus:—योऽपि चेतनकारणश्रवणबलेनैव समस्तस्य जगतश्चेतनतामुत्प्रेक्षते तस्यापि 'विज्ञानं चाविज्ञानं च' इति चेतनाचेतनविभागश्रवणं विभावनाविभावनाभ्यां चैतन्यस्य शक्यत एव योजयितुम्'. Thus S'aṇkara supports the view of the एकदेशि. Who is this एकदेशिन्? Can this view be referred to Sir R. Bhandarkar's view about Vallabha, 'The mysterious power which causes the differences by rendering certain qualities imperceptible'. Vaishnavism etc., p. 161.

s me, and the भो ा and भोग्य are अनन्य with Br hman, the भोक्ता does not become भोग्य nor भोग्य भोक्ता. This is fact evidenced by our everyday experience. फेन, वीची, तरंग etc., though अनन्य with the समुद्र, there is no इतरेतरभावापत्ति. A ring, a necklace, though as gold ornaments are अनन्य with gold, the ring does not become the necklace, nor the necklace the ring. S'aṇkara, after once explaining the sûtra accurately, adds 'यद्यपि भोक्ता न ब्रह्मणो विकारः, 'तत्सृष्ट्वा तदेवानुप्राविशत्' इति स्रष्टुरेवाविकृतस्य कार्यानुप्रवेशेन भोक्तृत्वश्रवणात्, तथापि कार्यमनुप्रविष्टस्या-स्त्युपाधिनिमित्तो विभाग आकाशस्येव घटाद्युपाधिनिमित्त इत्यतः परमकारणाद्ब्रह्मणो नन्यत्वेऽप्युपपद्यते भोक्तृभोग्यलक्षणो विभागः समुद्रतरंगादिन्यायेनेत्युक्तम्'. The instance of समुद्रतरंग is approved of by Bhâskara and others, but this latter addition is strongly criticised by Râmânuja. The wording of the sûtra does not favour S'aṇkara's addition. Again, S'aṇkara wants to refer this sûtra to व्यवहार, while the latter sûtra refers to परमार्थ stage according to him. This distinction of व्यवहार and परमार्थ is not accepted by any other Achârya, nor is it referred to by the Sûtrakâra. The wording of the sûtra cannot unquestionably be taken to suggest S'aṇkara's distinction. The words 'स्याल्लोकवत्' merely refer to the everyday experience. The experience is so very common that the Sûtrakâra does not consider it even desirable to point to any particular instance to support his view. The view expressed by S'aṇkara that भोक्ता Jîvâtman is the same as Brahman, the difference being caused by उपाधि, has been shown to be not countenanced by the sûtras of Bâdarâyaṇa. In sense, the Jîvâtman is no विकार of Brahman, but n अंश. But the Sûtrakâra here wants to point out only this much, that the Jada Jagat and the Chetana Jîvâtman, though both of them have their source in Brahman, still the Jada does not become Chetana, nor Chetana Jada. Hence the ब्र कारणता is not open to any objection.

Then we come to the sûtra 'तदनन्यत्वमार भण ब्दादिभ्यः' 2-1-14. This is one of the most important sûtras in the Brahmamîmânsâ. Except Madhva, all the Acharyas are unanimous in their referring this sûtra to a passage from the 6th prapâthaka of the Chhândogya. Bhâskara says he has written a Bhâshya on the Chhândogya, but it is not available, hence we shall have to satisfy ourselves with what he has observed on the question in his Brahma-sûtra-Bhashya 2-1-14. When we look at the sûtras of Bâdarâyaṇa as a whole, it appears clear that they fulfil a double function, *viz.*, removing doubts that might arise through the aberrant genius of several Vedic thinkers, and at the same time summarising the principal teachings of the Upanishads. Thus the sûtra 'तदनन्यत्वमारम्भणशब्दादिभ्यः' 2-1-14 has been written to set aside the doubt caused by words like आरंभण, नामधेय etc. Accordingly, the Sûtrakâra says that these words mean that cause and effect are अनन्य. It is to be noticed that the Sûtrakâra does not say that the effect is the same as the cause, but that they are अनन्य. From the word 'अनन्यत्वम्' one fails to work out the sense that विकार has no existence. 'नतु वस्तुवृत्तेन विकारो नाम कश्चिदस्ति'. Neither the श्रुति passage referred to, nor the wording of sûtra lends support to what S'aṅkara observes here:—'तस्माद्यथा घटकरकाद्याकाशानां महाकाशानन्यत्वं, यथा च मृगतृष्णिकोदकादीनामूषरादिभ्यो नन्यत्वं दृष्टनष्टस्वरूपत्वात्, स्वरूपेणानुपाख्यत्वात्, एवमस्य भोग्यभोक्त्रादिप्रपञ्च-जातस्य ब्रह्मव्यतिरेकेणाभाव इति द्रष्टव्यम्' 2-1-14. This absolute negation of the existence of the प्रपञ्च as such, is very seriously criticised by Bhâskara, Râmânuja, Vijnânabhikshu, Kes'ava Bhatta Kashmîrin and Vallabha. The text of the Chhândogya here referred to is this:—'यथा सोम्यैकेन मृत्पिण्डेन सर्वं मृन्मयं विज्ञातं स्याद्वाचारंभणं विकारो नामधेयं मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम्'. The meaning that naturally suggests itself from the text is this:—The knowledge of one ball of earth gives knowledge of all that is made of earth, though there is a different name and also form

विकार–रूप (as Rangarâmânuja takes it), or though there is a difference of name and form, still all the things made of earth are earth, and as earth they are सत्य. The passage cannot certainly be taken to mean that effects like pot etc., do not exist at all like the mirage, but that they exist in cause, they have no independent existence; the difference in name does not create a new object independent of the cause. Rightly does Vallabha observe:—'वाचारंभणं विकारो नामधेयं मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यमिति, तत्र विकारो वाङ्मात्रेणैवारभ्यते न वस्तुत इत्यर्थः प्रतिभाति, तथाच सति कस्य ब्रह्म कारणं भवेत्, अतः श्रुतिवाक्यस्यार्थमाह, आरंभण-शब्दादिभ्यः तदनन्यत्वं प्रतीयते, कार्यस्य कारणानन्यत्वं, न मिथ्यात्वम् ।'. The sage Uddâlaka wants to teach his son S'vetaketu 'the knowledge of all by the knowledge of one'. Now the knowledge of 'all' is possible only when 'all' has existence and is अनन्य with one; then only the knowledge of 'one' can produce the knowledge of 'all.' To explain this, the sage Uddâlaka gave three instances, from all of which the relation of cause and effect is suggested–that is–Uddâlaka means to say that the relation between the world and Brahman is the same that exists between the earthen pot and earth, Brahman is the cause and the world is the effect, the knowledge of cause Brahman produces the knowledge of effect the world, the reason being that they are अनन्य, as effect is अनन्य with the cause. From this it is impossible to concede that the cause Brahman exists while the world is non-existent, like mirage. *The fact that the Upanishad gives three instances of earth, gold, and iron teaching the relation of cause and effect, and nowhere mentions any of the instances viz.,* रज्जुसर्प, शुक्तिरजत *etc., which S'aṇkara so very zealously puts side by side with the above-mentioned ones, in his Bhâshya on the Chhândogya, as well as here, suggests a very strong inference against S'aṇkara that the Sûtrakara has in his mind not the doctrine of* विवर्त *of S'aṇkara, b t the doctrine of* परिणाम *of Brahman alone,*

and that the world is not an effect of illusion, but that of Brahman, the world is not a dream on a grand scale, but a real positive something which has its origination, existence and absorption in Brahman. True that in the sûtra 'मायामात्रं कात्स्न्र्येनानभिव्यक्तस्वरूपत्वात्' 3-2-3, the Sûtrakara distinctly says that the स्वप्नसृष्टि is मायामात्र, and whether we take 'माया' in the Bhâskara's sense of अर्थप्रत्ययशून्यत्व, or in Nimbârka's and Râmânuja's sense of आश्चर्यात्मकत्व, or in Vallabha's sense of सर्वभवनसामर्थ्य, or in S'aṇkara's sense of दृष्टनष्टस्वरूपत्व or अनिर्वचनीयत्व, the fact remains that according to the Sûtrakâra, the world is विधर्मि, from स्वप्न. 'वैधर्म्याच्च न स्वप्नादिवत्', that the स्वप्नसृष्टि may be मायामात्र, but the ब्रह्मसृष्टि is not so, it is not मायामात्र but ब्रह्मरूप and ब्रह्मानन्य. Bhâskara well observes in 3-2-3: 'ये पुनर्जागरितावस्थापि मायामात्रमित्याघोषयन्ति सूत्रकाराभिप्रायं नाशयन्तः श्रोत्रियजनं मोहयन्ति'. Again in 'वैधर्म्याच्च न स्वप्नादिवत्' 2-2-29 he observes to the same effect:—'ये तु बौद्धमतावलंबिनो मायावादिनस्ते प्यनेन न्यायेन सूत्रकारेणैव निरस्ता वेदितव्याः, यदि बाह्यो र्थो नाभिप्रेतः स्यात् किमर्थमिदं यतते सूत्रकारः' etc. The sûtra 'नाभाव उपलब्धेः' (2-2-28) also suggests that according to the Sûtrakar the world is not a nonentity. Thus though the world is not a nonentity, it does not follow that the Sûtrakâra takes it to be a separate entity from Brahman and independent of it. This is what he drives at, in the आरंभणाधिकरण. The श्रुति passage also reads 'मृत्तिका इति एव सत्यम्' and not 'मृत्तिकैव सत्या', and the Sûtrakâra also words the sûtra as 'तदनन्यत्वं' and not 'तन्मिथ्यात्वं' or 'तदेकत्वं'. These facts also go against S'aṇkara's view of जगन्मिथ्यात्व, or जगन्मायिकत्व.

From this, it follows that the view of the Sûtrakâra is exactly similar to, if not actually the same, as S'aṇkara tries to refute in 2-1-14:—'नन्वनेकात्मकं ब्रह्म, यथा वृक्षोऽनेकशाखः एवमनेकशक्तिप्रवृत्तियुक्तं ब्रह्म, अत एकत्वं नानात्वं चोभयमपि सत्यमेव, यथा वृक्ष इत्येकत्वं शाखा इति नानात्वं, यथाच समुद्रात्मनैकत्वं फेनतरंगाद्यात्मना नानात्वम्, यथाच मृदात्मनै त्वं घटशरावाद्यात्मना नानात्वम्, तत्रैकत्वांशेन नान्मोक्ष-

व्यवहारः सेत्स्यति, नानात्वांशेन तु कर्मकाण्डाश्रयौ लौकिकवैदिकव्यवहारौ सेत्स्यत इति, एवं मृदादिदृष्टान्ता अनुरूपा भविष्यन्तीति' + + +'ननु मृदादिदृष्टान्तप्रणयनात् परिणामवद् ब्रह्म शास्त्राभिमतमिति गम्यते, परिणामिनो हि मृदादयो र्था लोके समाधिगता इति'. The view expressed in these lines seems to be more in harmony with the sûtras of Bâdarâyaṇa, than S'aṅkara's own view given in refutation of the same. His objection 'न हि एकस्य ब्रह्मणः परिणामधर्मत्वं तद्रहितत्वं च शक्यं प्रतिपत्तुं, स्थितिगतिवत्स्यात्' etc, is also groundless in face of 'श्रुतेस्तु शब्दमूलत्वात्'. 2-1-27. His other objections are met at length by Bhâskara, Râmânuja, Kes'ava Bhatta and Nimbârka, but space at our disposal forbids us from entering into the full discussion of the same here. The श्रुति 'यत्र तु अस्य सर्वमात्मा एव अभूत् तत्केन किं पश्येत्' also teaches not 'सर्वाभावः' but 'आत्मनः सर्वभावः'. In the stage of ब्रह्मभाव the सर्व does not cease to exist, but the consciousness that सर्व is a different entity from Brahman vanishes, and the consciousness that Brahman alone is सर्व is generated. Against S'aṅkara's 'जगन्मिथ्यात्व' Vijnâna-Bhikshu advances a queer but not unreasonable argument thus:– 'प्रपञ्चस्यात्यन्तमभावे यत्प्रमाणमारंभणशब्दादिकं तत् सन्न वा, आद्ये बाधः, अन्त्ये हेत्वसिद्धिः, तस्मात् सदसत्त्वविकल्पपराहतैरारंभणशब्दादिभिः प्रमाणैः प्रपंचात्यन्तमभावो न सूत्रकारेणोन्मत्तेन साधयितुं शक्यते' p. 281. भि भाष्य. Ch. se. Bhâskara also observes in 2-1-14 thus 'न हि सूत्रकारः क्वचिन्मायाशब्दं प्रायुंक्त, यत्र स्वप्नज्ञानान्मायामात्रं कात्स्न्र्येन अनभिव्यक्तस्वरूपत्वादिति हि यत्रोक्तं वैधर्म्याच्च न स्वप्नादिवदिति वैधर्म्यमुक्तम्, ईक्षतेर्नाशब्दमिति चारभ्य प्रत्यधिकरणं स्मृतिमन्तरेण नोपपद्यते सूत्रकारस्य, स्मृत्यनवकाशदोष इत्यारभ्य सांख्याद्युद्भावितदूषणोद्धारार्थं प्रत्यधिकरणं प्रयासोनर्थकः स्यात्, मायामात्रत्वे 'न वियदश्रुते'रिति चारभ्य भूतानामुत्पत्त्यादिविचारोऽनर्थकः स्यात्' × × × अपि च मायाशब्दमात्रेण कृत्स्नो वेदः सुप्रमेयं स्वर्गापवर्गलक्षणं यथाभूतं प्रत्याययन्नप्रमाणमसत्यमिति वा कल्पयितुमिति ज्ञानेन प्रवर्तते वेदार्थं यथा वह्नेर्धूमशक्त्या यथा प्रवर्तन्तामिति' भा. भा. pp. 99-100. One cannot but concede that the above-mentioned arguments of Bhâskara have much force. Kes'ava Bhatta Kashmîrin, Râmânuja and Purushottama have also said much against S'aṅkara. All the writers on the Vedânta sûtras, in some form or other, ccept the परिणामवाद and जगत्सत्यत्व, and thi

fact by itself is an almost certain indication that the Sûtrakâra has neither in his mind the doctrine of विवर्त nor मिथ्यात्व of the world. In his zeal for मायावाद S'aṇkara forgets to what he is being drifted when he remarks 'तदेवमविद्यात्मकोपाधिपरिच्छेदापेक्षमेवेश्वरस्येश्वरत्वं सर्वज्ञत्वं सर्वशक्तित्वं, न परमार्थतः' etc. He himself feels conscious that Bâdarâyaṇa's ब्रह्मविचारप्रतिज्ञा and 'जन्माद्यस्य यत' are being put to a strain. The sûtras following in this अधिकरण also confirm the view expressed above. The sûtra 2-1-15, S'aṇkara reads also as 'भावाच्चोपलब्धेः'. The explanation which follows this sûtra reading, according to S'aṇkara himself, confirms the view that the world is only an अवस्थान्तर of ब्रह्मन् as पट of तन्तुs, and as पट is अनन्य with तन्तुs so is the world with Brahman. From this it is quite clear that according to the view of the Sûtrakâra as interpreted by S'aṇkara here, the 'अनन्यत्व' does not mean मिथ्यात्व of जगत्, but merely an अवस्थान्तरत्व. The next sûtr 'सत्त्वाच्चावर ' also teaching the सद्रूपत्व of Jagat, confirms the अनन्यत्व existing between a cause and n effect. The sûtras 2-1-19 and 20 also confirm the view of अनन्यत्व expressed above. Difference in रूप and क्रिया does not produce a new substance, पट may be in a different form from the तन् s, प्राणs may perform different functions but still the पट is अनन्य with तन्तुs, and उदान, etc. are अनन्य with प्राणवायु. 'ज्ञानक्रियाभेदात्सूत्रद्वयम्'. A. B.

The sûtras 'उपसंहारदर्शनान्नेति चेन्न क्षीरवद्धि' and 'देवादिवदपि लोके' 2-1-24-25 deal with the question that Brahman does not need any external साधन. By its own natural powers like gods it develops the universe out of itself. The sûtras 2-1-26-27 declare that as Veda teaches the अस्तित्व of अविकृतब्रह्मन् and ब्र परिणाम, there is no कृत्स्नप्रसक्ति or निरवयवत्वशब्दकोप. The सृष्टि is in itself, its powers are wonderful. 'आत्मनि चैवं विचित्राश्च हि'. The sûtras 2-1-30-31 take up another similar question. 'सर्वोपेता च तद्दर्शनात्' 'वि रणत ादिति चेत् तदुक्तम्'. Brahman is possess-

ed of all powers, and even though it h s no organs, it creates the universe etc., the Veda teaches so. S'aṇkara's remark on this सूत्र 'प्रतिषिद्धसर्वविशेषस्यापि ब्रह्मणः सर्वशक्तियोगः संभवतीत्येतदप्यविद्याकल्पितरूपभेदोपन्यासेनोक्तमेव' is quite out of place. The Sûtrakâra declares the सर्वशक्तियोग of ब्रह्मन् as based on दर्शन, Veda, while S'aṇkara wants to refer it to अविद्या.

Why should self-satisfied Brahman create this world when it has no प्रयोजन to fulfil? To this question an answer is furnished by 'लोकवत्तु लीला कैवल्यम्'. 2-1–33. S'aṇkar very beautifully explains the sûtra thus:—यद्यपि अस्माकमियं जगद्विम्बरचना गुरुतरसंरम्भेवाभाति, तथापि परमेश्वरस्य लीलैव केवलेयं, अपरिमितशक्तित्वात्। यदि नाम लोके लीलास्वपि किञ्चित्सूक्ष्मं प्रयोजनमुत्प्रेक्ष्येत, तथापि नैवात्र किञ्चित् प्रयोजनमुत्प्रेक्षितुं शक्यते, आप्तकामश्रुतेः, नाप्यप्रवृत्तिरुन्मत्तप्रवृत्तिर्वा, सृष्टिश्रुतेः, सर्वज्ञश्रुतेश्च'. This is quite in the strain of the Sûtrakâra, and we cannot understand why after this beautiful explanation, he thinks it necessary, practically against the Sûtrakâra, to add 'न चेयं परमार्थविषया सृष्टिश्रुतिः, अविद्याकल्पितनामरूपव्यवहारगोचरत्वात्, ब्रह्मात्मभावप्रतिपादनपरत्वाच्चेत्येतदपि नैव विस्मर्तव्यम्'.

The learned Sûtrakâra has dealt with the question that Brahman is the उपादान कारण, and though it is उपादान कारण it is without any sort of विकार, the विरोध being set aside by an implicit faith in the words of the texts of the Veda. Now in 2-1-34-35-36, he deals with the question that even though [1]Brahman is the efficient cause, even though it is कर्तृ, it is not liable to the faults of partiality and cruelty as Brahman allots fruits according to the Karmas of the individual souls. The जगत्प्रवाह is अनादि, hence this is possible.

In the last sûtra Bâdarâyaṇa removes all contradictions by remarking that Brahman is सर्वधर्मयुक्त. In the previous अधिकरण, he said that जगत्प्रवाह is अनादि, hence it was possible for Brahman to allot fruits according to कर्मs of

1. This question is dealt at length in जीवविचारणा.

the individual souls, but this directly goes against the श्रुति-passage 'सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत्' which distinctly teaches the एकत्व and अद्वितीयत्व of Brahman. To such a difficulty Bâdarâyaṇa's answer is on the same principles which he has laid down in 2-1-27. The swarûpa of Brahman is such. The प्रवाह may be अनादि, still ब्रह्मन् is एक and अद्वितीय, Brahman though giving fruits according to कर्मs is independent of it. In short, it is possessed of all धर्मs, there is no contradiction as such.

According to the reasoning of S'aṇkara, the explanation given by the Sûtrakâra in refutation of the वैषम्य-नैर्घृण्य is quite out of place. According to him the विषमता and निर्घृणता, the कर्तृत्व of Jîvâtman and Paramâtman are all creatures of अविद्या and with the removal of अविद्या, they vanish into nothingness.

To conclude, the Sûtrakara holds that this world is an effect of Brahman, is real. Brahman has, for its लीला केवल, without any other प्रयोजन, and without any organs or any external means, by the natural powers of itself, developed itself into the universe without itself undergoing ny change. The world is अनन्य with Brahman in all its three stages. It has no existence independent of Brahman, but at the same time it is neither मिथ्या nor an absolute non-entity. It is not a विवर्त of Brahman, but a real wilful परिणाम of Brahman. It is आत्मकृति and आत्मपरिणाम or ब्रह्मकृति and ब्रह्मपरिणाम. शरीर, शक्ति, प्रकृति, परमाणु, अविद्या, माया and others, have nothing to do with it so far as its primary cause is being investigated.

Lib r ti .

The fourth chapter of the Brahma-sûtras deals with the question of liberation. The first pâda deals with the question of जीवन्मुक्ति or liberation in life of the Brahmavid. The knowledge of Brahman puts an end to कर्मs good

and bad which have not begun to be enjoyed, 4-1-13-14-15. After the knowledge of Brahman is acquired, the कर्मs, which are then performed, do not touch the ब्रह्मविद्. The body[1] of the ब्रह्मविद् continues to live so long as his आरब्धकर्मs are not ended, 4-1-19. When the body[2] falls away, he becomes joined with Brahman. [3]Agnihotras etc., which are नित्यकर्मs, are to be performed by the ब्रह्मविद्, for they are useful in the acquirement of ब्रह्मज्ञान. This is the general reasoning of the Sûtrakâra, but this reasoning directly goes against that of S'aṇkara. According to S'aṇkara, कर्म, शरीर, everything is the creature of nescience. By the ब्रह्मज्ञान, the अविद्या is destroyed, and when the अविद्या is destroyed, its effects *viz.*, कर्म, शरीर etc., must also vanish, on the principle that effect and cause are अनन्य, and that in the absence of cause, the effect cannot exist. So there comes in the impossibility of जीवन्मुक्ति, for, with the rise of विद्या, the अविद्या with its effect शरीर etc., is destroyed, and the ब्रह्मविद् becomes Brahman at once. If this position is not accepted as being contradicted by our experience, then two alternatives come in *viz.*, either the ब्रह्मज्ञान is not thoroughly obtained, in which case there is no जीवन्मुक्ति, or if ब्रह्मज्ञान is obtained, then body etc., which continue to exist after the नाश of अविद्या are not creatures of अविद्या. From this it appears that the body etc., continue to exist even after the acquirement of ब्रह्मज्ञान, the difference being that, after ब्रह्मज्ञान, कर्म and its products शरीर etc., do not touch him (ब्रह्मविद्). The ब्रह्मविद् performs कर्मs, but these कर्मs are ब्रह्मकर्मs, and not his own. It is worthy of note that the Sûtrakâra says 'अश्लेष,' meaning thereby that कर्मs do not touch the ब्रह्मविद्. He becomes असंग. Thus though the ब्रह्मविद् is living and doing every-

1. तदधिगम उत्तरपूर्वाघयोरश्लेषविनाशौ तद्व्यपदेशात् 4-1-13. इतरस्याप्येवमश्लेषः पाते तु 4-1-14. अनारब्धकार्ये एव तु पूर्वे तदवधेः 4-1-15.
2. भोगेन त्वितरे क्षपयित्वाथ संपद्यते 4-1-19.
3. अग्निहोत्रादि तु तत्कार्यायैव तद्दर्शनात् 4-1-16.

thing, he is untouched by good or b d ction . His i - tence is for the enjoyment of कर्मs begun to be enjoyed. This seems to be the view of the Sûtrakâra bout जीवन्मुक्ति. S'aṇkara himself remarks that this has reference to सगुण-विद्या, in निर्गुणविद्या there is no need of mentioning this. 'सगुणासु तावद्विद्या विद्यत एव विधानम्। तासु च वाक्यशेष ऐश्वर्यप्राप्तिः पाप-निवृत्तिश्च विद्यावत उच्यते। तयोश्चाविवक्षाकारणं नास्तीत्यतः पाप्मप्रहाणपूर्वकैश्वर्यप्राप्ति-स्तासां फलमिति निश्चीयते। निर्गुणायां तु विद्यायां यद्यपि वि धानं नास्ति, तथाप्य-कर्त्रात्मबोधात् कर्मप्रदाहसिद्धिः। 4-1-13.

When the प्रारब्धकर्मs are ended by enjoyment by the body, that body of the Brahmavid falls away. The second पाद describes the process by which the body is dissolved. The उत्क्रान्ति of विद्वान् and अविद्वान् is common to a certain extent, of नाडीप्रवेश. The विद्वान् then passes by शताधिका. 4-2-16. In 4-2-13, 'स्पष्टो ह्येकेषाम्' S'aṇkara remarks:—'तस्मादविद्व-द्विषये प्राप्तयोः गत्युत्क्रान्त्योः विद्वद्विषये प्रतिषेध इत्येवमेव व्याख्येयं, व्यपदेशार्थ-वत्त्वाय। न च ब्रह्मविदः सर्वगतब्रह्मात्मभूतस्य प्रक्षीणकामकर्मणः उत्क्रान्तिर्गतिर्वो-पपद्यते, निमित्ताभावात्। 'अत्र ब्रह्म समश्नुते' इति चैवं जातीयकाः श्रुतयो गत्युत्क्रा-न्त्योरभावं सूचयन्ति।'. The उत्क्रान्ति here spoken of by the Sûtrakâra is quite consistent with his arrangement. In the first पाद the Sûtrakâra describes the state of ब्रह्मविद् in life, in the second उत क्रान्ति, in the third how and by which path he reaches Brahman (गति), and in the fourth the फल the ब्रह्मविद् enjoys after reaching Brahman. In this general arrangement the Sûtrakâra nowhere expressly says that the उत क्रान्ति and गति have no reference to the ब्रह्मविद्. The question of सद्योमुक्ति is altogether different, which is possi-ble only through the singular grace of Brahman. In case of the favoured ब्रह्मविद्, there is no detention even for enjoying आरब्धकर्मs. His दायकर्मs are taken away by his sons, good कर्मs by his friends and bad ones by his enemies. 'तस्य पुत्रा दायमुपयन्ति सुहृदः साधुकृत्यां द्विषन्तः पापकृत्याम्'. Bâd râyaṇa suggests this in 'अतो न्यापि केषामुभयोः' 4-1-17.

Thus, through the grace of Brahman, the कर्मs are ended, and the ब्रह्मविद् at once enjoys Brahman. This is only suggestion which is not possible to carry further than this. All the आचार्यs refer to Jaimini and Bâdarâyaṇa by the word उभय, and refer the श्रुति passage to काम्यकर्मs. But the objection to this view as is pointed out by Vallabha is that Jaimini is not spoken of either before or after in this पाद 4-1, and that पापकृत्या cannot be काम्यविषय. Whatever it may be, it seems almost impossible that Bâdarâyaṇa views the गतिश्रुति as belonging to अविद्वद्विषय. In the third pâda of the fourth chapter after describing the stations through which the soul of the ब्रह्मविद् passes by the path of देवयान, Bâdarâyaṇa says that the ब्रह्मविद् reaches Brahman from where there is no return. In the s me pâda Bâdarâyaṇa mentions two views of [1]Bâdari who holds that the final goal to which the Brahmavid is said to reach is कार्य, and of [2]Jaimini who holds that the final goal to which the Brahmavid reaches is परब्रह्मन्, and not अनित्यकार्य. S'aṇkara accepts the view of Bâdari and rejects that of Jaimini. In 'नच कार्ये प्रतिपत्त्यभिसंधिः' 4-3-14, S'aṇkar takes great pains to show that the गतिश्रुतिs re not to be accepted in their primary sense, but as referring to lower Brahman, they are to be finally rejected. The principal reasons which led S'aṇkara to reject the गतिश्रुतिs in their primary sense are expressed by him thus:—'न सत्यपि संभवे मुख्यस्यैवार्थस्य ग्रहणमिति कश्चिदाज्ञापयिता विद्यते। परविद्याप्रकरणे पि च तत्स्तुत्यर्थं विद्यान्तराश्रयगत्यनुकीर्तनमुपपद्यते, 'विष्वङ्ङन्या उत मणे भवन्ति' तिवत्। 'प्रजापतेः सभां वेश्म प्रपद्ये' इति तु पूर्ववाक्यविच्छेदेन कार्ये पि प्रति त्त्यभिसंधिर्न विरुध्यते। सगुणेऽपि च ब्रह्मणि सर्वात्मत्वसंकीर्तनं 'सर्वकर्मा सर्वकाम' इत्यादिवदवकल्पते। तस्मादपरब्रह्मविषया गतिश्रुतयः।' 4-3-14. S. B. N. S. p. 497. From this o e sees th t S'aṇkara's main difficulty consisted in the 'असंभव' or विरोध between the गतिti nd the व्यापकत्व of Brahman. In the abse ce of संभव,

1. 4-3-7-11. . 4- -11-14.

says he, there is no reason why the गतिश्रुतिs should be accepted in their primary sense. His other explanations *viz.*, 'कार्येऽपि प्रतिप्रत्यभिसंधिर्न विरुध्यते' and 'सगुणेऽपि ब्रह्मणि × × अवकल्पते,' are questions of plausibilities which stand or fail with the main argument. From what has been stated bove it is important to note that S'aṇkara does not adduce any sûtra of Bâdarâyaṇa in support of his theory, and therefore the sustained reasoning that he has worked out for rejecting the गतिश्रुति loses all its force. Before we examine his arguments in favour of the rejection of the गतिश्रुतिs and insistence of the निर्विशेषश्रुतिs, let us advert to the question of the असंभव. It is admitted on all hands, that the गतिश्रुतिs, as they stand, do present a contradiction with the व्यापकत्व of Brahman. But on this ground alone, it would not be proper to reject the गतिश्रुतिs. With this we have to bear in mind what the learned Sûtrakâra has said about Brahman and the letter of the Veda. As a faithful interpreter of the sûtras of Bâdarâyaṇa, one has to abide by his reasoning and conclusion. The position of the learned Sûtrakâra with regard to this question would be the same which he assumed in 2-1-26-27, 'श्रुतेस्तु शब्दमूलत्वात् ।'. The difficulty put forth by S'aṇkara arises only when unlike the Sûtrakâra one fails to put an implicit faith in the letter of the Veda. In the शब्दप्रमाणशास्त्र as is written by the Sûtrakâra, one is surprised, why S'aṇkara tries to modify and correct not only the clear sense of the श्रुतिs, but that of the sûtras also. The result of this is often unpleasant when one sees that S'aṇkara's modified interpretation not only goes against the wording of the sûtras, but directly contradicts what he himself has just said [1]before. In this connection, Bhâskara rightly defines the position of the Sûtrakâra

1. Second interpretation of आनन्दमयाधिकरण, Second interpretations in 2-1-27, 2-1-29, are instances out of many.

in his Bhâshya on page 238, 4-3-13, thus:—'उभयात्मकं तद्वस्तु + + न चास्माकमर्थवादत्वकल्पना, यथाश्रुतार्थग्रहणे किं नामानुपपन्नम्'. Thus Bhâskara sees no difficulty in accepting गतिश्रुतिs in their primary sense and व्यापकत्व of Brahman Vallabha's position is also similar. According to him the गतिश्रुति has no contradiction with the व्यापकत्व of Brahman for both are taught by Veda, and that Brahman's swarûpa is such as would admit the possibility of both the alternatives. Vallabha's commentator also observes on page 1368:—'किञ्च, तैरपि क्वचिद् गौणः शब्दो दृष्ट इति नैतावता शब्दप्रमाणकेऽर्थे गौणी कल्पना न्याय्या।'. (अ. भा. प्रकाश B. S. S.). On the question of गतिश्रुति Râmânuja, Nimbârka, Madhva, Vallabha, S'reekanth and Bhâskara are all at one, and this seems to be a strong ground to hold that the Sûtrakâra had never in his mind the difficulty of 'असंभव' between the गतिश्रुति and the व्यापकत्व. The Sûtrakâra's attitude is the one declared by Vallabha in 1-1-4., 'विरुद्धसर्वधर्माश्रयत्वं तु ब्रह्मणो भूषणाय'. It follows therefore, that S'aṅkara's interpretation of the गतिश्रुतिs in the लाक्षणिक sense is not viewed by any other commentator with favour, and we cannot but think that here also S'aṅkara is not faithful to the Sûtrakâra.

S'aṅkara has however paid very serious attention to this question. The following are the arguments advanced by him in 4-3-14–S. B. N. S. pp. 497–502:

I
(1) Brahman is व्यापक.
(2) Brahman is निर्विशेष.
(3) Jîva is अविद्योपाधिपरिच्छिन्न.

II
(4) गतिश्रुतिs refer to अपरब्रह्मन्.
(5) No गति is spoken of in परविद्या.

(6) The distinction between पर and अपरब्रह्मन् is based on the श्रुति passages.

(7) गमन is due to द्वयुपाधि.

(8) Jaimini's view is mentioned by the Sûtrakâra later for the development of intellect (प्र विकास).

The first objection is met by Bhâskara nd Vallabh by showing the possibility of गमन as being due to भोगजनक ारब्ध. 'ब्रह्म सर्वभोगनिमित्तं सर्वप्रपञ्चनिमित्तमिति निमित्तसप्तम्येवेत्यदोषः' says Bhâskara in 4-3-13. 'न च व्यापकत्वं गन्तव्यत्वे ाधकं, प्रारब्धभोगं विना तत्प्राप्त्यसंभवात्, यदा यत्र तद्भोगसमाप्तिस्तदा तत्र तत ासेर्निष्प्रत्यूहत्वात्' says V llabha in 4-3-14.

The second and third objections re answered by what has been said before in reference to Brahman nd the human Soul.

It has been shown that the Sûtrakâra does not hold the distinction between पर and अपरब्रह्मन्, hence the fourth and sixth objections are answered. This question has been exhaustively treated by Vallabha's commentator on pages 136 to 1365. A. B. P. B. S. S., and by Bhâskara in 4-3-13; and but for want of space we should have [1]quoted the same in full here.

The fifth objection is dealt with by Bhâskara thus:— 'न चास्माभिरियं गतिः कल्पिता, श्रुतयोऽत्र प्रमाणम्, परविद्या गतयो दृश्यन्ते'. 4-3-13. Then he quotes from न्दोग्य, प्रश्न, वल्ली, ऐतरेय, गीता, पुराण and वाजसनेय, to support his view that there is गमन in परविद्या.

The tendency of the Sûtrakâra is to accept the श्रुतिs alw ys in their primary sense, hence गमन is in the primary ense, and not in a secondary sense, as due to उपाधि. Thus the 7th objection is answered.

The last objection is certainly very weak. One does not understand why the Sûtrakâra should put his doctrine in the mouth of Bâdari, why he should place the सिद्धान्त view first and पूर्वपक्ष view after it. S'aṇkara says that it is done with a view to develop intellect श्र ा. True, b t since this is solitary unusual circumstance, one must be thoroughly convinced before he accepts S'aṇkar 's

1. ee Appendix. A.

view. It ppe rs that S′ ṇkar 's interpret tion tho gh fairly correct so far s the sûtras are concerned, become altogether opposed to the view of the sûtrakâr the moment S′aṇkara's interpretation is viwed in the light of his 'Esoteric doctrine' in the words of Dr. Deussen. Once it is shown that there is real ब्रह्मगमन, the sûtras of Bâdarâyaṇa become quite consistent. The holy words 'अनावृत्तिः शब्दात् अनावृत्तिः शब्दात्', teaching the non-return of those who have reached Brahman, cannot with justice be referred to a secondary hypothetical sense, for an ultimate rejection. That Bâdarâyaṇa should begin and end with sûtras which can on no account be reconciled with S′ ṇkara's reasoning, leads one to suppose that there is a flaw in S′aṇkara's reasoning so far as his faithfulness to the Sûtrakâra is concerned. Râmânuja and Nimbârka hav clearly an advantage over S′aṇkara in this, that their views evolve from the Sûtras of Bâdarâyaṇ with less difficulty. When the Sûtras and S′aṇkara's commentary dealing with his परा विद्या are compared, one cannot but honestly admit that there is a clear contradiction betwee the two. Sûtras, viewed in the light of S′aṇkara's esoteric doctrine, lose all their force in their criticisms of Sâṇkhya, Kâṇâda and other systems. Thus, it is not right with S′aṇkara to deprive the गतिश्रुतिs of their primary signific nce, for it is a view not favoured by Bâdarâyaṇa, or at le st we are not in a position to s pport it from the sûtr s.

Having established in the third पाद that the Brahmavid re ches Brahman, or rather is [1]led there, the fourth पाद describes the mode of his enjoyment there. After reaching Brahman, the Brahmavid gets [2]आविर्भाव, but all the same [3]he is अविभक्त with Brahman. For the sake of enjoyment, he becomes manifest in a new form which, though अविभक्त

1. अप्रतीकालंबनान्नयतीति बादरायण उभयथादोषात् तत्क्रतुश्च 4–3–15. 2. सम्पद्याविर्भावः स्वे शब्दात् 4–4–1. . अविभागेन दृष्टत्वात् 4–4–4.

with Brahman, is [1]ब्रा according to Jaimini; [2]चिद्रूप according to Audulomi, while उभयरूप according to [3]Bâdarâyaṇa; there is no विरोध between Jaimini's and Audulomi's views, as both are possible according to Bâdarâyaṇa. Being अविभक्त with Brahman the Brahmvid derives everything by Brahman's [4]संकल्प. Like Brahman he is [5]अनन्याधिपति. There is a difference of opinion between the views of Bâdari and Jaimini, the [6]former believes in the absence of शरीर etc., of the ब्रह्मविद्, while the [7]latter believes in the presence of शरीर etc., on the authority of Chh. U. 7-26-2, [8]while Bâdarâyaṇa believes in both the views, (उभयविधम्). With these शरीर etc., the Brahmavid enjoys भोग. The [9]absence of भोग spoken of in श्रुति has reference to स्वाप्यय, and श्रुतिs teaching भोग refer to संपत्ति. The [10]ऐश्वर्य of the Brahmavid is limited to the extent that he cannot like Brahman create Jagat. His [11]ऐश्वर्य is eternal. With [12]Brahman the Brahmavid by ब्राह्म form enjoys eternally. He [13]does not eturn to Sansâra.

This seems to be the general outline of the mode in which the Brahmavid enjoys in the Brahmaloka. The Brahmaloka is eternal. In this there is a general agreement among Râmânuja, Nimbârka and Vallabha. The sûtras of Bâdarâyaṇa stand naturally reconciled with the above view. There is no suggestion in these sûtras of the ideal of Moksha which S'aṇkara mentions in 1-1-4.

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1. ब्राह्मेण जैमिनिरुपन्यासादिभ्यः 4–4–5. 2. चिति तन्मात्रेण तदात्मकत्वादित्यौडुलोमिः 4–4–6. 3. एवमुपन्यासात्पूर्वभावादविरोधं बादरायणः 4–4–7. 4. संकल्पादेव तु तच्छ्रुतेः 4–4–8. 5. अत एव चानन्याधिपतिः 4–4–9. 6. अभावं बादरिराह ह्येवम् 4–4–10. 7. भावं जैमिनिर्विकल्पामननात् 4–4–11. 8. द्वादशाहवदुभयविधं बादरायणोऽतः 4–4–12. 9. स्वाप्ययसंपत्त्योरन्यतरापेक्षमाविष्कृतं हि 4–4–16. 10. जगद्व्यापारवर्जं प्रकरणादसंनिहितत्वाच्च 4–4–17. 11. विकारावर्ति च तथाहि स्थितिमाह 4–4–19. 12. भोगमात्रसाम्यलिंगाच्च 4–4–21. 13. अनावृत्तिः शब्दात् अनावृत्तिः शब्दात् 4–4–22.

'इदं तु पारमार्थिकं कूटस्थनित्यं, व्योमवत्सर्वव्यापि, सर्वविक्रियारहितं, नित्यतृप्तं, निरवयवं, स्वयंज्योतिःस्वभावम्, यत्र धर्माधर्मौ सह कार्येण कालत्रयं च नोपावर्तेते, तदेतदशरीरत्वं मोक्षाख्यम्'. "As may be seen from this passage, the conception of Liberation contains the same characteristics as serve, as a rule, to define Brahman; and indeed, Brahman and the state of liberation are identical terms; for liberation is nothing else than the becoming one with Brahman, or rather, since the identity of the Soul with Brahman has always subsisted and has only been hidden from it by an illusion, liberation is nothing else but the awakening of the consciousness that our own self is identical with Brahman. Accordingly, in liberation there is no question of becoming which does not already exist, but only of the attainment of the knowledge of what has existed from all eternity. It is because of this, that liberation is not accomplished through any sort of work, nor through moral improvement, but by knowledge alone." System of Vedânta. p. 401. It is absolutely clear that this reasoning cannot be traced to any sûtra of Bâdarâyaṇa. S'aṇkara's conception of Liberation has much in common with that of the Sâṇkhya. The highest aim of the Sâṇkhya[1] is to free himself from the प्रकृति, so the greatest aim of S'âṇkara is to free himself from the अविद्या. With the destruction of अविद्या, its creatures, *viz.*, his Jîvatva, his ब्रह्मप्राप्ति, everything vanishes, and he remains what he was, *viz.*, Brahman, the subject of all negations except existence. That this view is foreign to the sûtras of Bâdarâyaṇa can be seen from the summary of the sûtras given above. S'aṇkara's attempts to force up his doctrines in औडुलोमि and Bâdari suggest his departure from the lines of the Sûtrakâra. His attempt to reconcile Audulomi's view with that of Jaimini on the authority

1. *Vide* Sâṇkhya Kârika 62–68. and Vâchaspatimis'ra's तत्त्वकौमुदी.

of Bâdarâyaṇa in 4-4-7, 'एवमुपन्यासात्पूर्वभावादविरोधम् बादरायणः' results in a contradiction. He says: 'एवमपि पारमार्थिकचैतन्यमात्रस्वरूपाभ्युपगमेऽपि व्यवहारापेक्षया पूर्वस्यापि उपन्यासादिभ्योऽवगतस्य ब्राह्मैश्वर्यरूपस्याप्रत्याख्यानादविरोधं बादरायण आचार्यो मन्यते'. The contradiction arises from the fact that there come in ऐश्वर्य, etc., creatures of Ignorance after the Ignorance is destroyed. Govindânanda thus puts it 'अखण्डचिन्मात्रज्ञानान्मुक्तस्याज्ञानाभावात् कुत आज्ञानिकधर्मयोग इति'. *Vide* also अणुभाष्यप्रकाश pp. 1396–1401. The liberation in the sense of Bâdarâyaṇa is not merely the end of miseries, but also the attainment of ever-lasting bliss.

Co clu io .

From what has been said before, it follows that the Sûtrakâra's conception of Brahman is at great variance with that of S'aṇkara. As Dr. Thibaut observes:— 'They do not set forth the distinction of a higher and lower knowledge of Brahman, that they do not acknowledge the distinction of Brahman and Is'wara in S'aṇkara's sense.' Vedanta Sutras. I. p. 100. According to the Sûtrakâra, the Brahman is possessed of all attributes, and all wonderful powers. By its very swarûpa, it is possessed of all contradictory attributes. The negative vedic passages like 'नेति नेति' deny in Brahman all the earthly attributes, while those like 'सर्वकामः' etc., affirm in Brahman all divine attributes. Thus Brahman is उभयलिंग as is accepted by Vallabha and Nimbârka. The absolute negation of all attributes, and describing Brahman as निषेधशेष, is a view which does not find any expression in the sûtras of Bâdarâyaṇa. The subject of negation in negative Vedic passages has reference to what is non-Brahman as is remarked by the author of Bhâshya-Prakâs'a. B. S. S. p. 953. 'अतोऽन्यनिषेधो यो वर्तते स सर्वं ब्रह्मणोऽन्तर्निवेश्येतरं निषेधति, न सर्वं मिथ्याकृत्येति सुधीभिरवधेयम्'. Neither is Brahm devoid of ll attributes. 'अतो विशेषाणां नास्तताऽपि तु

निर्विशेषमात्राभ्युपगन्तृणामेवास्ततेति बोध्यम्'. Aṇu. B. P. p. 48. This Brahman which is spoken of in the Upanishads a 'नेति नेति' or as 'सर्वकाम' is n independent कर्तृ. It is Sad-Chid-Ânanda. For the sake of sport alone it develops itself into the universe, but unlike the Pantheism of Spinoza, s is shown by Sir Ramakṛishna Bhandarkar, it is not exhausted into the universe, but remains transcendent. Residing in the heart, it becomes अन्तर्यामिन्, and existing outside, though 'agamya', becomes 'gamya' by meditation and devotion, when it likes. It is the fountain-source from which all activity, all intelligence, all joy proceed. It is Brahman which evolves names and forms, and makes अव्याकृत व्याकृत. The universe with its immense diversity has its source in Brahman. The human souls have their source in Brahman. The Brahman of the sûtras is not only a personal God, but it is one of its phases. Brahman is *avyakta* when one tries to find Him by means of intellect alone, but becomes व्यक्त through meditation and devotion. The innermost soul of the human souls is Brahman, hence it is to be meditated upon as the आत्मन्. 4-1-3. The infinite[2] variety is united in the Brahman. Sages like Vâmadeva, in the stage of Brahma-Bhâva, have experienced this *Sarvatva*. Brahman is अनुस्यूत in the universe by Sad, Chid, and Ânanda. It follows from this, that the author of the sûtras follows a process quite opposite to that of S'aṇkara's, in working out his Pantheism. He does not deny everything of Brahm n, but unlike S'aṇkara, affirms everything of Brahman.

In the case of the human soul also, the view of the Sûtrakâra is opposed to that of S'aṇkara. As Dr. Thibaut puts it, the sûtras 'do not, with S'aṇkara, proclaim the abso-

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1. आत्मेतितूपगच्छन्ति ग्राहयन्ति च। 2 तत्र सर्वेषां सर्वभावे सर्वानन्त्यप्रसंगात् सर्वमेकमेवेति वक्तव्यम्। Aṇu Bhâshya B. S. S. p. 262. 1–1–29.

lute identity of the individual and the highest Self.' Introduction to Vedânta Sûtra I. p. 100. According to the Sûtrakâra, the human soul springs out of Brahman as spark out of fire. It is atomic. It is part–अंश of Brahman, and as the अंश of अंशिन् Brahman, it is अनन्य with it. It is Kartṛi and Bhoktṛi, but its activity has its source in Brahman. In the stage of Brahmabhâva it experiences विभुत्व, etc., with its Aṇutva. It is neither an आभास nor a प्रतिबिंब of Brahman. It is not a creature of nescience, nor is it the same as Brahman differentiated by अविद्या. It is not a non-entity but a real entity.

As regards the universe also, Bâdarâyaṇa and S'aṇkara are opposed. As Dr. Thibaut puts it:—'They do not hold the doctrine of the unreality of the world.' According to the Sûtrakâra, the universe has for its material and efficient cause Brahman alone. Though Brahman alone is the material cause, it does not undergo any change while developing itself into the universe. As efficient cause Brahman is neither cruel nor unjust. The world is अनन्य with Brahman, in the sense that the effect is अनन्य with the cause. As the effect exists in the cause in all the three stages of origination, existence and absorption, similarly the universe, in all its three stages, exists in Brahman, and is अनन्य with it. It is a real development of Avikṛita Brahman. The Sûtrakâra does not, like S'aṇkara maintain that the universe is a dream on a grand scale. He does not hold that the universe is a figment of nescience. The universe has for its cause Brahman, still there is an infinite variety in effects. The creation of the universe is a Keval Lîlâ of Brahman and not a Mâyâ.

From the description given of the path leading to Brahman, and the mode of enjoyment of ऐश्वर्य in the

fourth Adhyâya, th conception of Moksha, according to the Sûtrakâra, is different from that of S'aṇkara. It is a stage attained by a gradual course of spiritual development, and not a stage which has existed at all times, but which is concealed through अविद्या, and which is revealed by the destruction of अविद्या.

From the sûtras of Bâdarâyaṇa like 'आत्मकृतेः परिणामात्', we distinctly understand that the Sûtrakâra favours the परिणामवाद and not the विवर्तवाद of S'aṇkara. In this respect, as is shown before by a quotation from Sir R. Bhândârkar's Vaishṇavism etc., Vallabha's ब्रह्मपरिणाम is the one approved of by the Sûtrakâra. It should not be supposed that thereby either of them accepts the proposition that Brahman thereby undergoes any विकार. According to both of them, Brahman's causality and transcendency are both possible. In all the instances given by the Sûtrakâra, and in the older Upanishads, nowhere do we find any instance given, which S'aṇkara so very often quotes to support his doctrine of विवर्त. This fact suggests a very strong inference against him. Where the श्रुति gives the instance of मृद् and घट, S'aṇkara tries to incorporate शुक्ति and रजत. *Vide* न्दोग्यभाष्य. VI.

There is again a distinction to be drawn as to the attitude of the Sûtrakâra and S'aṇkara towards other systems. S'aṇkara's attitude to the पूर्वमीमांसा seems to be very hostile, while Râmânuja and Bhâskara look upon both the Mîmânsâs as forming one S'âstra. Upavarsha, whose view, Bhâskara follows, is said to have written one Bhâshya on the two Mîmânsâs. *Vide* भास्करभाष्य p. 6. and अणुभाष्यप्रकाश. p. 47. According to S'aṇkara, nothing remains to be done in the stage of ब्रह्मत्वावगति. 'तस्माज्ज्ञानमेकं मुक्ता क्रियाया गन्धमात्रस्याप्यनुप्रवेश इह नोपपद्यते'. S. B. 1-1-4. p. 18. This absolute rejection of कर्मs cannot be traced to any

sûtra of Bâdarâyaṇa. In 4-1-16, the नित्यकर्मs like अग्निहोत्र etc., are to be performed by the Brahmavid. This would go to show that the Brahmavid has not to reject the performance of कर्मs, but the mode of performance is different. Again in 3-4-26, 'सर्वापेक्षा च यज्ञादिश्रुतेरश्ववत्,' the absolute disregard of कर्म is not accepted. It cannot be taken that the two Mîmânsâs form one S'âstra, but the mutual helpfulness cannot be denied. *Vide* Aṇu Bhâshya p. 42. and pp. 110 to 114. *Vide* also 3-3-1-25 sûtras.

While meeting the Sâṇkhyas, Kâṇâdas, and the Bauddhas, S'aṇkara follows the Sûtrakâra in maintaining the strict reality of the universe, and the causality of Brahman; but once that is done, he rejects the same view, consigning it to अविद्या. S'aṇkara has been rightly and repeatedly charged with these contradictions by his opponents.

From what has been said above, we come to the conclusion that S'aṇkara's esoteric doctrine, *viz.*, the Mâyâvâda is the development of the Sâṇkhya and Buddhistic tenets, blended with misinterpretations of the passage of the Bṛihadâraṇyaka Upanishad, referring to the creation of the dreaming soul on the lines of Gaudapâda, and it has nothing to do with the sûtras of Bâdarâyaṇa. After showing numerous contradictions in the system of S'aṇkara from his Bhâshya, Col. Jacob remarks:—'To me, therefore, it seems impossible to come to any other conclusion than that the विशिष्टाद्वैतवादिन्s, or some similar school, were in possession of the field in S'aṇkara's time, and that his own mind was so saturated with their doctrines as to be unable to shake them off even when propounding an antagonistic system." Vedânta-Sâra. Intro. p. 9. This suggestion of Col. Jacob is as original as it is true. If we take S'aṇkara's Bhâshya, and do away with those portions which superim-

pose his doctrine of अविद्या, from what is left of his commentary, a general system, representing Bâdarâyaṇa's view, can fairly be worked out. Vallabha's Aṇu Bhâshy seems to answer the above description. When we read Col. Jacob's remark with the observations of Sir R. Bhandarkar, pp. 160–161. Vaishṇavism etc., the inevitable conclusion one comes to is this, that Bâdarâyaṇa represents in his sûtras a system which corresponds with one which Vallabha propounds in his Bhâshya, viz., 'The development of Purushottama into the world and at the same time his transcendency.' p. 161. Vaishṇavism. That S'aṇkara himself was conscious of such a doctrine can be seen from his Bhâshya in passages like 'ननु मृदादिदृष्टान्तप्रणयनात् परिणामवद् ब्रह्म शास्त्रस्याभिमतम्' 2. 1. 14. 'यत्तूक्तं स्वरूपोपमर्दमन्तरेण कस्यचित्कूटस्थस्य वस्तुनः कारणत्वानुपपत्तेरभावाद्भावोत्पत्तिर्भवितुमर्हतीति, तदूदुरुक्तम्, स्थिरस्वभावानामेव सुवर्णादीनां प्रत्यभिज्ञायमानानां रुचकादिकार्यकारणभावदर्शनात्' 2. 2. 26. p. 246. Thus while dealing with Sâṇkhya, Bauddha and others, he puts forth Bâdarâyaṇa's doctrine, but that being done, he rejects Bâdarâyaṇa's view, and puts forth his own. Hence the conclusion is that Bâdarâyaṇa and S'aṇkara both hold different, if not opposed, views. Rao Bahadur Rangacharya has published a book, called सर्वसिद्धान्तसंग्रह of S'aṇkarâchârya. This book is different from that of Madhava's. The noteworthy feature of Rangacharya's book is that fourteen *matas* are mentioned there, the last two of which refer to Vedavyâsa and Vedânta. And though this view of Vedavyâsa purports to be based on the Mahâbhârata, there is a significant fact that S'aṇkarâchârya, the author of the book, drew a distinction between the two views. Other writers also refer to two views of Vedânta which go to show that Bâdarâyaṇa and S'aṇkara hold different views. In the Tâtparya Tîka of the न्यायसूत्रs, 4-1-19, a reference to the two views thus m de:—'मा भूदयं नामरूपप्रपंचः शून्यतोपादानः,

अपि तु ब्रह्मोपादानो भविष्यति, ब्रह्मैव प्रपञ्चरूपेण परिणमते मृत्तिकेव घटशरावोदंचनादिभावेन, न च एवं नित्यत्वव्याघातः, परिणामेऽपि तत्त्वानपायात् तल्लक्षणत्वाच्च नित्यतायाः, यदाह यस्मिन् तत्त्वं न विहन्यते, तदपि नित्यमित्येकं दर्शनम्,' 'अपरं च ब्रह्मैव अनाद्यविद्योपधानाभेदात् नामरूपप्रपंचभेदेन विवर्तते मुखमिव एकमनेकमणिकृपाणादर्शभेदान्नैकविधं प्रतिबिंबभेदेनेति,' तत् एतद् दर्शनद्वयम्'. It is quite clear from this quotation that even Naiyâyikas had to draw a distinction between the ब्रह्मपरिणाम of Bâdarâyaṇa and विवर्तवाद of S'aṇkara. Moreover, S'aṇkara's preference for the views of Bâdari, Kâs'akritsna and Audulomi, suggests the inference that S'aṇkara had in his mind a system different from that of the Sûtrakâra. To add to this, S'ankara's own statement, at the close of the introduction of his अध्यासभाष्य, suggests the same conclusion, as is pointed out by R. B. Rangacharya, 'that the aim of S'aṇkarâchârya was to try to evolve what he himself took to be the teachings of the Upanishads out of the Vedânta Sûtras of Bâdarâyaṇa–that is, to put into the sûtras what, he himself understood to be the teachings of the Upanishads,' and not what Bâdarâyaṇa understood them to be. 'यथा चायमर्थः सर्वेषां वेदान्तानां तथा वयमस्यां शारीरकमीमांसायां प्रदर्शयिष्यामः।'. 'Even orthodox Advaitins seem to accept this view in a general sort of way, and there is a stanza attributed to Madhusûdana Sarasvati which gives a notably clever expression to it. The stanza is:

न स्तौमि तं व्यासमशेषमर्थं सम्यङ्न सूत्रैरपि यो बबन्ध ।
विनापि तैः संग्रथिताखिलार्थं तं शंकरं नौमि सुरेश्वरार्यम् ॥

It is evident from this that it is granted by some Advaitins themselves, that the Vedânta sûtras of Vyâsa are not responsible for the whole philosophy of S'aṇkarâchârya: and one need not therefore be surprised when one sees them occasionally making a distinction between the *Sûtrakâra mata* and the *Bhâshyakâra mata*. The distinction between a *Vyâsa mata* and a *Vedânta mata* as

brought out in the Sarva-Siddhânta-Sangraha clearly confirms the position of Dr. Thibaut as to what kind of Vedânta it is, that is really represented by the Vedânt Sûtras.' Introduction to S. S. of Rangacharya pp. 16-17. From this it appears that so far as the sûtras of Bâdarâyaṇa are concerned, S'aṇkara's claim to be the faithful expositor is very weak.

The question as to whether Bâdarâyaṇa's or S'ankara's teachings stand nearer to the Upanishads, though to the orthodox appears at the first sight absurd, is rather very interesting. Gough, Deussen and Thibaut have declared in S'aṇkara's favour. Our subject forbids us from entering into this question, but certainly we cannot concede that the question is settled. The views of Gough and Deussen are not entitled to as much weight as that of Thibaut, since the former two do not seem to have looked to anything except S'aṇkara's interpretations, while th latter had the advantage of being familiar with a powerful critic of S'aṇkara viz., Râmânuja. Hence let us hear what he says on p. 124 of his Introduction to Vedânta Sûtras I. 'S'ankara's method (of higher and lower Brahman) thus enables him in a certain way to do justice to different stages of historical developments; to recognize clearly existing differences which other systematisers are intent on obliterating. And there has yet to be made a further and even more important admission in favour of his system. It is not only more pliable, more capable of amalgamating heterogeneous material than other systems; but its fundamental doctrines are manifestly in greater harmony with the essential teaching of the Upanishads than those of the other Vedantic systems. Above we were unable to allow that the distinction made by S'aṇkara between Br hman and Îs'vara is known to the Up nish ds, but

we must now admit that if, for the purpose of determining the ture of the highest being, a choice had to be made between those texts which represent Brahman as nirguṇ and those which ascribe to it personal attributes, S'aṇkar is right in giving preference to texts of the former kind. × × × The older Upanishads, at any rate, lay very little tress upon personal attributes of the highest being, and hence, S'aṇkara is right in so far as he assigns to his hypostatized personal Îs'vara a lower place than to his absolute Brahman. That he also faithfully represents the prevailing spirit of the Upanishads.' × × 'If so, the philosophy of S'aṇkara would on the whole stand nearer to the teaching of the Upanishads than the Sûtras of Bâdarâyaṇa.' p. 126. This may be or may not be, much can be said on [1]both sides, but there is one thing which needs be pointed out here, and it is this. For the purpose of determining the highest Being, Bâdarâyaṇa or any Vaidika Âchâry would not like to make choice between the two

1. Compare Jayagopâla's introduction to his तैत्तिरीयभाष्यः—तत्र तावदुपनिषदोनेकविधाः, काश्चन केवलपूर्णपुरुषोत्तमतत्प्राप्तिसाधनप्रतिपादिकाः, काश्चन केव - पुरुषोत्तमस्वरूपप्रतिपादिकाः, यथा गोपालतापिनीकृष्णोपनिषदादयः। ाश्चन पूर्णपुरुषोत्तमस्वरूपतत्प्राप्तियोग्यतासम्पादकाक्षरब्रह्मज्ञानविषयीभूताक्षरब्र स्वरूपस्य पुरुषोत्तमस्वरूपस्य पुरुषोत्तमेन सह सर्वकामभोगरूपफलस्य च प्रतिपादिकाः, यथा तैत्तिरियोपनिषन्मुण्डकोपनिषदादयः। काश्चन केवलविभूतितत्प्राप्तिसाधनप्रतिपादिकाः, यथा वासुदेवोपनिषन्नारायणोपनिषदादयः। काश्चन व ाक्षरब्रह्मतत्प्राप्तिसाधनप्रतिपादिकाः, यथा बृहदारण्यक ान्दोग्योपनिषदादयः। काश्चन मुक्तिसाधनीभूतभक्तिज्ञानाङ्गसंन्यासवैराग्ययोगसांख्यादिप्रतिपादिकाः, यथा संन्यासोपनिषदारुणेयोपनिषत्कण्ठश्रुत्युपनिषद्भर्भोपनिषदद्वैताख्योपनिषद ातशान्त्युपनिषदमृतबिन्दूपनिषत्तेजोबिन्दूपनिषद्योगशिखोपनिषद्योगतत्त्वोपनिषदादयः। काश्चन भक्तिज्ञानसाधनश्रवणादितत्साधनशरीरादीनामाधिभौतिकाध्यात्मिकाधिदैविकाद्युपद्रवनिवारकसाधनप्रतिपादिकाः, यथा गरुडोपनिषदादयः। *Vide* also Sir R. Bhandarkar's re ark:—The opinion expressed by some eminent scholars that the burden of the Upanishad teaching is the illusive character of the world and the reality of the one soul only, is anifestly wrong, and I may even say, is indicative of an uncritical judg ent. As stated in the text, the Upanishads, from the very nature of the co pilations, cannot but be expected to teach not one, but any syste s of doctrine. Vaishṇavis . p. 2. note 2.

sorts of Vedic passages, but he would refer them both to Brahm n, or, in the words of Vallabha, the Sûtrakâr ' position would be this:—'तथा चास्थूलादिगुणयुक्त एवाविद्रि यमाण एवात्मानं करोतीति वेदान्तार्थः संगतो भवति, विरुद्धसर्वधर्माश्रयत्वं ब्रह्मणो भूषणाय A. B. p. 121. If Bâdarâyaṇa were to accept a position like this, his Brahman would be capable of am lgamating more heterogeneous material than S'aṇkar 's higher and lower Brahman put together. Preference and giving prominence to one sort of Vedic passages results in rejection and ignoring of others, and to believers in the infallible wisdom and eternity of the Vedas, such a one-sided preference would be fatal to his claim to be called a Vaidika. The duty of the Vaidika is to interpret the sense of Ved and not to subordinate one to the other. 'आम्नातस्यार्थं प्रतिपत्तुं भवामो नाम्नातं पर्यनुयोक्तुम् ।' 1. 4. 3. p. 150. S. B. (text. N.S.P). 'नहि वेदवाक्यानां कस्यचिदर्थवत्त्वं कस्यचिदनर्थवत्त्वमिति युक्तं प्रतिपत्तुं, माणत्वाविशेषात्' । 3-2-15 p.p. 357. S. B. text. Thus according to S'aṇkar lso, the authoritativeness of Saguṇa and Nirguṇ Vedic passages is equal, and so far as the learned Sûtrakâra accepts both sorts of श्रुतिs nd refers them both to his highest Being, Brahman, his interpretation must with justice be preferred to that of either S'aṇkara who gives prominence to Nirguṇa श्रुतिs; or Râmânuja, Madhv , nd others, who put forth only Saguṇa श्रुतिs. In this respect Bâdarâyaṇa is followed by Vallabha alone. Hence, except in reference to Vall bh , Dr. Thibaut would not be quit wro g in saying that S'aṇkara by accepting two Brahm n viz., Saguṇa and Nirguṇa gives some scope to ll the श्रुतिs, while other systematisers like Râmânuj and Madhv do c st into the background the Nirguṇa तिs; but Dr. Thibaut's claim that S'aṇkara's system would stand nearer to the Upanishads than that of Bâdarâyaṇa cannot be accepted as unchallenged, since Bâdarâyaṇa's mode of interpretation and harmonising the conflicting Vedic pass ges

is better th n that of S'aṇkara, since Bâdarâyaṇa S'aṇkara bears in mind the माणाविशेषत्व of differer passages as shown above, and does not prefer th the other, but accepts them all as carrying equal a and deserving equal prominence.

Thus disagreeing with Thibaut in accepti S'aṇkara is a better exponent of the Upanisha Bâdarâyaṇa, we must admit that S'aṇkara's s might have had its representatives in Bâdari, Kâs nd to a certain extent in Audulomi. If the personality of Bâdarâyaṇa, with his irresist hitherto unquestioned authority were to be from the field, then a chain of tradition of S system can be maintained from Bâdari to Ga Govinda and S'aṇkara, and with this res Gough's position would not be wrong. It ma pointed out by Bhâskara[1], that S'aṇkara's sys independent of the sûtras, and that by the forc powerful genius he attempted to superimpos his on the sûtras of Bâdarâyaṇa. No other comm has tried to correct or modify the sûtras of Bâd while S'aṇkara's commentator[2] actually lays do rule that where सूत्रs conflict with the Veda, the be misinterpreted. This is possible only if S derstood that there was a difference in the in tion of the Upanishads between Bâdarâyaṇa and the

The spirit of S'aṇkara's system is certainly pes His imagining the existence of [3]दुःख in the आनन्द declaring that [4]activity is दुःखरूप, and a preference

1. सूत्राभिप्रायसंवृत्या स्वाभिप्रायप्रकाशनात्।
व्याख्यातं यैरिदं शास्त्रं व्याख्येयं तन्निवृत्तये। भा. भा. P. 1.

2. वेदसूत्रयोर्विरोधे 'गुणे त्वन्यायकल्पने'ति सूत्राण्यन्यथा नेतव्यानि। भाम S. 1–1–19. P. P. 128. 129.

3. अपि च आनन्दप्रचुर इत्युक्ते दुःखास्तित्वमपि गम्यते etc., 1-1-19.

4. 'कर्तृत्वस्य दुःखरूपत्वात्।' 2-3-40. S. B. p. 292.

egativ श्रुतिs, tend to the same conclusio . His rejection of आनन्दमय's Brahmanhood, and imagining the existenc of misery in it have been the subject of an almost bitter remark[1] of Vallabha's commentator. From the way i which he defines his conception of Brahman, by negativing everything of it except its existence, and declaring Brahman to be अविषय, he makes it difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish his system from Buddhism, and it appear that his system has evolved in a transition period when the Buddhistic doctrine of Void was being driven out of the field.

" धात्रा स्वेन सदा निरस्तकुहकं सत्यं परं धीमहि ।"

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1. अत एवं सत्यपि यत् तदविचारेणानन्दमये दुःखास्तित्वकथनं तद् ग्रन्थकृतो महादुःखसंस्कारस्य प्राबल्यमेव गमयतीति दिक् । अ. भा. प्रकाश. B. S. S. pp. 198. 199.

तेन यत्तैः प्रश्नोपनिषद्वाक्यात् परापरे द्वे ब्रह्मणी अङ्गीकृत्य, यदविद्याकृतनामरूपादिविशेषप्रतिषेधेनास्थूलादिशब्दैर्ब्रह्मोपदिश्यते तत् परम्, यत्पुनर्नामरूपविशेषाणां केनचिद्विशिष्टमुपासनयोपदिश्यते 'मनोमयः प्राणशरीर' इत्यादिशब्दैस्तदपरमिति प्रतिपादितम्। तत्र किं मानम्? न तावदस्थूलादिवाक्यम्, मनोमयवाक्यं च। तत्र परापरशब्दयोरश्रवणात्। आद्ये अक्षरशब्देनैव लक्ष्यनिर्देशात्। यदि च मुण्डके 'अथ परा यया तदक्षरमधिगम्यत' इत्यक्षरविद्यायां परत्वश्रावणात् तद्वेद्यस्याक्षरस्य परत्वमिष्यते। बाढम्। तदा पुरुषस्य ततोऽपि परत्वमेव द्रष्टव्यम्। 'दिव्यो ह्यमूर्तः पुरुषः स बाह्याभ्यन्तरो ह्यजः, अप्राणो ह्यमनाः शुभ्रो ह्यक्षरात्परतः पर' इति तत्रैव श्रावणात्। न च तस्य यावद्विशेषशून्यत्वम्। तदग्रे 'एतस्माज्जायत प्राण' इति मन्त्रेण तत एव सृष्टेः श्रावणात्। 'अग्निर्मूर्धे'त्यादिभिस्तद्रूपोपन्यासाच्च। नाप्यक्षरस्य तथात्वम्। अस्थूलादिश्रावणोत्तरं प्रशासनस्य वेद्यत्वद्रष्टृत्वादीनां आकाशोपादानत्वस्य च श्रावणेन, मुण्डकेपि 'यत्तदद्दश्य'मित्याद्युक्त्वा 'यद्भूतयोनिं परिपश्यन्ती'त्यादिजगदुपादनत्वसर्वज्ञत्वादीनां श्रावणेन यावद्विशेषशून्यताया वक्तुमशक्यत्वात्। अत एव वाक्यान्तरेष्वपि द्र व्यम्। सर्वत्र एकस्यैव ब्रह्मणः प्रतिपाद्यत्वात्। अत एव श्वेताश्वतरेपि 'प्रधानक्षेत्रज्ञपतिर्गुणेशः', 'यो ब्रह्माणं विदधाति पूर्व'मित्यादीन् नानाधर्मबोधकानेव मन्त्रानुक्त्वा 'निष्कलं निष्क्रिय' मित्युक्तम्। 'स वा एष महानज आत्मे'त्यत्रापि शारीरब्राह्मणे, 'अन्नादो वसुदान इति सर्वस्य वशी सर्वस्येशान' इत्यादयो धर्मा उक्ताः। 'स वा एष नेति नेती'त्युक्त्वा, 'अगृह्यो न हि गृह्यते, अशीर्यो न हि शीर्यते, असङ्गोऽसितो न स ते न व्यथत इत्ये'वं निषेधो विवृतो, न तु यावद्धर्मपरत्वेनेति द्र व्यम्। अतो यत्रोत्कर्षस्य विश्रान्तिः, अक्षराद्वा यदुत्कृ तदेव परमिति मन्तव्यम्। उक्तमुण्डकश्रुतेः। 'अव्यक्तात् पुरुषः परः पुरुषान्न परं किञ्चित् सा काष्ठा सा परा गति' रिति काठकश्रुतेः। 'अम्भस्यपार' इत्युपक्रम्य, 'अतः परं नान्यदणीयसं हि परात् परं यन्महतो महान्त'मिति तैत्तिरीयश्रुतेश्च। पुरुषस्य च विरुद्धधर्माश्रयत्वमेताभ्येव प्रतिपादितम्। एतदेव परत्वम्। गीतासु च 'अव्यक्तोऽक्षर इत्युक्तस्तमाहुः परमां गतिम्, यं प्राप्य न निवर्तन्ते तद्धाम परमं मम। पुरुषः स परः पार्थ भक्त्या लभ्यस्त्वनन्यये'ति। 'द्वाविमौ पुरुषौ लोके क्षरश्चाक्षर एव च, क्षरः सर्वाणि भूतानि कूटस्थोऽक्षर उच्यते। उत्तमः पुरुषस्त्वन्यः परमात्मेत्युदाहृतः, यो लोकत्रयमाविश्य बिभर्त्यव्यय ईश्वरः। यस्मात् क्षरमतीतोहमक्षरादपि चोत्तमः, अतोस्मि लोके वेदे च प्रथितः पुरुषोत्तम' इति तदुपबृंहणात्। अत एव, 'न तत्समश्चाभ्यधिकश्च दृश्यते' इत्यादिषु तस्य समाभ्यधिकनिषेधोऽपि युज्यते। न च पुरुषोत्तमाक्षरयोः परापरभावाङ्गीकारे अद्वैतश्रुतिविरोधः। गणितागणितानन्दत्वधर्मभेदेपि वस्त्वभेदेन द्वैताभावे तदभावात्। अमित्रादिवदद्वैतवि-

रुद्धसम्पद्रूपत्वेनाभेदस्य तादात्म्यात्मकत्वात्। अथवा, शब्दब्रह्मवेद्यं परम्, शब्द ह्यै-वापरम्। षष्ठस्कन्धे चित्रकेतुं प्रति 'शब्दब्रह्म परं ब्रह्म ममोभे शाश्वती तनू' इति भगवद्वाक्यस्य 'द्वे ब्रह्मणी वेदितव्ये शब्दब्रह्म परं च यत्। शब्दब्रह्मणि निष्णातः परं ब्रह्माधिगच्छ ती'त्यादि वाक्यस्य च स्वारस्यात्। 'एतद्वै सत्यकाम परं च ब्रह्मे'ति वाक्य-विचारेऽप्योङ्कारस्य, 'एतद्वै यजुस्त्रयीं विद्यां प्रती'ति श्रुतेः सर्ववेदमूलत्वेन वाच्याभि-न्नत्वेन चोभयरूपत्वं प्रति.ाय तदभिध्यानफलकथने एकद्वित्रिमात्राध्यानेनर्ग्यजुःसाम-भिर्मनुष्यलोकसोमलोकसूर्यलोकेषु यथायथं महिमानुभवं फलमुक्त्वार्धचतुर्थमात्रेणोङ्का-रेण ध्याने, अथर्वभिर्ब्रह्मलोकप्राप्तिं चोक्त्वा, 'स एतस्माज्जीवघनात् परात् परं पुरि-शयं पुरुषमीक्षत' इति फलमुक्तम्। शङ्कराचार्यमतेत्र त्रिमात्र एवोङ्कारोङ्गीकृतः। स पाठो यद्यपीदानींतनेभ्यः पुस्तकेभ्यः पाठिभिः पठ्यमानात् पाठाच्च विरुध्यते, तथापि त्रिमात्रध्यानेपि 'ॐमित्येतेनैवाक्षरेण परं पुरुषमभिध्यायीत स तेजसि परे सम्पन्नो यथा पादोदरस्त्वचा विनिर्मुच्यत एवं ह वै स पाप्मना विनिर्मुक्त' इत्येतावतो ग्रन्थस्य 'स एतस्माज्जीवघनात् परात् परं पुरिशयं पुरुषमीक्षत' इति ग्रन्थस्याग्रिमश्लोकद्वयस्य च वर्तमानत्वेन शब्दब्रह्म अपरं मृत्युमन्मात्राप्रतिपाद्यं वापरं जीवघनरूपो यो हिरण्यगर्भः क्षरः पुरुषस्तस्मात् परमक्षरं ब्रह्म। परं ततोपि यः परः पुरिशयोन्तर्यामी उक्तः, श्लो-केपि 'तमो ारेणैवायनेनान्वेति विद्वान् यत्तच्चान्तमजरममृतमभयं परं परायणं चे' त्युक्तः स एव पर इति सिध्यति। तथा चात्र परायणं चेति चकारादक्षरात् परः पुरुषोपि परं परायणं यस्येति योगादक्षरधामवासी बोधितः। तेन मुण्डकवदेवात्राप्यर्थः। अपरं तु ब्रह्म वेदात्मकम्, हिरण्यगर्भस्य शब्दब्रह्मात्मकत्वात्। ××× मुण्डके 'यथोर्ण-नाभिः सृजते गृह्णते चे'त्यादिना अक्षरात् सृष्टिमुपक्रम्य 'तस्मादेतद् ब्र नामरूपमन्नं च जायते तदेतत्सत्य'मिति निगमनात्। 'तदेतद् ऋषिः पश्यन् वामदेवः प्रतिपेद' इत्यादिश्रुत्युक्ताऽबाधितब्रह्मवित्प्रत्यक्षविषयत्वात्। व्यावहारिको नामरूपप्रपञ्चः, स्वो-त्कृ सत्ताकतत्प्रपञ्चपूर्वकः, मायिकप्रपञ्चत्वादिन्द्रजालिकादिप्रपञ्चवदित्यत्र साध्यविशे-षणत्वेनानुमितिविषयत्वा। अतो नामरूपादीनामपि न सर्वेषामाविद्यकत्वमिति सि-ध्यति। एवं सति 'मनोमयः प्राणशरीरो भारूपः', 'अयमात्मापहतपाप्मा विजरो विमृत्युर्विशोको विजिघत्सोऽपिपासः सत्यकामः सत्यस ल्प' इत्यादिषु शाण्डिल्यदहर-भूमविद्याप्रभृतिवाक्येष्वपहतपाप्मसत्यकामादिशब्दैस्तत्तद्विशेषणविशि यदुपासनायोप-दिश्यते, तस्याविद्या तनामरूपविशेषविशि त्वं कुतोऽवधारितं येन तस्यापरब्रह्मत्वमु-च्यते। न तावदुपासनाविषयत्वात्। उपासनाविषये तथात्वनियमस्य क्वाप्यसिद्धत्वेन माणशून्यत्वात्। न च 'यन्मनसा न मनुते येनाहुर्मनो मतं तदेव ब्रह्म त्वं विद्धि नेदं यदिदमुपासते' इत्यादितलवकारश्रुतेरिति युक्तम्। तत्र तथार्थाभावात्। नेदमित्यनेन मनोवागादिनिषेधोत्तरं 'इदं ब्रह्म विद्धि यदुपासते' इत्यर्थात्। अन्यथा, द्वितीयेद-ङ्कार योगवैयर्थ्यप्रसङ्गादित्येवं प्रागेवोपपादितत्वात्। 'तदेव ब्रह्म त्वं विद्धि' ति वि-